Levels of Education and Support for Direct Democracy

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What is This?
Levels of Education and Support for Direct Democracy

Loren Collingwood1

Abstract
Conventional wisdom based on public opinion surveys suggests that voters are generally supportive of direct democracy. Recent research has shown that perhaps public support for direct democracy may not be as strong as is traditionally thought. Given this, I hypothesize that voters without a college degree are less supportive of direct democracy once asked how they will vote on a series of ballot initiative questions in the context of a survey. Voters with a college degree will not be affected by these questions in their evaluations of direct democracy because they have more confidence in their ability to participate in politics. I conduct a split sample survey experiment to investigate opinions toward direct democracy. The results confirm that, when exposed to ballot initiative questions, voters without a college degree are less supportive of direct democracy compared to college graduates. Implications are discussed.

Keywords
direct democracy, ballot initiatives, education, voting behavior, survey methodology

Direct democracy is the broad process whereby voters play a more direct, and by implication, decisive, role in public policy formation and governance.

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Between the years 1898 and 1992, more than 1,700 ballot initiatives, referenda, and constitutional amendments were presented before American voters in 24 states, with a passage rate of 38% (Bowler, Donovan, & Tolbert 1998; Magleby, 1984). Despite this relatively low passage rate, public opinion remains favorably disposed to the ballot initiative process (Waters, 2003). In a comprehensive review of initiatives in different states, Waters (2003) finds that in initiative states between 60% and 75% of voters are consistently supportive of direct democracy. At the same time, more than 6 in 10 voters agree with the statement, “People don’t have enough time or knowledge to make political decisions.” Buttressing this apparent ambivalence, examining a Field Poll, Cronin (1978) finds that 78% of voters surveyed agree that many issues are too complex to be decided by voters; yet 66% of voters agree that citizens should be allowed to vote on policies and issues as opposed to their representatives voting for them. In short, support for direct democracy—measured via the sample survey—remains high given evidence that should militate against such high support.

This article aims to disentangle why voter support for the ballot initiative process appears so strong in the face of overall low passage rates and voters’ ostensible lack of faith in their own ability to make political decisions. I seek to understand what constrains voter attitudes regarding direct democracy. This topic is important because ballot initiatives and referenda have become very influential in the generation of public laws in many jurisdictions throughout the United States (Matsusaka, 2005).

To do so, I review relevant literature on voter constraint and direct democracy, education and voting, and survey methodology. I contend that attitudes toward direct democracy are not as strong as conventional wisdom and public opinion polls suggest because voters purport generally positive reactions to participatory democracy. In other words, public opinion polls overstate true voter support for the ballot initiative process. If this is the case, who are direct democracy’s most ardent proponents, what affects their support, and how can we measure true support for direct democracy? I predict and show that the stability of a voter’s attitude toward direct democracy is structured primarily by the presence or absence of a college education, which has heretofore not been consistently shown. Relative to less educated voters, the well educated have more constrained attitudes (Converse, 1964; Sniderman, Brady, & Tetlock, 1991; Zaller, 1992) and are likely less prone to initiative voter fatigue (Nicholson, 2003). Ultimately, I argue, this leads to greater confidence in not only one’s reasoning ability but also one’s confidence in their ability to participate in politics. This confidence is decisively important when deciding
how to vote on many ballot initiatives and referenda. To support my claims, I present empirical evidence from a 2007 survey experiment placed in a statewide poll of registered voters in Washington State.

**Voter Constraint and Direct Democracy**

How is opinion toward direct democracy actually structured? Researchers have explored this question with somewhat mixed results. In general, two broad theories—the cognitive mobilization and disaffection hypotheses—have been posited to explain attitudes toward direct democracy (Donovan & Karp, 2006). Regarding the former, support for direct democracy is argued to be highest among people most interested in political affairs, enthusiastic about participating in politics, and who have relatively high cognitive ability and education. The latter posits that support for direct democracy is tied to dissatisfaction with government. Therefore, people who are least interested and informed about politics as well as those with extreme ideologies should be the most supportive of direct democracy (Dalton et al., 2001).

Craig and colleagues (2001) explore both of these theories by examining several variables such as education, internal efficacy, political knowledge, and interest in politics. Their results show almost no correlation between approval for direct democracy and their variables of interest. They conclude, “The movement toward more citizen legislation appears to be a ‘movement’ without a reliable and committed mass base” (p. 37). Their findings suggest that voters may support direct democracy on a general level, but the depth of this support may be relatively shallow. Or, as Citrin (1996) claims, support for direct democracy may be the expression of a “ritualistic commitment to the principle of popular consent while at the same time permitting respondents to express contempt for the professional politician” (p. 273).

Dalton and Colleagues (2001) argue that direct democracy’s greatest supporters, at least in Germany, are citizens at the fringes of politics—those least involved and members of extreme parties. Similarly, Gilljam and Colleagues (1998) find that those citizens less trustful of government are most supportive of direct democracy. Neither Dalton et al. (2001), Gilljam et al. (1998), or Craig et al. (2001) find support for the cognitive mobilization process. However, in a six-nation study, Donovan and Karp (2006) find mixed results for both hypotheses. Notably, regarding cognitive mobilization, political interest and voter motivation were associated with greater approval of the referendum process in New Zealand and Switzerland, but having a university degree had no effect or a negative effect in all six countries, counter to what
we would expect from the cognitive mobilization hypothesis. This finding corroborates Magleby (1984), who finds little distinction by education: “more than three-quarters of voters in all categories of party, ideology, occupation, race, and education felt that having propositions on the ballot was good” (p. 9).

Examining a set of surveys, Cronin (1988) draws similar conclusions as Craig and colleagues (2001), demonstrating that voters hold generically pro-supportive attitudes that are constrained by their fear of the possible abuses of too direct involvement. However, in *Direct Democracy: The Politics of Initiative, Referendum, and Recall*, Cronin (1989) does find that referendum voters are more educated, have higher income, and are more aware of public affairs.

In *Stealth Democracy*, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) wrestle with voter ambivalence and democracy and suggest that this ambivalence may weigh on attitudes toward direct democracy. Basing their evidence on focus group and survey findings, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse conclude that voters’ desire for a “balance of influence between elected officials and ordinary people with neither dominating the other” (p. 81)—what they call stealth democracy. Although they do not directly test whether educational status influences attitudinal structures of direct democracy, they find that levels of education are unrelated to support for stealth democracy.

