The Politics of Refuge: Sanctuary Cities, Crime, and Undocumented Immigration

October 16, 2016

Abstract

This paper assesses the claim that sanctuary cities – defined as cities that expressly forbid city officials or police departments from inquiring into immigration status – are associated with post-hoc increases in crime. We employ a causal inference matching strategy to compare similarly situated cities where key variables are the same across the cities except the sanctuary status of the city. We find no statistically discernible difference in violent crime rate, rape, or property crime across the cities. Our findings provide evidence that sanctuary policies have no effect on crime rates, despite narratives to the contrary. The potential benefits of sanctuary cities, such as better incorporation of the undocumented community and cooperation with police, thus have little cost for the cities in question in terms of crime.

Keywords: Sanctuary Cities; Latino Politics; Immigration

1   Introduction

On June 7th, 1983 the Madison, Wisconsin city council passed Resolution 39,105, officially commending churches in the city that were offering sanctuary to Central American refugees, many (if not most) of whom had arrived illegally. The Madison city council followed this with Resolution 41,075 on March 5th, 1985, officially declaring the entire city a sanctuary for Central Americans fleeing violence in El Salvador and Guatemala. Since then more than a hundred cities nationwide have passed similar laws limiting the participation of local officials in the enforcement of federal immigration law, formally becoming "sanctuary cities." In this paper, we define a sanctuary city as *a city or police department that has passed a resolution or ordinance expressly forbidding city or law enforcement officials from inquiring into immigration status and/or cooperation with ICE*. While sanctuary policies have received increasing attention over the last year, there has been little academic inquiry into this phenomena and up until recently they received relatively little attention from mainstream media or politicians in the United States.

However, on July 1st, 2015, Kathryn Steinle was shot and killed in San Francisco by Juan Francisco Lopez-Sanchez, an undocumented immigrant who had been convicted of seven felonies and deported seven times.[1] In March of 2015, Lopez-Sanchez had been arrested for an outstanding drug warrant and briefly was in jail in San Francisco where ICE filed a detainer asking that he be released into their custody for deportation. Because of its status as a sanctuary city, the detainer was not honored and instead Lopez-Sanchez was released, as he was not a violent criminal and the city had declined to prosecute the marijuana-possession charge he was being

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[1]Christina Littlefield, "Sanctuary cities: How Kathryn Steinle's death intensified the immigration debate." Los Angles Times, July 24th, 2014.

held for.[2] The shooting of Steinle ignited a firestorm over San Francisco's sanctuary policy, with Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump making opposition to sanctuary policies a major part of his campaign in the fall of 2015. Trump had previously argued that, "When Mexico sends its people, it's not sending their best. They're sending people who have a lot of problems...They're bringing drugs. They're bringing crime. They're rapists. And some, I assume, are good people." Trump seized on Steinle's shooting as proof for this statement and a further justification for the border wall his campaign had promised to build if he was elected. On the heels of Trump's statement and the Steinle shooting, nearly all the GOP presidential candidates included opposition to sanctuary policy in their platforms.

However, it remains unclear whether sanctuary policies actually lead to increases in crime, as their opponents argue, or if they increase Latino incorporation and cooperation with police in cities like San Francisco, as their supporters counter.[3] Since undocumented immigrants face deportation in addition to criminal charges, it is logical that they would avoid breaking the law to a greater extent than the native born population. Indeed, initial evidence suggests little generalizable support for the claim that sanctuary cities cause increases in crime. In 2013, Lyons et al. (2013) found that those cities with sanctuary policies had lower robbery and homicide rates in neighborhoods with high concentrations of immigrants, suggesting that sanctuary policies are actually associated with lower crime rates.

While Lyons et al. (2013) informs our analyses and expectations, we employ a different analytic approach and have a different hypothesis when it comes to the effect of sanctuary cities on

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[2]Ibid.

[3]In this paper, we focus primarily on crime, but suggest in the discussion section that future research should examine various aspects of incorporation.

crime. First, we analyze the city as opposed to the Census tract. We are interested in the broader unit of analysis because political claims and complaints about sanctuary cities are launched at the city level (e.g., Donald Trump and other high profile Republicans talking about San Francisco). Second, instead of employing a hierarchical linear model with instrumental variables – which is regression based in its orientation – we take a causal inference approach that allows us to isolate the effects of the sanctuary city policy itself.[4]

In this paper we look to build upon the findings of Lyons et al. (2013) by looking at the effects of sanctuary policies on different types of crime while also matching cities based on variables like population, the size of the Latino community, economic criteria, and other racial criteria. We also argue that rather than a decrease in crime, we expect to see no statistically significant difference between sanctuary and non-sanctuary cities.

Because most studies have shown that undocumented immigrants tend to commit less crime than the native born (Lyons et al., 2013; Lee et al., 2001; Ousey and Kubrin, 2009; Wadsworth, 2010), we see two possibilities why sanctuary cities might result in lower crime rates. First, the main antecedent to seeing a decrease in city crime as a function of sanctuary policy would be the movement of undocumented immigrants into sanctuary cities post passage. If this in fact was the case, it would suggest that sanctuary cities could have lower homicide rates if there was net in-migration of undocumented citizens into a city after it "became" a sanctuary. We evaluate this possibility and find no difference in in-migration post-passage in our data across the sanctuary/non-sanctuary conditions. Second, some sanctuary policies are premised on the

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[4]While causal inference is not a perfect approach in that it – like any observational method – cannot fully account for unobservable heterogeneity – we combine matching with multivariate regression to enhance confidence in our findings.

idea that the policy will lead to greater cooperation with the police and incorporation of the existing undocumented population. The latter is expected to decrease crime as a result of greater opportunities, as Lyons et al. found in their 2013 study. This is a real possibility, however, we think this is more of a long-term possibility and may also be counterbalanced by an increase in crime reporting precisely because of increased cooperation.

The other possibility – like some candidates have claimed – is that sanctuary cities by virtue of their unique status contribute to increases in crime. This claim rests on two possibilities. First – like the hypothesis anticipating less crime – this argument might be true if undocumented immigrants do commit more crime and then move into sanctuary cities post passage. The first premise does not hold because, as just stated, there does not appear to be a significant difference in in-migration into sanctuary cities relative to similarly situation non-sanctuary cities. In addition, the premise does not square with the extant literature that undocumented immigrants commit less crime than the native born population. Second, we might see more crime as a result of sanctuary policy if undocumented residents already living in a city begin to commit more crime or report more crime because they feel more secure. Again, this premise holds little weight as the vast majority of research on this issue indicates the foreign born commit less crime than the native born or that no difference exists (see for example, Miles and Cox (2014), who examined the rates of homicide, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault in counties as Secure Communities was rolled out between 2008 and 2012 and found no statistically significant decrease in crime rates as a result of the implementation or intensity of Secure Communities.).[5] However, given the design and motivation of most sanctuary policies, it is possible that greater cooperation be-

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[5]Intensity was measured by the number of detentions by Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

tween city officials and undocumented immigrants could emerge. This could lead to an increase in crime-reporting, not an increase in crime per se.