Dyck and Baldassare (2009) and Hagen and Lascher (2005) use public opinion data to examine voters’ underlying support for direct democracy. Using a variety of survey questions, these scholars find that citizens exhibit variation on attitudes toward direct democracy. Importantly, “the public is far more supportive of direct democracy when asked about the institution in the abstract, rather than on specifics” (Dyck & Baldassare, 2009, p. 554). In addition, Dyck and Baldassare (2009) find that the likelihood of voting “no” on a measure is associated with holding questioning views of the institution itself. However, these scholars do not look at education, nor do they treat direct democracy as their dependent variable, but rather as their independent variable.

On balance, these findings suggest two things. First, findings are mixed concerning explanations of mass public support for direct democracy. Second, voters appear to contain rather ambivalent attitudes toward the ballot initiative and referendum process. These findings are surprising given evidence on the relationship between education and democratic citizenship. That is, it seems reasonable to suspect education may covary with support for direct democracy.
Education and Voting

It has long been known that education guides many voting decisions and myriad aspects of democratic citizenship (Campbell et al., 1960; Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Nie, Junn, & Stehlik- Barry, 1996; Sniderman et al., 1991; Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980). It is thought that, according to Luskin (1990), “classes, informal discussions, and readings expose many students to large quantities of political information . . . the lengthier the schooling, the greater, on average, the exposure” (p. 335). Education, it appears, prepares citizens to make better and more informed voting decisions.

Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) argue that the benefits of education are threefold. Education increases cognitive skills, thereby allowing a person to more successfully navigate abstract concepts such as politics and ballot initiatives. Second, education increases citizen duty and moral pressure to participate in politics. Third, schooling acquaints people with bureaucratic processes such as filling out forms, meeting deadlines, and so forth. Nie and colleagues’ (1996) Absolute Education Model (AEM) argues that education’s impact on democratic citizenship is driven by the two broad forces of network centrality and cognitive proficiency. That is, educated voters are placed into networks that encourage them to participate in democracy—and—they have the cognitive ability to do so. Sniderman and colleagues (1991) find that vote decisions are structured differently for the well educated and the not so well educated. Specifically, well-educated voters are more likely to compare candidates when voting, whereas poorly educated voters base their vote decision more on feelings of the incumbent, arguably a less cognitively challenging task. Finally, while Nicholson (2003) does not directly test for education, he finds that voter awareness and knowledge of individual ballot initiatives decreases with increases in the total number of initiatives on the ballot (voter fatigue). Given what we know about education and voting, it stands to reason that less educated voters may experience higher rates of voter fatigue and may therefore express lower levels of support for direct democracy.

Research has also focused on how political knowledge or sophistication mediates relationships between a host of variables and political outcomes (Delli, Carpini, & Keeter, 1996; Luskin, 1990; Zaller, 1992). To be sure, political knowledge and education are highly correlated; in fact, researchers often substitute education as a proxy for political knowledge (Zaller, 1992). In the present context, voters with high levels of political knowledge are likely to have more confidence with respect to voting on ballot initiatives (and the converse for voters with low political knowledge). Therefore political
knowledge may theoretically constrain attitudes toward direct democracy. Nonetheless, my focus is on education because I am interested in how the skills and behavior gained from formal education (i.e., taking tests, familiarity with paper work, creating a sense of duty, etc.)—specifically a college education—affect how voters think about direct democracy as an institution. The point is that education tends to generate pro-democracy attitudes, so it may also constrain how voters think about the more specific issue of direct democracy.3

Given the above discussion about education and voting, and the cognitive abilities clearly required of direct democracy, the previously cited findings concerning the nexus between education and direct democracy seem puzzling. Instead of simply correlating education with support for direct democracy, we must take issues of attitude stability and measurement into account when analyzing the relationship between these two variables. I incorporate research in survey methodology to help explain these previous findings on education and direct democracy. I conclude that a survey experiment is required to tease out the effect of education on attitudes toward direct democracy.

**Research on Survey Method**

A plethora of work has explored attitude instability in the survey research literature. Relevant to the current investigation, these topics include attitude crystallization, attitude strength, and acquiescence bias. As I lay out in the methods section, survey experiments involving priming allow researchers to tease out the degree to which these aforementioned effects shape survey response (Sniderman & Piazza, 1993). Thus the true structure of opinion is more acutely estimated.

Tourangeau and colleagues (2000) and Fischhoff (1991), argue that a strength-of-attitude continuum exists moving from no opinion on an issue to a well-articulated position on an issue. Between these endpoints, respondents may have a loosely articulated attitude structure guiding their opinion. Schuman and Presser (1996) find that the crystallization and reliability of attitudes are greater for respondents who “quite strongly” agree with an opinion as opposed to respondents who “not so strongly” agree. If different groups of people (i.e., college educated vs. high school educated) differ in their levels of attitude strength, attitude consistency may vary by group. In other words, in the face of “new” information, one group may be more amenable to attitude change.
This acquiescence bias is simply the tendency for respondents to agree rather than disagree to survey questions (Tourangeau, et al., 2000). One reason that support for the ballot initiative process may be so high is the tendency for all respondents to engage in acquiescence bias. Nevertheless, it is unclear as to the extent that acquiescence bias plays a role in the survey response. On one hand, Campbell and colleagues (1967) claim that acquiescence may play a role in survey response, but contributes less to response variation than item content (i.e., wording changes). On the other hand, Schuman and Presser’s (1996) research reveals that there is “strong evidence for acquiescence” (p. 213) in data they analyze. These researchers also find that respondents lower in education disproportionately engage in the acquiescence bias. Presumably, these respondents have less constrained attitude structures and are thus less likely to produce a counter argument indicating why they should disagree with the posed question. This speaks to the broad notion that lower educated respondents are more affected by measurement issues than higher educated respondents.

To fully account for how education may covary with attitudes about direct democracy, a research design should account for attitude instability. I account for attitude instability by using a survey experiment designed to detect not only true sentiment towards direct democracy, but also what structures attitudes toward direct democracy.

**Theoretical Framework**

While attitudes toward direct democracy in the abstract are generally one-sided and favorable, I argue that for some voters—those who have not gone through the college process—attitudes are not as stable as they appear because these voters have less developed attitude structures (i.e., available considerations and heuristics). Questions concerning direct democracy, I argue, engage two dimensions. The more abstract questions, such as “Do you think that statewide initiative elections are a good thing for the state, a bad thing for the state, or that they don’t make much difference?” tap generic prodemocracy notions, whereas questions about specific initiatives result in thinking along the dimension of information needed to make particular decisions.

Attitudes toward this second dimension of direct democracy are different for college- and non-college-educated voters because considerations comprising their reported attitudes are different. Voters draw not only on elite messages (which are mostly one sided) but also on their beliefs in their ability
to participate in the political process. While college- and non-college-educated voters may not show attitudinal cleavage on abstract direct democracy questions—when faced with deciding how to vote on a series of initiatives in the context of a survey, less educated voters should experience a greater threat to their ability to participate in politics as well as undergo higher levels of ballot fatigue. With these new challenges, I expect less educated voters to rate direct democracy lower than college-educated voters.

I expect the process to generally work in the following way. First, initial responses to abstract direct democracy poll questions reflect antagonisms toward authority. The notion of bucking entrenched power, politics as usual, and special interest groups that are concerned with attaining influence for their own ends not the ends of the public, fits with the American ethos of individualism (Elder & Cobb, 1983; Shain, 1994) and populism (Goodwyn, 1976; Smith, 1998). These sentiments have been popularized by tax crusaders, such as Howard Jarvis and Tim Eyman. Voters reject entrenched power and report the opinion that direct democracy is warranted.

Second, this expressed attitude lacks depth and anchoring for at least some voters—those without a college degree. In contravention, voters with a college education have gone through the arduous process of taking exams for 4 or more years and the stresses that accompany that. Since they graduated it can be assumed that they were at least somewhat successful at this process. Accordingly, the process required to think through and weigh the merits of an initiative—which could be argued shares many similarities to an exam—may be less daunting to these voters than it is for voters who have not been socialized in higher education.

The next section formalizes these claims, followed by an empirical examination using a survey experiment designed to mimic real-life experiences confronting voters in their interactions with direct democracy.

**Formal Hypotheses**

The theoretical framework advanced leads to two claims that can be empirically tested via survey research. First, do stimuli related to the types of decisions required in direct democracy affect support for that institution? Second, attitude stability and hence voter support for direct democracy is structured by education. To test these propositions, I use a split sample survey experiment where I expose a treatment group of voters to questions about specific upcoming initiatives before they are queried about their feelings toward direct democracy. The control group is simply asked about their support for
direct democracy. Within the confines of this experiment, the hypotheses are as follows:

**Hypothesis 1:** Voters without a college degree will reduce support for direct democracy after they are asked to vote on numerous initiatives that will be on their November ballot, as compared to voters without a college degree who are not asked to vote on the initiatives. **Hypothesis 2:** College-educated voters will witness no change in support for direct democracy whether they first vote on the initiatives or not.

**The Data and Method**

In this section, I outline the data and methods employed to determine attitude strength and structure regarding direct democracy. Because my method involves a survey experiment, I include throughout relevant discussion of how the literature on priming inform respondent attitudes. Finally, I discuss the variables used to determine the contours of attitude structure and change regarding direct democracy.

To assess these public opinion dynamics, I rely on a preelection survey of registered voters conducted in October, 2007, in Washington State. At the statewide level, odd year elections in Washington State are exclusively ballot initiative and referenda contests; therefore initiative campaigns do not compete with other statewide contests such as Governor and Senate. Political advertisements and media discussions are thus focused heavily on the various statewide initiatives on the ballot. Compared to even year elections, then, voters are exposed predominantly to direct democracy. This is important because it allows for a relatively unmolested test of how voter attitudes are structured concerning direct democracy. Exogenous influences and spillover effects from other campaigns are not an issue concerning these data.

The sample was drawn proportionate to population by county from the Washington State voter file using a systematic random sampling design. The total sample size of the data set is 601 registered voter respondents. The data were collected via telephone using a public opinion data collection firm, Pacific Market Research, located in Renton, Washington.

The data set includes a host of survey questions involving voting behavior, political attitudes, issue attitudes, civic participation, and demographic questions. Below, the survey experiment is presented, but first I discuss how “direct democracy”—the dependent variable—is operationalized.
Dependent Variable

A variety of questions have been employed to measure attitudes toward direct democracy. In a six-nation study, using four different questions, Donovan and Karp (2006) report that “each question does capture a sense of whether a person supports the practice of using referendums . . . we find substantial support for the occasional or frequent use of direct democracy in each nation” (p. 677). I use one of the questions from one of their polls, a question that is also used by the Field Poll in California. The question below is my dependent variable.

Overall, do you think that statewide initiative elections are a good thing for the state, a bad thing for the state, or that they don’t make much difference?

The Experiment

The experiment embedded in the survey is designed to mimic real and plausible scenarios a voter will face when presented with a series of ballot initiatives. Accordingly, the goal of this experiment is to measure direct democracy attitude stability as well as to determine what variable(s) moderates stability. As such, I use a random assignment design that includes a control group \((n = 301)\) and a treatment group \((n = 300)\) to test whether opinion differences regarding direct democracy emerge across conditions. Due to randomization, any difference can be attributed to the treatment presented in the questionnaire.9

Respondents in the control group are asked their opinion concerning the ballot initiative process, followed by a series of ballot initiative vote questions conferred as the treatment in the other group. Thus respondent opinion in this control condition should be an unadulterated measure of generic voter attitude toward direct democracy.

Respondents in the treatment group essentially receive the question blocks in reverse order. They first receive a series of questions inquiring how they will vote on a set of ballot initiatives, referenda, and constitutional amendments. While these questions are part of the standard preelection questionnaire, they nevertheless mirror the process that many voters may experience when they step into the ballot box or open their ballot in the mail—sifting through, at times, fairly complex ballot language to determine whether to vote yes or no or to approve or reject. In the control condition voters are asked only their opinion about direct democracy; however, in the treatment condition, voters must first think about each of the various direct democracy
measures they will vote on, perhaps realizing that the measures are not so straightforward. In addition to these vote questions, respondents were also questioned whether they thought the election auditor in their county should be elected or appointed. To attempt to make the treatment more representative of actual voter decision making, two final questions asked respondents whether they were confused by two of the initiatives tested in the survey. These questions are as follows:

In talking to people about the election we find that due to ballot language or contradictory campaign advertisements a lot of people find ballot propositions confusing. How about you, do you find statewide ballot initiative [960/4,204], the one which we just talked about, confusing?