Based on the evidence so far, we believe that a statistical examination of sanctuary policy will show that these policies do not lead to either net increases or decreases in crime even when cities are matched to isolate the effect that sanctuary status has. In our analysis, we isolate the effects of sanctuary policy itself not its antecedents per se – therefore we control for the size of the Latino population as well as the Latino non-citizen population (i.e., those most likely to be undocumented immigrants). Thus, our matching procedure allows us to compare similarly situated cities on the aforementioned variables. In this analysis, sanctuary cities – on average – will not have more undocumented immigrants in them compared to their matched city, so the above logic that cities with larger shares of undocumented residents should experience lower crime rates is not applicable.[6] Instead, we think there should be no net effect on crime as an outcome from a sanctuary city policy.

The majority of the literature to date on sanctuary cities has largely focused on the faith-based movements of the 1980s and 1990s on which many sanctuary policies were based. This paper will focus on sanctuary policies post-9/11, though some of these, like San Francisco's sanctuary policy, have roots that can be traced back to the faith-based movement of the 1980s. To understand sanctuary policies today, it is necessary to know a little about the movement that many of them initially drew upon for inspiration and which enjoyed a brief rebirth on the heels of 9/11.

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[6]We conducted several t-tests on non-citizen Latino growth rate (1990-1999, and 2000-2010) between the treatments. There is no statistically significant difference in non-citizen Latino growth rate (percent change) between the different types of cities (t=-0.045, df=106.1 p-value = 0.963). This suggests that undocumented immigrants are no more likely to move into a sanctuary city relative to a similarly situated sanctuary city.

Thus, this paper proceeds as follows: First, we define what we mean by a sanctuary city. Next we trace the origins and movements of sanctuary cities in the United States. This is followed by a critique of the supposed link between criminality and immigration. We then place these cities into contemporary political context and lay out the claims as to why they are bad or good policy. This leads to a set of hypotheses that we then test in the rest of the paper. We review our data and methods employed to answer the questions posed. Finally, we present our results and finish with a discussion of these results.

2 Defining the Sanctuary City

One initial difficulty inherent in the study of sanctuary cities is that there is no concrete definition of how exactly to define what a sanctuary city is. For instance, the Ohio Jobs & Justice PAC, which maintains a list of sanctuary cities online, also includes "informal" sanctuary cities in their definition. Informal sanctuary cities are where there is no resolution or policy on paper but instead where their classification is based on observed actions, such as lack of enforcement.[7] However, this classification seems open to subjective, and biased, interpretations of who is illegal and what counts as lack of enforcement.

For those cities with formal policies in place, there is a gradation of sanctuary policies. Some cities or police departments only forbid law enforcement from making immigration inquiries,[8] while others forbid local officials from doing so in the dispensation of city-level benefits. Some

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[7]See the Ohio Jobs & Justice PAC website for a list of some of the actions that can lead to a city being classified as a sanctuary even if no formal policy exists. http://www.ojjpac.org/sanctuary.asp

[8]Like the Los Angeles Police Department's Special Order 40, which was passed in 1979 and thus represents one of the earliest examples of sanctuary policy. The goal of Special Order 40 was not ideological, instead it was simply meant to foster greater cooperation between the Latino immigrant community in Los Angeles and the police

cities also include direct ideological statements affirming the rights of immigrants or criticisms of federal immigration enforcement and policy. For example, Berkeley's Resolution 63,711-N.S. states, "Whereas, the spirit and intent of Berkeley's refuge Resolutions would be violated if City funds, facilities or staff were utilized to assist the Federal government's inhumane immigration policies and practices."[9] In cities like Berkeley, sanctuary is declared not just for practical reasons but also as a way of protesting federal immigration policies. Yet not all policies that could be construed as "sanctuary" policies include this ideological aspect or have as their goal protecting the rights of immigrants themselves. As previously stated, we define a sanctuary city as *a city or police department that has passed a resolution or ordinance expressly forbidding city or law enforcement officials from inquiring into immigration status and/or cooperation with ICE*; thus incorporating both ideological and non-ideological cities for the purpose of this analysis. In future work we may return to this to see if there are identifiable differences in effect between the two different "types" of sanctuary cities.

A number of scholars have recently begun an examination of sub-federal immigration policies like Arizona's SB1070, which would have allowed police to ask for proof of citizenship during routine traffic stops (Ramakrishnan and Gulasekaram, 2012; Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan, 2013; Vasanyi et al., 2012; Newton, 2012). In addition, scholars have examined the expansion of local enforcement and cooperation (e.g., see Capps et al. (2011)), as well as the process of integration (Mollenkopf and Pastor, 2016)). Related to the normative implications of some of this research, sanctuary policies can be thought of as the "other side of the coin" to

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[9]http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/citycouncil/2007citycouncil/packet/052207/2007-05-22%20Item%2034b%20City%20Refuge%20Ordinance%20to%20Prevent%20Co-operation%20with%20Immigration%20Raids.pdf

policies like Arizona's SB1070. Sub-federal immigration policies like SB1070 have often rested on claims that the federal government is not doing enough, which therefore justifies state or local intervention in immigration policy, leading to what Vasanyi et al. (2012) call a "multilayered jurisdictional patchwork." While sanctuary policies rest on the opposite claim that the federal government is being far too aggressive with immigration enforcement for justification, they also represent a sub-federal level of policymaking when it comes to immigration (Gulasekaram, 2009). Similarly, they also face some of the same critiques that can be leveled at policies like SB1070, particularly to charges that they are driven by ideological considerations rather than negative effects on local immigrant communities or police departments from participation in the enforcement of federal immigration policy (Ramakrishnan and Gulasekaram, 2012; Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan, 2013). Yet it is unclear if sanctuary policies have negative effects that could justify their repeal, while other sub-federal policies like SB1070 have been shown to have very real negative impacts in terms of the potential for racial profiling and trust between the Latino community and local officials (Waslin, 2010).

3   The Birth and Growth of Sanctuary Cities

To gain an intuition for why sanctuary policies might actually promote incorporation as opposed to crime, it is important to understand their birth and development. The Central American Sanctuary Movement of the 1980s is the ideological precursor to modern sanctuary policy and was motivated by the deportation of those fleeing political violence in El Salvador and Guatemala. The Central American Sanctuary Movement would provide safe harbor to many of these immi-

grants via a network of churches and synagogues spread across the nation, despite the potential consequences of this open defiance of U.S. immigration policy through the blatant harboring of undocumented immigrants. The Sanctuary Movement encompassed a number of religious and faith-based groups around the country, with additional support coming from university campuses, civil rights organizations, lawyers, and a host of other concerned parties (Golden and Mac-Connell, 1986). The Sanctuary Movement grew into a nationwide phenomenon and its members did not shy from the public eye despite the illegality of their actions. Rose Cruz Villazor cites some astounding figures in relation to the number of individuals involved with the Sanctuary Movement. She notes that, "At the height of the sanctuary movement, an estimated 20,000 to 30,000 church members and more than 100 churches and synagogues participated in the sanctuary movement, making the conflict between the church and state inevitable" (Villazor, 2008). In addition, the movement had tremendous public support according to Villazor, including governmental support from forty-seven members of Congress.[10]

This was followed by the New Sanctuary Movement that came into existence following the September 11th attacks and the passage of the Patriot Act. The New Sanctuary Movement drew on Central American Sanctuary Movement for inspiration for its resistance to more aggressive immigration enforcement on the part of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) that often led to the separation of families (Freeland, 2010). Both were founded by church and faith-based groups and sought to address what was perceived to be inequities in the enforcement of U.S. immigration policy. Most sanctuary policies were based on the intentions behind these faith-based interventions on behalf of undocumented immigrants and refugees though some, like Los

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[10]Ibid.