While voters do not necessarily think of “confusion” per se when weighing how to vote, voters often report having political discussions of all aspects of politics (Jacobs et al., 2009, Delli Carpini, Cook, & Jacobs, 2004, Nisbet & Scheufele, 2004). Because many ballot initiatives are seen as complex (Magleby, 1984), it stands to reason that many voters discuss ballot initiatives because at least some voters are confused over ballot language. Moreover, research indicates that at times, voters are so confused about initiatives that they vote incorrectly (Gastil & Crosby, 2006; Reedy & Wells, 2009). Thus, inserting questions about ballot confusion may make the treatment more realistic to the median voter.

Overall, this series of questions is operationalized as the treatment. Following these questions, treatment group respondents were then asked their opinion of direct democracy (the dependent variable). Thus, in full, the respondents in the treatment group are asked to evaluate four ballot initiatives, think about whether they will vote yes or no, and then asked twice if they felt a specific initiative was complex. This treatment is meant to closely mimic the real world that nearly all voters face in direct democracy states.

The treatment thus reflects a lower ordered prime—voters are not shocked with new information per se, but I still expect to see differences on opinion toward direct democracy based on the subtle exposure differences across groups. Indeed, Higgins and King (1981) find that priming—the theory that recently activated constructs are more accessible to the subject—increases the likelihood that a subject will use the primed information to inform subsequent evaluations of a construct. Dell and colleagues (1981) find that subjects respond quickly and accurately to questions with words they are recently primed with. In other words, primed individuals are more likely than nonprimed individuals to use the information they are primed with to evaluate subsequent objects.
Independent Variables

The primary independent variable under examination is education, as it is hypothesized that the presence of a college degree moderates any change in that respondent’s attitude toward direct democracy. Research shows that college-educated respondents are discrete in their attitudes and cognitive ability relative to respondents who have not attained a college degree (Nie et al., 1996; Sniderman et al., 1991; Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980), therefore, I expect heterogeneity of opinion between these two groups. Accordingly, respondents who are college educated are coded as 1, voters without a college degree are coded as 0.

Age, whether respondents read a newspaper, and news consumption are secondary variables hypothesized to affect attitudes toward the ballot initiative process. In general, higher scores on these measures are expected to associate with greater support for direct democracy. The survey includes a question that asks what year respondents are born, a question that asks voters if they read a newspaper, and two questions regarding respondents’ level of exposure to local and national news programs. I also include a host of standard demographic, attitudinal, and behavioral variables shown to affect respondent opinion. These include, party, gender, income, union membership, Internet usage, and trust in government.

The Model and Results

As mentioned, the dependent variable is a question regarding voter support for direct democracy, coded so that high values represent support for direct democracy. In the survey, because this question is split sampled—half the respondents are asked the question before the treatment and half are asked the question after treatment—the data from the two questions are combined for modeling purposes. Here, respondents in the control group are coded as 0, and respondents in the treatment group are coded as 1.

As shown in Table 2, overall, 72% of respondents support the ballot initiative process, 8% think it is a bad thing, 16% think it makes no difference, and 4% responded don’t know or refused to answer the question. For modeling purposes, the data are coded as either 1, for initiative elections are good for the state (72% of the respondents), or 0, for every other response (28% of the respondents).

Table 2 reports the logistic regression results. The main effect coefficient for education is negative and statistically significant, which suggests that college-educated voters, on balance, are 15.3% less favorable to direct
democracy than their counterparts without a college degree. The main effect coefficient for treatment is also negative and statistically significant, indicating that voters in the treatment are 13.4% less likely to be supportive of direct democracy than voters in the control group. The college × treatment interaction term is positive and statistically significant indicating that respondents who are college educated and in the treatment group are 13.4% more favorable toward direct democracy, countering the main effect’s discovery that college-educated voters are more favorable toward the ballot initiative process than noncollege voters.\(^{16}\)

For ease of interpretation, simulations were conducted using the Spost package in Stata to graphically demonstrate the total effects of education and treatment on attitudes toward the ballot initiative process. Predicted probabilities are displayed graphically in Figure 1. Figure 1 shows a
Table 1. Distribution of Opinion Toward Direct Democracy by Education and Treatment Condition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>College</th>
<th>Noncollege</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Treatment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A good thing</td>
<td>69 (103)</td>
<td>69 (109)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A bad thing</td>
<td>12 (18)</td>
<td>14 (22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makes no difference</td>
<td>15 (22)</td>
<td>13 (21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know/refused</td>
<td>4 (6)</td>
<td>4 (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100 (149)</td>
<td>100 (157)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Overall, do you think that statewide initiative elections are a good thing for the state, a bad thing for the state, or that they don’t make much difference (0)? Percentage and observation size (in parentheses) are displayed.

statistically significant difference between noncollege voters in the control group compared to noncollege voters in the treatment group. Holding all other model variables at their mean, the predicted probability that a noncollege voter in the control condition will support direct democracy is estimated to be .76, whereas this probability is just .62 among noncollege respondents in the treatment condition. College-educated voters however appear to be unaffected by the treatment, as college-educated voters in both control (.72 probability of supporting direct democracy) and treatment (.77% probability of supporting direct democracy) fall within the confidence band. Finally, because the confidence bands barely overlap for voters in the treatment condition, we cannot say for certain that the college-educated voters in the treatment group are statistically different from non-college-educated voters in the treatment group.

These findings support both hypotheses advanced—that voters without a college degree will be affected by the treatment designed to mirror stimuli encountered in the real voting environment, whereas college-educated respondents will remain unaffected by the survey’s treatment. It seems plausible, then, that voters think about direct democracy along two dimensions. First, in the abstract, voters are strongly supportive of the ballot initiative process. This is reflected initially in high levels of support for direct democracy shown in Table 1. Second, when voters actually go through the process of deciding how to vote on initiatives, only voters without a college degree decrease their support for the ballot initiative process. This suggests that less-educated voters may experience a reduction in confidence with respect
to their ability to participate in politics, thereby affecting their considerations (now, a new negative consideration) about direct democracy. College-educated voters, on the other hand, are not affected by the treatment likely because answering the ballot initiatives posed in the experiment does not negatively affect their belief in their ability to participate in politics.