Angeles' Special Order 40 which was passed in 1979, were based simply on fostering greater cooperation with authorities on the part of the Latino community.

The U.S. Patriot Act, the Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal (CLEAR) Act, and the Homeland Security and Enhancement (HSEA) Act that came on the heels of September 11th led many cities to adopt sanctuary policies in response to what they believed were the abuses inherent in this legislation and the burden it imposed on local law enforcement by having them enforce federal immigration law. While these policies were based on the sanctuary policies passed during the Central American refugee crisis in the 1980s they differed significantly in the group they were meant to protect. While refugees fleeing political violence elicited some sympathy, modern sanctuary cities protected an oft-demonized group: undocumented immigrants. It is those cities who passed sanctuary policies in the wake of 9/11 that this paper will focus on because of their place in the larger debate about undocumented immigration. With nearly 12 million undocumented immigrants currently in the United States and a regular scapegoating of this group as job-stealing criminals who refuse to assimilate (and speak English) the existence of sanctuary cities is argued to drive up crime, increase unemployment rates, and encourage further undocumented immigration.

Besides having passed sanctuary ordinances, sanctuary cities vary from one another on many socioeconomic variables – including population size, noncitizen Latino population, partisanship, and poverty levels. For instance, two sanctuary cities Gaston, Oregon; and New York City, New York, vary considerably. Gaston is about 45 minutes (by car) outside of Portland, and is essentially a farming community. In the year 2000, Gaston had just 600 people; whereas New York City recorded over 8 million people and is the cultural and financial capital of the United

States. As of 2000, the percent of the population that was noncitizen Latino in New York was roughly seven percent but the overall Latino percent was about 21 percent Latino. In Gaston, the percent of noncitizen Latinos was about four percent with a total Latino population of about 15 percent. Likewise, the areas vary on partisanship; in the 2000 election Gaston resided in a swing county (50 percent of Washington County voted in favor of Republican George W. Bush), whereas New York went over 74 percent for Democrat Al Gore. Thus, not all sanctuary cities are simply liberal enclaves with large non-citizen populations. Finally, Census records indicate that 1999 poverty levels for individuals 18 and older in Gaston was 5.9 percent, and over 18.4 percent in New York. Clearly, sanctuary cities are not uniform.

Despite sharing sanctuary status, each of these cities passed slightly different ordinances at slightly different times. According to the NILC, in April of 2002 Gaston's City Council Resolution No 03-01 made "detecting or apprehending persons of foreign citizenship based only on violation of federal immigration law" illegal for city employees and departments.[11] Similarly, while New York City long had sanctuary policies favorable to undocumented immigrants, the city reasserted its support for sanctuaries with Executive Order 41. Passed in August 2003, the order "[p]rohibits city officers or employees from disclosing confidential information, including information concerning immigration status" in all but the most extreme situations where the individual is either wanted for non-immigration crimes or is a known terrorist.[12]

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[11]Footnote for the NILC document, page 16, http://www.ailadownloads.org/advo/NILC-LocalLawsResolutionsAndPoliciesLimitingImmEnforcement.pdf

[12]Footnote referring to NILC data, page 15. http://www.ailadownloads.org/advo/NILC-LocalLawsResolutionsAndPoliciesLimitingImmEnforcement.pdf

4   The Myth of Immigrant Criminality & Sanctuary Policy

The idea that sanctuary policies drive up crime rates is premised to a large extent on the notion that undocumented immigrants tend to offend at higher rates, something that has been disproven time and again. In fact, many studies find an inverse relationship between immigration, undocumented or otherwise, and crime rates. One of the earliest examples of this was the 1931 report by the Wickersham Commission on crime and the foreign born, which specially examined the relationship between Mexican immigration and crime. The commission found that the native born actually offended at higher rates in most instances than did Mexican immigrants (National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, 1931). Even in those cities where Mexicans were found to offend at higher rates than the native born, the offense was often cultural rather than criminal. Indeed, many of the arrests were for violations of Prohibition laws, which makes sense since alcohol consumption was legal in Mexico at the time.

In 2001, Lee et al. (2001) examined homicide rates in three border cities with large immigrant communities and high levels of immigration between 1985 and 1995. Examining 352 neighborhood census tracts in Miami, El Paso, and San Diego, the authors found that the percentage of new immigrants in these tracts had no relationship to homicide rates, with the exception of El Paso, where there was an inverse relationship between the two. Rather than immigration, the only consistent predictor of homicide in the three cities was, unsurprisingly, poverty. In a longitudinal study of homicides in San Diego from 1980-2000, Martinez et al. (2010) found that neighborhood homicide rates in San Diego were, as was the case in El Paso, negatively associated with the percent foreign born who were present in the community. In 2010 Tim Wadsworth

expanded on these studies by drawing on homicide and robbery data for 459 cities nationwide and using a pooled cross-sectional time series model, which allowed him to examine the effect that changes in immigration had on crime rates between 1990 and 2000. Wadsworth found that the size of the new immigrant population, defined as those who had been in the U.S. five years or less, had an inverse relationship to rates of both robbery and homicide (Wadsworth, 2010).

Indeed, if anything, undocumented immigrants may actually be more likely to be victims of crime, rather than perpetrators of crime (Kittrie, 2006). This is because – regardless of legal formalities, many undocumented immigrants may fear that turning to local police will result in deportation. For example, undocumented women have been shown to be reluctant to call the police in cases of domestic violence due to fear that either they or their partner will be deported (Crenshaw, 1995; Menjivar and Salcido, 2002; Menjivar and Bejarano, 2004). In addition, the immigrant population – especially the undocumented – may experience cultural and language problems interacting with the state; leading some to remain in the shadows as victims (Davis and Erez, 1998). Indeed, research shows that non-Hispanic whites are less likely than Anglos, Blacks, American Indians, and Asians to report violent crime perpetrated against them (Rennison, 2007).