As expected, age is positive, but does not reach the appropriate level of statistical significance such that we can be confident its effect is different than zero. However, as indicated by the age-squared term, as respondents get older they do become less supportive of the ballot initiative process (82% less
supportive from minimum to maximum of the variable)—which is not surprising because cognitive ability eventually depreciates with old age. Since voting on initiatives requires relatively large amounts of cognitive ability, this result makes sense. Party membership has no effect on attitudes toward direct democracy, as neither Republican identification nor Independent/Other identification are statistically different from Democratic identification. While we might expect Republicans to be more dissatisfied with government in Washington State because Democrats tend to hold greater sway over government, the ballot initiative process may be so institutionalized in the state as to simply register high levels of approval across the partisan spectrum. Gender does not have an effect on attitudes toward direct democracy. It appears men and women are equally supportive, perhaps because women in Washington State maintain equally high levels of education as men. Income also does not exhibit statistically significant divisions on attitudes about the ballot initiative process. While we might expect higher income voters to be more supportive of direct democracy, this is not the case here.

As expected, voters who maintain higher levels of interest in the news are more likely to be supportive of direct democracy compared to voters who have little interest in the news. Compared to voters with zero interest in the news, voters with very high interest are 13.8% more supportive of direct democracy. This is logical when we consider that voters who know more about the news likely know more about individual ballot initiatives and thus will be more confident in their ability to vote on these initiatives. Surprisingly, the coefficient for newspaper is not significant. Likely, the news interest variable is simply more associated with attitudes toward direct democracy. Internet usage, union membership, trust in government, years lived in Washington, and whether the respondent is a renter are also not statistically significant. It appears that these variables—often important in voting behavior—are less useful in modeling attitudes regarding direct democracy.

### Conclusion and Discussion

This article began with an interesting puzzle: why is support for direct democracy so high in the face of voter reservations about their own ability to handle complex direct legislation? I suggested that many survey questions designed to gauge attitudes toward the ballot initiative process tap a dimension of abstract support for democracy. I further suggested that questions about specific initiatives tap a second dimension, which includes beliefs about one’s ability to participate in politics. Building on previous findings in education...
and voting, I hypothesized that voters without a college degree—when encountering questions about ballot initiatives—will become more diffident about their ability to participate in politics and will therefore become less supportive of direct democracy. Because of their socializing college experience, voters with a college degree should remain confident in their ability to participate in politics and will therefore show similar support for direct democracy regardless of exposure to ballot initiative questions.

I used a randomized survey experiment that exposed half of the respondents to a series of initiative questions followed by a question designed to gauge support for the ballot initiative process (treatment), and half of the respondents to only the ballot initiative question (control). I found that non-college voters in the treatment group were significantly less supportive (62 support—38% oppose) of direct democracy compared to noncollege voters in the control group (76%—24% oppose). This amounts to a net difference of 29% between treatment and control. However, no statistically significant difference emerged among college-educated voters. Both of these findings support the hypotheses advanced. Thus I conclude that education helps structure attitudes toward direct democracy.

While attitude cleavage between college and noncollege voters can be found in many facets of public opinion, it is particularly notable in the current context, as predicted probabilities reveal a statistically meaningful difference among treatment conditions for noncollege respondents but none among college educated respondents. In other words, college-educated voters appear to contain much more stable opinions, as they remain unaffected by the survey treatment. College-educated voters, in general, are more likely to be informed about the news and politics. In addition, educated respondents have gone through 4 or more years of college examinations where they must recall information quickly and accurately—a process not entirely divorced from filling out a ballot or answering questions concerning ballot initiatives. In short, the results of this study conform with the expectation that college-educated voters are less likely to question their own knowledge of the ballot initiatives they will vote on; thus, they respond, if anything, more favorably toward direct democracy—as a process—after undergoing the treatment. Their knowledge is reinforced; whereas voters without a college degree are more likely to question their own knowledge and respond that direct democracy is not necessarily a good thing for the state.

These findings are important because little work has been done to examine the public’s underlying attitude structure concerning the ballot initiative process—a process that has grown in use and importance in recent years, and continues to play an important part in public policy formation in the
United States. While Dyck and Baldassare (2009) and Hagen and Lascher (2005) found attitudinal variation among different questions about direct democracy—suggesting that perhaps attitudes toward direct democracy were not so one-sided—they did not examine education’s influence on how respondents think about direct democracy. And while scholars have investigated education’s influence on direct democracy and have found mixed results (Donovan & Karp, 2006, Craig et al. 2001), these previous studies did not use survey experiments to examine whether voters think about direct democracy in a two-dimensional way. Because, I argue, voter thinking about direct democracy contains both abstract support for direct democracy and beliefs about one’s ability to participate in politics, I used a method that allowed a test of this theory: the survey experiment. In the end, this article reconciles earlier findings—by pointing out that conventional survey items overstate support for direct democracy, exposing voters to a treatment or control condition, and finding that education moderates support for the ballot initiative process.

While this study did not engage the normative components of direct democracy (is it good or bad for public policy formation), the results may have normative implications. Smith and Tolbert (2004) find that ballot initiatives—and their campaigns—improve voters’ understanding of issues, which is normatively a good thing. Indeed, they find that voters living in states with ballot initiatives tend to be more educated about politics. The present findings suggest that perhaps this finding may be conditional on voter capability or level of education. It may be that the aggregate change is due primarily to college-educated voters getting “smarter” about politics/initiatives. Voters without a college degree may be no more knowledgeable of the issues compared to their counterparts in nondirect democracy states. The extent that this education gap contributes to differences in the allocation of socioeconomic resources, the normative effects of direct democracy may be questionable. To be sure, this study does not answer this question—but further research should engage this topic.

In a similar vein, this study calls into question how we think about direct democracy. If, on reading ballot initiatives, less educated voters are less supportive of direct democracy-as-institution, it follows that less educated voters may be more likely to abstain from voting on these issues. This raises similar normative concerns presented in the previous paragraph. And while Lupia (1994) found that voters can “vote correctly”—in line with their political predispositions such as party ID—on ballot initiatives so long as the proper heuristics are available, what happens when proper heuristics are not available? Not all initiative campaigns are heavily advertised. The present results suggest that less-educated voters may have more trouble voting correctly than do their college-educated counterparts. This raises questions about some
voters’ ability to handle voting on ballot initiatives. Further research should examine differences in voting behavior across initiatives with varying levels of saliency. That is, do less-educated voters vote more correctly in highly salient initiative elections compared to low salience initiative elections?

Finally, future work should consider using alternative dependent variables (such as feeling thermometers or scales similar to that used by Dyck & Baldassare, 2009), to see if education variables produce more impressive results on dependent variables with more variation. In addition, political knowledge should be used as a possible moderator to determine whether that concept works similarly to education insofar as it structures opinion on direct democracy. Future experiments of this sort should investigate precisely how education and political knowledge may work together to structure attitudes toward direct democracy.

Appendix A

Question Wording

Washington Poll 2007 Survey

The Experimental Treatment: Vote Questions

On statewide ballot initiative 960, which would require two-thirds legislative or two-thirds voter approval to increase state taxes, will you vote yes or no on 960?

Yes I-960—certain.................................30.29
Yes I-960—could change.........................8.26
No I-960—certain..................................27.76
No I-960—could change..........................9.43
Undecided—lean Yes...............................2.45
Undecided—lean No...............................3.47
Undecided/don’t know............................18.33

Total Yes.............................................41.00
Total No............................................40.66

In talking to people about the election we find that due to ballot language or contradictory campaign advertisements a lot of people find ballot propositions confusing. How about you, do you find statewide ballot initiative 960, the one which we just talked about, confusing?

(continued)
Appendix A (continued)

Yes, confusing..................................................46.99
No, not confusing...........................................38.27
(Don’t know/not sure).................................13.88
(Refused)........................................................0.86

On statewide Referendum 67, which will make it unlawful for health insurers to unreasonably deny certain coverage claims, will you vote to approve or reject?

Approve R-67—certain.................................34.94
Approve R-67—could change ..................9.25
Reject R-67—certain...............................21.94
Reject R-67—could change......................4.75
Undecided—lean approve.......................4.26
Undecided—lean reject .........................3.93
Undecided/don’t know............................20.94

Total approve..................................................48.45
Total reject......................................................30.62

On Constitutional Amendment 8206, which would require the state legislature to set aside one percent of state revenue each year for a “budget stabilization account,” that could not be spent that year, will you vote to approve or reject?

Yes CA-8206—certain...............................45.21
Yes CA-8206—could change ..........12.80
No CA-8206—certain.........................10.00
No CA-8206—could change ............4.73
Undecided—lean approve...............2.94
Undecided—lean reject...............2.16
Undecided/don’t know..................22.15

Total approve..................................................60.95
Total reject......................................................16.89

On Constitutional Amendment 4204, which would allow a simple majority rather than a supermajority to approve school tax levies, will you vote to approve or reject?

Downloaded from apr.sagepub.com at UNIV OF CALIFORNIA RIVERSIDE on January 10, 2013
Appendix A

Approve CA-4204—certain.......................51.66
Approve CA-4204—could change ..............5.77
Reject CA-4204—certain ..........................27.10
Reject CA-4204—could change ...................3.10
Undecided—lean approve............................0.61
Undecided—lean reject.............................0.50
Undecided/don’t know.............................11.25

Total approve..............................................58.04
Total reject..................................................30.70

In talking to people about the election we find that due to the ballot language or contradictory campaign advertisements a lot of people find ballot propositions confusing. How about you, do you find Constitutional Amendment 4204, the one we just talked about, confusing?

Yes confusing............................................27.79
No not confusing.......................................61.14
(Don’t know/not sure)...............................10.14
(Refused).....................................................0.94

[King, Pierce, Snohomish counties only]
Proposition 1 is the regional roads and transit plan to improve local roads, highways, and the Sound transit rail, and will cost an estimated US$18 billion in higher sales taxes and car-tab fees. Will you vote yes or no?

Yes P-1—certain.......................................30.18
Yes P-1—could change................................9.17
No P-1—certain.........................................35.91
No P-1—could change.................................5.66
Undecided—lean Yes..................................3.65
Undecided—lean No..................................4.04
Undecided/don’t know.............................11.40

Total Yes...................................................43.00
Total No....................................................45.61

(continued)
Appendix A (continued)

Do you think the job of election auditor here in [INSERT COUNTY] County should be appointed by the County Council, or should the election auditor be elected by the voters?

- Appointed—strongly ........................................ 15.26
- Appointed—somewhat ..................................... 14.26
- Elected—somewhat ........................................ 17.76
- Elected—strongly ........................................... 36.66
- (Don’t know/neither/don’t care) ......................... 15.03
- (Refused) ..................................................... 1.03

Total appointed .............................................. 29.52
Total elected ................................................... 54.42

Overall, do you think that statewide initiative elections are a good thing for the state, a bad thing for the state, or that they don't make much difference?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A (Before)</th>
<th>B (After)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Good thing</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad thing</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No difference</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Don’t Know/Refused)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix B

Variable Coding

Independent Variables

- Education  0 = Some college, high school, or less; 1 = College/Postgraduate
- Political Know. (07) 0 = Both knowledge questions wrong; 1 = One question right, one wrong; 2 = Both questions correct
- Political Know. (08) 0 = No questions correct; 1 = one question correct; 2 = two questions correct; 3 = three questions correct; 4 = four questions correct.
- Age This is coded as the actual age for each respondent
**Appendix B**

- **Age**
  - This is coded as the squared age for each respondent

- **Age Low**
  - 0 = Not 44 or younger; 1 = 44 or younger

- **Age High**
  - 0 = Not 66 or older; 1 = 66 or older

- **Party Identification**
  - Democrat
    - Serves as base group
  - Republican
    - 0 = Not Republican; 1 = Republican
  - Ind/Other
    - 0 = Not Independent/Other; 1 = Independent/Other

- **Income**
  - Low Income dummy 1 = Less than US$40,000
  - Low-Med Income dummy 1 = US$40,001-US$60,000
  - Med Income dummy 1 = US$60,001-US$100,000
  - High Income dummy 1 = Above US$100,001 (OMITTED CATEGORY)
  - Missing Income dummy 1 = Respondent did not disclose income

- **News consumption**
  - Index variable combining number of days in a week a respondent watches the local and national news divided by two.