These studies suggest that immigrants tend to offend at lower rates than the native-born population, which we would expect to apply to the undocumented community as well. Sanctuary policies could help with incorporation, which Lyons et al. argue could lead to lower crime rates in sanctuary cities. However, the positive benefits associated with greater Latino incorporation could be hidden insofar as crime rate is concerned, as cooperation could lead to a concomitant rise in crime reporting – regardless of actual changes to crime levels. Moreover, the data suggests that an increase in the size of the immigrant population in a city should decrease crime even if

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incorporation is not assisted by sanctuary policies. Because the presence of immigrants seems to be positively related to lower crime rates, we would expect that unless sanctuary cities draw in a larger number of immigrants, there would be no relationship between sanctuary policies and crime. As mentioned earlier, we did evaluate the in-migration in both sanctuary and non-sanctuary cities in our study and did not find a significant difference. Since sanctuary policies do not seem to increase the number of immigrants in a city, we would expect them to have little effect on the crime rate.

However, the record on sanctuary cities remains very unclear. While there are a number of blogs and websites such as that maintained by the Ohio Jobs & Justice PAC that cite examples of immigrant criminality, the potential effect sanctuary policies could have on labor, and other issues, there is little statistical evidence for this thus far. The examinations of crime in sanctuary cities thus far have found the exact opposite in fact. For instance, Josh Harkinson notes that San Francisco's crime rate has been falling despite its status as a sanctuary city and that when compared to similar, non-sanctuary cities, San Francisco actually has a lower crime rate.[13] Lyons et al. found that crime rates in neighborhoods in cities designated as sanctuaries were actually lower than in non-sanctuary cities when they looked at 89 cities nationally with a population of more than 100,000.

Both of these findings suggest that sanctuary cities may actually reduce crime rates, or at the very least not lead to the increases their opponents claim they do on the heels of tragedies like the Kathryn Steinle shooting. However, in the case of the Mother Jones piece, all the author did was

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[13]Josh Harkinson. "Actually, Sanctuary Cities are Safer", Mother Jones, July 10th, 2015. http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/07/sanctuary-cities-public-safety-kate-steinle-san-francisco

compare crime rates between San Francisco and cities of similar size that are not sanctuaries, which really only provides anecdotal evidence.

5   Expectations and Hypothesis

Given the above logic and that explicated in the introduction, we evaluate the following hypothesis: Compared to other similarly situated cities, we find it unlikely that sanctuary cities will have more crime – be it violent, property, or rape, as claimed by some political candidates and opponents of sanctuary cities. However, again, in comparison to similarly situated cities we doubt that undocumented immigrants move to cities because of that city's sanctuary status thereby reducing the crime rate. Many costs are associated with moving even for later immigrants (Amundsen, 1985; Carrington et al., 1996), and it is unclear whether undocumented immigrants or the public more generally are broadly aware the sanctuary status of a city. In examining the in-migration of Latinos we found no difference in matched sanctuary/non-sanctuary cities and thus we would not expect any population effect on crime rates based on sanctuary status alone.

6   Data and Methods

To evaluate our hypotheses, we conduct two types of analyses. The first analysis is a simple difference of means t-test at the individual sanctuary-city level. Taking crime data from all 55 cities in our dataset that passed sanctuary city laws post 9/11, we compare crime rate in the year following implementation of a sanctuary policy to the crime rate in the year preceding the

implementation of a sanctuary policy. We do this for the following types of crime: violent crime, property crime, and rape crime.

The second analysis is more involved. We employ a matching causal inference strategy to test the claim that sanctuary cities are associated with more crime than are non-sanctuary cities. This approach lets us control for – and thereby rule out – a variety of confounding factors that might lead to the making of a sanctuary city in the first place. Because we want to know the effects of a sanctuary city-as-policy we want to compare similarly situated cities (treatment = sanctuary; control = non-sanctuary) where everything is the same across the cities prior to the enactment of the sanctuary policy. Differences between the treatment and control in crime rates following the enactment can then be attributed to the policy – as opposed to economic conditions, differences in the size of the Latino population, and other characteristics that might predict why a city may initially invoke sanctuary policies.

This approach is sensible because sanctuary cities – on their face – are quite distinct from non-sanctuary cities (which are most cities). Indeed, Table 1 indicates that sanctuary cities – compared to non-sanctuary cities – are larger, less white, more racially and ethnically diverse, have lower median incomes, have higher levels of poverty, have larger foreign-born populations, and are more Democratic. Specifically, in our data, the Latino population in sanctuary cities as of the year 2000 was 17.3 percent, whereas in non-sanctuary cities it was 14.08. And among the foreign born population in sanctuary cities, 40.08 percent were from Latin America, whereas in non-sanctuary cities this percentage was 35.36. The percentage of the non-citizen Latino population was also a bit higher in sanctuary cities than non-sanctuary cities but overall the numbers are small. Thus, a simple comparison of sanctuary cities to non-sanctuary cities is unbalanced. Any

resulting difference in crime might be associated with underlying socio-economic differences between city types as opposed to sanctuary policies, specifically.

We base our list of sanctuary cities on data provided by the National Immigration Law Center (NILC).[14] All sanctuary cities included in the study passed sanctuary laws after or during the year of 2002. We time-bound our analysis for a variety of reasons. First 9/11 quite possibly changed the tenor and nature of immigration-related politics, such that a sanctuary city pre/post 9/11 might well have different motivations. In addition, some cities that became sanctuary cities prior to 9/11 were often responding to different crises (i.e., those in Central America) and received far less publicity and negative attention than did cities post 9/11. In addition, Immigration and Customs Enforcement was created as part of the Department of Homeland Security on the heels of 9/11 and has generally been much more aggressive in enforcement via workplace and neighborhood raids than it's precursor Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS). The effect of sanctuary policy may have differed under the INS and thus we confine our analysis to those cities whose policies were specifically created in reaction to ICE in the post-9/11 period.

Because we look at a variety of data by year (across time), the total number of sanctuary cities varies depending on the availability of crime data from the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI). On an independent basis, city police departments provide the FBI with annual crime reports for most or all categories of crime. Therefore, due to incomplete, missing, or inaccurate data, matching analysis of crime between sanctuary and non-sanctuary cities was conducted on an annual basis by crime type in order to maximize the amount of observations per year. Only those cities that had crime data listed before and after passing sanctuary city legislation were used

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[14]For more detailed information see Lyons et al. (2013)

for our analysis in each year, in order to accurately test the before and after effects of sanctuary legislation.

Given the aforementioned restrictions, analysis of crime data was maximized between 48 and 55 sanctuary city observations annually. In total, we matched the sanctuary cities against roughly 4,000 non-sanctuary cities across 20 states and the District of Columbia. Figure 1 maps out the geographic location of the sanctuary cities that we analyze. The geographical distribution of cities reveals that most are clustered in specific regions, including the Northeast to Mid-Atlantic corridor, around the Great Lakes, and along the West Coast. However, there are also a few cities in the Southwest and in Alaska deemed as sanctuaries.