- **Newspaper**
  - 0 = Not newspaper main source of news; 1 = newspaper main source

- **Union**
  - 0 = Not a union household; 1 = Union household

- **Regular Internet User**
  - 0 = Not regular internet user; 1 = Respondent goes online and checked email yesterday

- **Trust in government**
  - 1 = None of the time; 2 = Some of the time; 3 = Most of the time; 4 = Just about always

- **Years lived in WA (07)**
  - The reported number of years each respondent has lived in WA State

- **Years lived in WA (08)**
  - 1 = less than 1 year; 2 = 1-5 years; 3 = 6-10 years; 4 = 11-20 years; 5 = more than 20 years

- **Renter**
  - 0 = Home owner or other; 1 = Rents home/apartment
### Appendix C

**Alternative Model Specifications**

#### Table 3. Support for Direct Democracy Noncollege Only Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>% Change Predicted Probability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Treatment/control</td>
<td>-0.917***</td>
<td>-0.328</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>-0.044</td>
<td>0.705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age squared</td>
<td>-0.001*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-0.888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican ID</td>
<td>-0.602</td>
<td>-0.411</td>
<td>-0.105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent ID</td>
<td>-0.182</td>
<td>-0.404</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>-0.32</td>
<td>0.076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income: less than US$40K</td>
<td>-0.346</td>
<td>-0.594</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
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<tr>
<td>Income: US$40K-US$60K</td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>-0.537</td>
<td>0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income: US$60K-US$100K</td>
<td>0.483</td>
<td>-0.547</td>
<td>0.073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income: missing</td>
<td>-0.668</td>
<td>-0.543</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News interest</td>
<td>0.280****</td>
<td>-0.076</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper source of information</td>
<td>0.046</td>
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<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular Internet user</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>-0.354</td>
<td>0.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union household</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>-0.341</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in government</td>
<td>0.254</td>
<td>-0.264</td>
<td>0.121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years lived in Washington</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>-0.059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renter</td>
<td>0.783</td>
<td>-0.555</td>
<td>0.106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.987</td>
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<td>N</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Predicted correct</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</table>

Note: Dependent Variable: Overall, do you think that statewide initiative elections are a good thing for the state (1), a bad thing for the state (0), or that they don’t make much difference (0)?

*p < .100. **p < .050. ***p < .010. ****p < .001.

#### Table 4. Support for Direct Democracy College Only Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>% Change Predicted Probability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Treatment/control</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>-0.269</td>
<td>0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.106</td>
</tr>
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</table>

(continued)
Table 4. (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>% Change Predicted Probability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age squared</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican ID</td>
<td>0.349</td>
<td>-0.399</td>
<td>0.071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent ID</td>
<td>-0.037</td>
<td>-0.309</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.091</td>
<td>-0.275</td>
<td>0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income: less than US$40K</td>
<td>-0.416</td>
<td>-0.505</td>
<td>-0.093</td>
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<tr>
<td>Income: US$40K-US$60K</td>
<td>0.367</td>
<td>-0.46</td>
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<td>Income: US$60K-US$100K</td>
<td>-0.203</td>
<td>-0.343</td>
<td>-0.044</td>
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<tr>
<td>Income: missing</td>
<td>-0.182</td>
<td>-0.47</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
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<td>News Interest</td>
<td>0.007</td>
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<td>0.01</td>
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<tr>
<td>Newspaper source of information</td>
<td>0.183</td>
<td>-0.303</td>
<td>0.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular Internet user</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
<td>-0.346</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
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<td>Union Household</td>
<td>-0.242</td>
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<td>-0.052</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trust in government</td>
<td>-0.42†</td>
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<td>-0.263</td>
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<td>Years lived in Washington</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>0.094</td>
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<td>Renter</td>
<td>0.495</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>-1.502</td>
<td>0.011</td>
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</table>

N = 279

Pseudo R = .04

% Predicted correct = 70%

Note: Dependent Variable: Overall, do you think that statewide initiative elections are a good thing for the state (1), a bad thing for the state (0), or that they don’t make much difference (0)?

*p < .100. **p < .050. ***p < .010. ****p < .001.

Table 5. Support for Direct Democracy “Not Confused” Only Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>% Change Predicted Probability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>-1.570***</td>
<td>0.593</td>
<td>-0.237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment/control</td>
<td>-1.577**</td>
<td>0.609</td>
<td>-0.238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College × Treatment</td>
<td>1.650**</td>
<td>0.733</td>
<td>0.203</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td>-0.048</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age squared</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.211</td>
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<tr>
<td>Republican ID</td>
<td>1.023</td>
<td>0.498</td>
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<tr>
<td>Independent ID</td>
<td>0.504**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.043</td>
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<td>-0.007</td>
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<td>Income: less than US$40K</td>
<td>-0.838</td>
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(continued)
Table 5. (continued)

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>% Change Predicted Probability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Income: US$40K-US$60K</td>
<td>0.329</td>
<td>0.562</td>
<td>0.047</td>
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<tr>
<td>Income: US$60K-US$100K</td>
<td>−0.709**</td>
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<td>−0.119</td>
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<td>Income: missing</td>
<td>0.224</td>
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<td>News Interest</td>
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<td>0.068</td>
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<td>Newspaper source of information</td>
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<td>0.391</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular Internet user</td>
<td>0.320</td>
<td>0.405</td>
<td>0.051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union household</td>
<td>0.212</td>
<td>0.368</td>
<td>0.032</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trust in government</td>
<td>−0.408</td>
<td>0.273</td>
<td>−0.190</td>
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<tr>
<td>Years lived in Washington</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renter</td>
<td>2.422***</td>
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<td>0.201</td>
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<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.323</td>
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<tr>
<td>% Predicted correct</td>
<td>75.3</td>
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Note: Dependent Variable: Overall, do you think that statewide initiative elections are a good thing for the state (1), a bad thing for the state (0), or that they don’t make much difference (0)? *p < .100. **p < .050. ***p < .010. ****p < .001.