[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]

For our crime data match, we also gather data on all other cities in these 20 states and the District of Columbia so that we can compare cities in similarly situated locations. We use the genetic matching algorithm from the MatchIt package as specified in Ho et al. (2007). This algorithm matches treatment to control using a series of propensity scores and weights to find the most similar control city to the treatment city.[15]

With our list of cities and key variables outlined, we built up the dataset with relevant Census data. Because we are interested in examining all cities post 2002, we use data from the 2000 Census as our baseline comparison. The variables included in the match are total population, percent white, percent black, percent Asian, percent Hispanic, percent unemployed, median household income, percent poverty, percent college degree (25 years old plus), percent foreign born, percent

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[15]See appendix for a list of the cities.

foreign born not citizen, percent foreign born from Latin America, percent Latino non-citizen, and percent new city residents (mobility). On total population, larger cities are substantively different than smaller localities so it is important to take these qualitative differences into account in the matching process. For instance, San Francisco, a city of nearly 900,000 people could have similar percent estimates for a variety of demographic and economic indicators as a small town of 10,000 but it stretches credulity to say these cities are comparable. Race/ethnicity is important to account for in the match because racial characteristics may influence cities to implement sanctuary policies. Likewise, economic indicators such as median household income, unemployment, and poverty are all important control variables (Cantor and Land, 1985). While we do not control for age and gender in the match, we do control for that in the post-match regression, because these variables should be more important to predicting crime than predicting sanctuary city status. That is, places with lots of young males may be more predisposed to higher crime (Farrington, 1986; Hirschi and Gottfredson, 1983). Finally, a measure of latent ideology (percent Gore 2000) is included to guard against the possibility that more Democratic cities may be more prone to passing sanctuary laws. The appendix includes our coding procedure for the aforementioned variables.

Tables 1 and 2 show the balance improvement across the match control variables. All variables show a dramatic increase in balance post-match. But the balance is not perfect, which is why after our analysis with matched data we also complete a regression analysis to control for small imbalances across treatment and control.

[INSERT TABLE 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE]

Our main outcome variables of interest are the various indicators of crime. With respect to this, we gathered the following data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI): violent crime rate, property crime, and rape between the years 2000-2012. These data are gathered by year so we can assess whether there is any change in crime over time, possibly because the effects of a sanctuary policy may be delayed. In addition, sanctuary cities come into being at different points in time across our spectrum of analysis. Again, the motivation behind gathering these data is that they are statistics that opponents of sanctuary cities purport to be caused by sanctuary policies.

The next section discusses our results, where we employ mean comparisons and regression analysis. Both indicate little difference on our outcomes of interest by treatment (sanctuary) or control (non-sanctuary) condition.

7   Results

As specified in the data/methods section, we analyze the crime data in two ways – first at the individual-city level by observing whether crime rates change in the year following the implementation of a sanctuary policy within the city. Our second method is to conduct a match between sanctuary cities and similarly situated cities that do not have sanctuary policies, then examine whether crime is different across the two groups.

Beginning with our pre-post city-level analysis, recall that our hypothesis is that there are no systematic differences on crime rates following the passage of a sanctuary policy within a city. If we are correct, we will observe two possible sets of outcomes: 1) there will be no change whatsoever at the city-level, or 2) there will be some change post sanctuary implementation but

some cities will experience higher crime, other cities lower crime. To test this, Figures 2, 4, and 6 plot each city's change in crime rate (violent, property, rape) following adoption of a city sanctuary policy.[16] For instance, if a city passed a sanctuary ordinance in 2006, our measure subtracts that city's crime rate in 2005 from that city's crime rate in 2007. Dots that are to the right of 0 show increases in crime, whereas dots to the left of 0 show decreases in crime following implementation of a sanctuary policy.

The plots clearly reveal that some cities experience mild increases in various assortments of crime, whereas other cities experience drops in crime. There is no clear generalizable pattern based on these graphs – but what is clear is that the individual-city level plots are supportive of our hypothesis that sanctuary policy as a general rule does not lead to more crime.

[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]

[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]

[INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]

[INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE]

[INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE]

[INSERT FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE]

To buttress these findings, we also conducted a difference of means t-test where one group is all city crime rates before sanctuary implementation, and the other group is all city crime

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[16]Additionally, we visualize the data with maps in Figures 3, 5, and 7

rates post implementation. The results of the t-test show that for violent crime (t-stat $= -0.133$, p-value $= 0.894$), property crime (t-stat $= 0.996$, p-value $= 0.321$), and rape crime (t-stat $= -0.733$, p-value $= 0.465$) there is no statistical difference across the two groups. Indeed, the mean difference for violent crime and for rape are very near to zero.

We begin our second analysis with an examination of crime data by year. Recall that in contradistinction to public claims that sanctuary cities cause crime to increase, our hypotheses suggest no such effects. If we are correct – then there will be no statistically significant evidence that sanctuary cities look different than non-sanctuary cities in crime-related statistics after the sanctuary policy has been implemented. Based on previous research and existing data, we believe undocumented immigrants are less likely to commit crime because they do not want to be deported. Thus, to the extent that sanctuary cities may draw in more undocumented immigrants precisely because of their sanctuary policies, if anything, crime rates should drop. However, we doubt such movement occurs as the process of inter-city moving can be taxing, and people tend to follow jobs as the primary motivator for moving (however, we do control for mobility). In addition, as we noted earlier, we find no difference in non-citizen Latino immigration rates between matched sanctuary and non-sanctuary cities, providing evidence that sanctuary cities in and of themselves do not attract undocumented immigrants.

We conducted a series of difference of means t-tests between our matched treatment groups. Figures 8, 9, 10 largely confirm our hypotheses. The first plot shows the difference in violent crime rate between non-sanctuary and sanctuary cities. If the two lines for each year cross each other at any point, then the relationship between violent crime and city-type is not statistically significant. While there is a mild tendency to have slightly more crime in sanctuary cities, these

effects are very small, and are not statistically significant. In general, the crime rate per 100,000 people differs between 100-200 incidents a year; however, again, these effects remain statistically insignificant.

[INSERT FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE]

On property crime we see a very similar pattern. In general, sanctuary cities tend to have slightly less property crime but there is no statistical confidence in such a claim as most of the point estimates are relatively close to the 0 line and in no case do the error bars not cross the line. Years 2007 and 2008 reveal property crime to be higher in non-sanctuary cities, although, again, this finding is not statistically significant. These results corroborate findings from violent crime, and support our central hypotheses. Sanctuary cities are no different from non-sanctuary cities on property crime during the years that we analyzed.

[INSERT FIGURE 9 ABOUT HERE]

Finally, we evaluate whether rape is higher in sanctuary cities, as some political figures have claimed. Recall, the argument that has been advanced by some is that sanctuary cities have become a haven for criminals and rapists. In this scenario the implicit causal mechanism is that would-be rapists are more likely to congregate or attack in these cities because they think their chances of getting away with an act are higher. To us, this logic seems fanciful;[17] we argue that sanctuary cities and non-sanctuary cities should witness similar incidents of rapes because the only difference between these cities – in general – is the policy itself.

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[17]It is possible that sanctuary cities have more rapes that go unreported, but it is hard to imagine a causal mechanism that explains why that would be, when the whole point of the sanctuary is to communicate to citizens broadly that the government is more on the side of the most vulnerable.

Similar to Figures 8 and 9, our data reveal no significant relationship between sanctuary cities and rape (see Figure 10). In terms of point estimates, there is no clear pattern whether sanctuary cities have more or less crime. What remains consistent, however, is that no statistically significant relationship between sanctuary city and rape emerge. Again, these findings support our hypothesis – that there are no differences on crime rates.

[INSERT FIGURE 10 ABOUT HERE]

Thus far, we have shown no difference by treatment on violent crime, property crime, and rape, which are collectively supportive of our hypothesis. Sanctuary policy thus has no demonstrable effect on crime rates, in terms of either increasing or reducing them. Again, this runs counter to the current narrative by some in the Republican Party that sanctuary policies lead to increased crime. We find no support for this regardless of whether we are looking at violent crime, property crimes, or rape.

However, while the match is designed to control for differences between treatment cities on variables that may induce sanctuary status, the post-match balance table (Table 2) shows that our two treatment groups are not perfectly balanced. This is a clear limitation of matching – i.e., the matching procedure and balancing process is never perfect, and there are possibly unobservable differences between our treatment and non-treatment cities. Following Ho et al. (2007), one way to improve the confidence in our results, though, is to conduct a multivariate regression analysis post match. Therefore, we also conducted a regression analysis of our matched data on our three dependent variables. Table 3 presents results for this analysis for crime rates in 2012. If our hypotheses are correct, similar to our t-test analyses, we should not see a statistically significant

coefficient for our treatment variable. This is precisely what we find for violent crime, property crime, and rape crime, respectively.[18]

Moreover, these results hold controlling for a plethora of variables that may theoretically affect both sanctuary city adoption and crime rate. These controls are important to the assessment of sanctuary policy because, fitting with other literature, compositions of cities tend to contribute to variation in crime rate as opposed to sanctuary status. Fitting with expectations, poverty is associated with higher rates of violent crime but not necessarily property crime. Unemployment rates actually have the opposite effect, as places with higher levels of unemployment have more property crime but actually a bit less violent crime. These results make sense because poverty tends to be more long-term and endemic leading to greater violence. At the same time these areas are places with relatively low property values. Race is also related to crime but not necessarily in ways fitting with popular expectations. Once we control for a host of factors, places with increasing amounts of whites, blacks, and Hispanics tend towards slightly lower rates of violent, property, and rape crime. Interestingly, the only significant and positive predictor is percent Asian and property crime. This makes sense when we consider that a increasing number of Asian Americans live in higher-income neighbors. In the end, though, our main concern and result is that sanctuary policies themselves appear to have no effect on subsequent crime rates.

[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]

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[18]We conducted this analysis for all years for all cities that had passed a sanctuary law up to that point in time. We find null results for our sanctuary city indicator variable in every case.

8 Discussion and Conclusion

Our findings suggest that sanctuary policies themselves do not affect crime rates, which contradicts the primary narrative for their repeal. The positive benefits of sanctuary policy for immigrant incorporation could disappear based on little more than fear-mongering if Congress does manage to pass a bill like the *Enforce the Law for Sanctuary Cities Act*, which cleared the House before dying in committee in the Senate. This bill would have stripped federal law enforcement funds from cities with sanctuary policies, endangering the trust these policies can help to create between undocumented immigrants and city officials.[19] The justification for the *Enforce the Law for Sanctuary Cities Act* relied heavily on the narrative of criminality despite having no empirical support for claims that sanctuary cities increased crime and our findings suggest that the reason for this lack of supporting evidence is simply because it does not exist.

Sanctuary cities were initially designed to provide aid to and then incorporate people into American life from war-torn Central American countries. The policies have a strong basis in empathy, often with the backing of churches and local aid organizations. Thus, the policies are designed to assist people in extremely vulnerable positions in the United States in navigating their way to a life that is as safe and healthy as possible. However, in recent years, a few high profile incidents where undocumented immigrants have committed horrific crimes have led some political candidates – generally on the right – and other actors to make sweeping negative claims about the deleterious effects of sanctuary cities. The argument is that sanctuary cities bring crime: undocumented immigrants who are by definition criminals, go to these cities to commit

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[19]http://www.politico.com/story/2016/07/senate-rejects-sanctuary-cities-defunding-225181

their crimes because they know their chances of deportation are much lower. Despite evidence to the contrary (i.e., Lyons et al. (2013) or Ridgley (2008)), these voices argue that sanctuary policies lead to more crime and general destabilization.

We found these claims highly dubious on their face given evidence beginning in the 1930s and continuing until today that immigrant populations tend to produce less crime because these populations are more concerned with deportation and running afoul of the law relative to the native-born population. While other research certainly indicates that relative to other cities, sanctuary cities, on average, produce less crime or no crime, we felt compelled to re-examine this question taking a different analytical approach. We did this in part because we want to evaluate the sanctuary policy definitively. Given the political saliency of the issue, we found it necessary to assess sanctuary cities using a causal inference method, in this case matching. This approach lets us isolate the direct effect of a sanctuary policy on a variety of outcome variables – while controlling for several confounding variables.

To test these claims we collected city-level data from the U.S. Census, including population size, age, gender, education, income, ethnicity, and citizenship status. These are all variables thought to either influence criminal activity or weigh on the selection decision by a city to become a sanctuary city. That is, we control for both confounding variables as well as rule out possible selection effects. We then used a genetic match, which allows us to compare each sanctuary city in our data against another sanctuary city within the same state. Once we controlled for these variables, the difference between our sanctuary cities and non-sanctuary cities on the matching variables reduced to essentially zero. The result indicates that there is no discernible difference on each type of crime we measured between sanctuary and non-sanctuary cities. Thus, when

it comes to crime, we conclude that sanctuary cities have essentially no impact one way or the other.

Our findings have clear normative democratic implications. Sanctuary policies in terms of leading to crime do not appear to be a problem. In fact, as we pointed out in our earlier review of the literature, almost all research that assesses links between immigration and criminality find an inverse relationship. The argument advanced by some politicians that immigration – namely "illegal" immigration – is somehow linked to crime in any sort of meaningful way is simply not true. Our findings, in addition to findings from others (e.g., Lyons et al. (2013)) suggest that sanctuary policies do not on their face lead to increase in crime. To the contrary, sanctuary cities as a policy should be enhanced – they can act as what Sidanius and Pratto (2001) call hierarchy attenuating structures. In general, these policies help aid and protect people in often very precarious situations. Indeed, the long-run impact of sanctuary policy may increase Latino and other immigrant incorporation leading to a more democratic polity.

While our main goal here was to assess whether sanctuary cities lead to crime, future research should move beyond this dependent variable to examine more in-depth the myriad aspects of Latino incorporation. Especially as the number of sanctuary cities and perhaps counties expand, we can begin to examine – over the long run – whether foreign born Latinos in sanctuary cities become U.S. citizens, register, and vote at higher rates than similarly situated Latinos in other cities. While some literature might suggest otherwise (see Pantoja et al. (2001), who show that Latino political participation surged in California in the 1990s in response to Republican Pete Wilson and his support for the anti-immigrant proposition 187), it's also quite plausible that sanctuaries are viewed as more welcoming, which, in the long run, leads to greater political and

civic participation (Pedraza, 2014).