Table 6. Support for Direct Democracy “Confused” Only Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>% Change Predicted Probability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>−0.610</td>
<td>0.404</td>
<td>−0.128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment/control</td>
<td>−0.848**</td>
<td>0.392</td>
<td>−0.177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College × Treatment</td>
<td>0.939*</td>
<td>0.557</td>
<td>0.174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>0.698</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age squared</td>
<td>−0.001</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>−0.910</td>
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<td>Republican ID</td>
<td>−0.626*</td>
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<td>Independent ID</td>
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<td>Female</td>
<td>0.458*</td>
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<td>−0.003</td>
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<td>Income: US$40K-US$60K</td>
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<td>Income: US$60K-US$100K</td>
<td>0.567</td>
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<td>0.110</td>
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<td>Income: missing</td>
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<td>−0.107</td>
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<tr>
<td>News interest</td>
<td>0.140**</td>
<td>0.060</td>
<td>0.212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper source of information</td>
<td>0.167</td>
<td>0.317</td>
<td>0.034</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(continued)
Table 6. (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>% Change Predicted Probability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regular Internet user</td>
<td>−0.177</td>
<td>0.314</td>
<td>−0.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union household</td>
<td>−0.317</td>
<td>0.298</td>
<td>−0.068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in government</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>0.226</td>
<td>0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years lived in Washington</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renter</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>0.445</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>1.339</td>
<td>−0.128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>290</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td></td>
<td>68.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Dependent Variable: Overall, do you think that statewide initiative elections are a good thing for the state (1), a bad thing for the state (0), or that they don’t make much difference (0)?

*p < .100. **p < .050. ***p < .010. ****p < .001.

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Notes

1. Data for this project finds that in Washington State, in 2007, public support for direct democracy is 72% among registered voters.
3. Even though my interest is primarily in education, I did do some analysis with political knowledge. Three political knowledge questions were placed on the survey; however, when combined, the alpha reliability is not strong. A scaled knowledge variable does not significantly covary with attitudes toward direct democracy.
4. After conducting several survey experiments regarding acquiescence bias among agree-disagree questions as well as assertion questions, Schuman and Presser note that our hypothesis now must be that there is nothing special about agree-disagree assertions that produces acquiescence. Whatever acquiescence occurs...
evidently comes from the one-sided nature of a question or statement, as against a deliberate attempt to offer respondents two or more choices that are equally balanced in the way they are presented. (Schuman & Presser, 1996, p. 228)

5. That is, formal schooling, taking exams, thinking through abstract problems prepares people for thinking through abstract ballot initiatives.

6. Political elite communication about direct democracy as an institution may be largely one sided. Because of the perceived popularity of the initiative process, parties may have adopted a tactic of tacit approval of direct democracy over the years. In this way, political pressure has constrained party elites from negatively weighing in on the initiative process as a whole, for it seems implausible that a strategic political actor would argue that his or her constituency is not intellectually capable to debate and vote on direct legislation. Instead, the initiative process has been popularized by people such as tax crusaders Howard Jarvis in California, Douglas Bruce in Colorado, and Tim Eyman in Washington State. These actors have framed their causes as populist challenges to entrenched political powers (Smith 1998). These frames match the symbolic predispositions of a majority of Americans; therefore they can be very persuasive (Elder & Cobb, 1983).

7. Data were collected from October 22 to 28, 2007, just before the general election, with a sample size of $n = 601$.

8. See Appendix A for survey questions used in the experiment.

9. ANOVA comparisons across groups find no statistically significant differences on demographic indicators.

10. Voters in King, Snohomish, and Pierce counties (about half the sample) were also asked about a roads and transit initiative voted on just in those three counties.

11. These two statewide measures were the most widely discussed and debated of the election cycle.

12. One reviewer expressed concern that the inclusion of the confusion questions reduces external validity. This may make it difficult to evaluate whether the difference in opinion found across the control and treatment groups is due to the ballot issue questions or the confusion questions. The claim has credence because not every respondent may think about confusion when voting. To address this concern in light of the fact that the experiment has already been conducted, I created a dummy variable that coded respondents who answered “yes, confused” to one or both of the two confusion questions as a 1, and voters who answered “no” as 0. I then ran two additional regression analyses, one among “confused” voters and one among “not confused” voters. Results for both regressions, which can be found in the Appendix C, are similar for both models (and fit with the substantive
findings from the main model), indicating that the confusion questions do not appear to influence the treatment. Thus, while the confusion questions indeed have the potential to confound the survey experiment, they appear unlikely to have done so in the present analysis. In any event, regardless of questions about external validity, when confronted with the prospect of complexity, voters with less formal education are less supportive of direct democracy.

13. The question reads, “What is the highest level of education you completed? Just stop me when I read the correct category: Grades 1 to 8, some high school, high school graduate, some college/technical school, college graduate, postgraduate education.” I coded this variable as 1 = college or higher, 0 = some college or lower. Theoretically, this specification makes sense as I argue that educational differences are most notable as a college degree—no college degree split. Coding the variable as, say, 1 = High School or Less, 2 = Some College, 3 = College, and 4 = Post Graduate is not as theoretically satisfying because it presupposes an even division between these categories. For example, according to this specification, someone with a master’s degree will be distinctly less affected by the treatment compared to someone with a bachelor’s degree. Nevertheless, I ran the model with educated coded in this fashion. Results were similar to results shown in table 2, with statistically significant main effects for education and the treatment condition. However, as I speculated, the interaction between education and treatment, while in the expected direction, is not statistically significant.

14. Income was coded as a series of dummy variables to reduce missing data. A separate analysis was done with income treated as a linear variable. The results are essentially the same.

15. See Appendix B for details.

16. Appendix C presents the results from two split sample regression models, where a regression was run among only noncollege voters and college voters, respectively. As expected, the results correspond to the findings from the interaction model. In the noncollege only model, respondents in the treatment group were 15% less likely to support direct democracy than voters in the control group—a finding that is statistically significant. In the college only model, the treatment variable is not statistically nor substantively significant indicating that the treatment has no effect for college-educated voters.

17. A chi-square test indicates that men and women have the same amount of college education (2.3019, p value = .129)

18. News interest and newspaper are not correlated, so the issue is not one of multicollinearity.

19. These variables have been kept in the model because the log likelihood indicates a better model fit.
20. In each condition (control and treatment), opposition to direct democracy is differentiated from support for direct democracy. The number reported is the difference between these figures. Net Difference = (Control Support – Control Opposition) - (Treatment Support – Treatment Opposition).

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