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Francisco I Pedraza. The two-way street of acculturation, discrimination, and latino immigration restrictionism. *Political Research Quarterly*, 67(4):889–904, 2014.

9   Figures

Figure 1: The geographical distribution of sanctuary cities in our dataset reveals that most cities are clustered in specific regions, including the Northeast to Mid-Atlantic corridor, around the Great Lakes, and along the West Coast.

Figure 2: City-level violent crime pre/post passage of post 9/11 sanctuary policy. Dots indicate an annual decrease (left of 0) or increase (right of 0) in crime rates post passage sanctuary policy enforcement. There is no clear discernible pattern in terms of violence following passage of such policies. Some cities see small increases in overall violent crime, others see small decreases in overall violent crime.

**Violent Crime Change Pre–Post Sanctuary Policy (Per 100,000 People)**

Figure 3: The geographical distribution of sanctuary cities with indication as to the change in rate of violent crime (per city) after passing sanctuary city legislation. There appears to be no distinct geographical pattern to explain increases or decreases in crime.

Sanctuary Cities

Figure 4: City-level property crime pre/post passage of post 9/11 sanctuary policy. Dots indicate an annual decrease (left of 0) or increase (right of 0) in crime rates post passage sanctuary policy enforcement. There is no clear discernible pattern in terms of property crime following passage of such policies. A few cities see small increases in overall property crime, whereas most cities see either no change or a slight drop in overall property crime.

Property Crime Change Pre–Post Sanctuary Policy (Per 100,000 People)

Figure 5: The geographical distribution of individual sanctuary cities with indication as to the change in rate of property crime (per city) after passing sanctuary city legislation. There appears to be no distinct geographical pattern to explain increases or decreases in crime.

Figure 6: City-level rape crime pre/post passage of post 9/11 sanctuary policy. Dots indicate an annual decrease (left of 0) or increase (right of 0) in crime rates post passage sanctuary policy enforcement. About half of the cities show slightly higher rape crime post policy implementation, whereas the other half show a drop in rape crime


Rape Crime Change Pre–Post Sanctuary Policy (Per 100,000 People)

Figure 7: The geographical distribution of sanctuary cities with indication as to the change in rate of rape crime (per city) after passing sanctuary city legislation. There appears to be no distinct geographical pattern to explain increases or decreases in crime.

Figure 8: Violent crime rate by sanctuary and non-sanctuary city. No statistically discernible difference in violent crime rate emerges across the two treatment conditions. The rug at the bottom indicates the point in time when cities became sanctuaries. The rug is measured annually but ticks were given a slight amount of random noise to prevent complete overlap and provide visual perspective of the amount of sanctuary policies passed per year.

Figure 9: Property crime rate by sanctuary and non-sanctuary city. No statistically discernible difference in property crime rate emerges across the two treatment conditions. The rug at the bottom indicates the point in time when cities became sanctuaries. The rug is measured annually but ticks were given a slight amount of random noise to prevent complete overlap and provide visual perspective of the amount of sanctuary policies passed per year.

Figure 10: Rape crime rate by sanctuary and non-sanctuary city. No statistically discernible difference in rape crime rate emerges across the two treatment conditions. The rug at the bottom indicates the point in time when cities became sanctuaries. The rug is measured annually but ticks were given a slight amount of random noise to prevent complete overlap and provide visual perspective of the amount of sanctuary policies passed per year.

10 Tables

|	Means Treated	Means Control	SD Control	Mean Diff	eQQ Med	eQQ Mean	eQQ Max
distance	0.43	0.02	0.07	0.40	0.35	0.39	0.94
Total_Pop_2000	539373.33	41927.99	64399.29	497445.34	157917.50	475981.46	6687233.00
Pct_White_2000	59.01	78.00	18.88	-19.00	19.70	18.66	30.40
Pct_Black_2000	20.11	6.96	12.27	13.15	9.20	12.73	33.60
Pct_Asian_2000	7.13	4.79	7.22	2.34	1.85	3.02	30.90
Pct_Hisp_2000	17.30	14.08	18.89	3.21	4.05	4.92	22.30
Pct__Unemployed_16Plus_2000	4.74	3.66	2.10	1.08	1.20	1.62	23.60
Median_Income_1999	42654.77	49719.77	20264.11	-7065.00	6167.00	9006.38	96332.00
Pct_Poverty_18Plus_1999	15.04	9.73	6.71	5.31	6.30	5.94	23.90
Pct_EDU_25Plus_BAPlus_2000	34.20	27.64	15.91	6.56	6.95	6.41	10.40
Pct_ForBorn_2000	17.87	13.02	11.57	4.85	5.10	5.35	21.00
Pct_ForBorn_NotCit_2000	11.34	7.53	7.61	3.81	4.00	3.88	8.50
Pct_ForBorn_LatinAm_2000	40.08	35.36	27.19	4.72	8.90	8.66	17.70
Pct_Latino_Not_Citizen_2000	5.36	3.98	6.61	1.38	1.18	1.58	9.91
Pct_New_City_Residents_2000	23.23	28.08	8.82	-4.84	4.78	5.00	21.86
PGORE	58.67	51.49	9.90	7.18	7.60	7.44	13.10

Table 1: Pre-Match: Example covariate balance table shows that the match brings treatment control into relative alignment

Sanctuary Cities

	Means Treated	Means Control	SD Control	Mean Diff	eQQ Med	eQQ Mean	eQQ Max
distance	0.43	0.23	0.22	0.20	0.23	0.20	0.47
Total_Pop_2000	539373.33	184489.17	228230.82	354884.17	87319.50	354963.46	6687233.00
Pct_White_2000	59.01	62.42	20.55	-3.42	3.20	4.31	10.50
Pct_Black_2000	20.11	17.12	19.39	2.99	2.70	3.41	13.80
Pct_Asian_2000	7.13	5.48	7.11	1.65	1.00	2.00	9.40
Pct_Hisp_2000	17.30	18.48	18.05	-1.18	1.55	2.88	23.50
Pct__Unemployed_16Plus_2000	4.74	4.45	1.81	0.28	0.30	0.32	0.90
Median_Income_1999	42654.77	42292.56	13028.64	362.21	1372.00	1989.17	8717.00
Pct_Poverty_18Plus_1999	15.04	14.04	5.81	0.99	1.45	1.36	3.90
Pct_EDU_25Plus_BAPlus_2000	34.20	32.28	17.41	1.92	2.85	2.98	8.30
Pct_ForBorn_2000	17.87	16.63	11.10	1.24	1.20	1.85	6.90
Pct_ForBorn_NotCit_2000	11.34	10.63	7.56	0.71	0.90	1.15	6.30
Pct_ForBorn_LatinAm_2000	40.08	46.46	24.30	-6.38	6.50	6.38	13.50
Pct_Latino_Not_Citizen_2000	5.36	5.28	7.05	0.08	0.29	0.58	6.05
Pct_New_City_Residents_2000	23.23	25.59	8.52	-2.36	2.41	2.58	6.17
PGORE	58.68	54.39	10.47	4.28	3.95	4.67	13.70

Table 2: Post-Match: Example covariate balance table shows that the match brings treatment control into relative alignment

Table 3: Regression analysis post-match, modeling various types of crime for year 2012. Findings corroborate the earlier findings, there is no evidence for an effect for sanctuary city policy.

	Crime Type		
	Violent	Property	Rape
Sanctuary (Treatment)	84.840	−830.597	−2.796
	(55.097)	(595.049)	(8.867)
Population Size	−0.00004	−0.0004	−0.00000
	(0.00003)	(0.0004)	(0.00001)
Percent White	−15.914***	−28.238	−5.337***
	(3.412)	(34.780)	(0.544)
Percent Black	−9.146**	−115.709***	−5.538***
	(3.479)	(38.299)	(0.572)
Percent Asian	1.995	282.489***	−4.176***
	(7.082)	(79.321)	(1.242)
Percent Hispanic	−9.869**	−66.199	−3.939***
	(4.792)	(49.268)	(0.784)
Percent Unemployed	−28.822*	1,928.772***	−0.493
	(15.141)	(165.997)	(2.440)
Median Income	−0.001	−0.094**	0.0002
	(0.005)	(0.042)	(0.001)
Poverty (Over 18)	31.646***	−415.281***	1.616
	(11.530)	(117.185)	(1.742)
BA or Greater (25+)	−3.316	96.981**	0.328
	(3.926)	(37.941)	(0.640)
Percent Foreign Born	−27.993*	−563.896***	−3.271
	(14.424)	(146.861)	(2.339)
Percent Foreign Born w/o Citizenship	14.703	748.087***	2.255
	(22.684)	(233.805)	(3.669)
Percent Foreign Born Latin American.	2.998	70.046***	0.607*
	(2.055)	(22.512)	(0.326)
Latino Not Citizen	−2.214	−169.784	0.483
	(12.679)	(130.954)	(2.087)
Mobility	−15.101***	−231.417***	−1.549*
	(5.028)	(56.682)	(0.836)
Gore Vote (2000)	4.239	72.535**	−0.129
	(3.175)	(33.115)	(0.493)
Percent Male 15-19	56.494	−1,019.732***	−1.359
	(35.161)	(308.888)	(5.453)
Percent Male 20-24	−38.024*	494.330**	1.722
	(21.527)	(203.327)	(3.119)
Percent Male 25-29	44.939	−129.336	−5.123
	(37.475)	(413.826)	(5.277)
Percent Male 30-34	16.563	−408.006	11.240
	(44.046)	(494.855)	(6.802)
Constant	1,487.174**	14,143.280**	511.970***
	(631.806)	(6,162.528)	(97.314)
Observations	110	110	110
R^2	0.756	0.717	0.715
Adjusted R^2	0.701	0.653	0.651
Residual Std. Error (df = 89)	264.853	2,899.324	42.932
F Statistic (df = 20; 89)	13.762***	11.277***	11.170***
Note:			*$p<0.1$; **$p<0.05$; ***$p<0.01$

11   Appendix

Number	City	State	Year
1	Anchorage	ALASKA	2003
2	Haines	ALASKA	2003
3	Sitka	ALASKA	2003
4	Chandler	ARIZONA	2006
5	Berkeley	CALIFORNIA	2007
6	East Palo Alto	CALIFORNIA	2007
7	Fresno	CALIFORNIA	2003
8	Garden Grove	CALIFORNIA	2007
9	Los Angeles	CALIFORNIA	2007
10	Oakland	CALIFORNIA	2007
11	Richmond	CALIFORNIA	2007
12	San Diego	CALIFORNIA	2008
13	San Francisco	CALIFORNIA	2002
14	San Jose	CALIFORNIA	2007
15	San Rafael	CALIFORNIA	2003
16	Santa Cruz	CALIFORNIA	2007
17	Watsonville	CALIFORNIA	2007
18	Durango	COLORADO	2004
19	Hartford	CONNECTICUT	2007
20	New Haven	CONNECTICUT	2006
21	Washington	DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA	2003
22	Portland	MAINE	2004
23	Baltimore	MARYLAND	2003
24	Takoma Park	MARYLAND	2007
25	Boston	MASSACHUSETTS	2006
26	Brewster	MASSACHUSETTS	2003
27	Brookline	MASSACHUSETTS	2006
28	Cambridge	MASSACHUSETTS	2002
29	Lexington	MASSACHUSETTS	2004
30	Orleans	MASSACHUSETTS	2003
31	Ann Arbor	MICHIGAN	2003
32	Detroit	MICHIGAN	2002
33	Hamtramck	MICHIGAN	2008
34	Lansing	MICHIGAN	2004
35	Minneapolis	MINNESOTA	2007
36	St. Paul	MINNESOTA	2004
37	St. Louis	MISSOURI	2004
38	Elko	NEVADA	2004
39	Montclair	NEW JERSEY	2004
40	Newark	NEW JERSEY	2006
41	Trenton	NEW JERSEY	2004

Sanctuary Cities

42	Albuquerque	NEW MEXICO	2007
43	New York	NEW YORK	2003
44	Syracuse	NEW YORK	2003
45	Durham	NORTH CAROLINA	2003
46	Ashland	OREGON	2003
47	Gaston	OREGON	2002
48	Portland	OREGON	2003
49	Talent	OREGON	2003
50	Philadelphia	PENNSYLVANIA	2002
51	Pittsburgh	PENNSYLVANIA	2004
52	Seattle	WASHINGTON	2003
53	Madison	WISCONSIN	2002
54	Milwaukee	WISCONSIN	2004

Table 4: List of sanctuary cities by state and year

Variable	Type	Coding
Total Population (2000)	numeric	raw count
Percent White	numeric	percent
Percent Black	numeric	percent
Percent Asian	numeric	percent
Percent Hispanic	numeric	percent
Percent Unemployed (2000)	numeric	percent
Median Income (2000)	numeric	city median
Percent poverty (1999)	numeric	percent
BA or Greater (25+)	numeric	percent
Percent Foreign-Born	numeric	percent
Percent Latino Non-citizen (2000)	numeric	percent
Percent Foreign Born Latin American (2000)	numeric	percent
Gore Vote	Numeric	percentage
Percent Age Male 15 -19 (2000)	numeric	percent
Percent Age Male 20 - 24 (2000)	numeric	percent
Percent Age Male 25 - 29 (2000)	numeric	percent
Percent Age Male 30 - 34 (2000)	numeric	percent
Violent Crime	numeric	per/100,000
Property Crime	numeric	per/100,000
Rape Crime	numeric	per/100,000

Table 5: Variable Coding