

# Partisan Learning or Racial Learning: Opinion Change on Sanctuary City Policy Preferences in California and Texas

LOREN COLLINGWOOD<sup>\*1</sup>, BENJAMIN GONZALEZ O'BRIEN<sup>†2</sup>, AND JOE R.  
TAFOYA<sup>‡3</sup>

<sup>1</sup>*University of California, Riverside*

<sup>2</sup>*Highline College*

<sup>3</sup>*University of Texas*

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\*loren.collingwood@ucr.edu, Corresponding author; authors listed alphabetically

†bgonzalez@highline.edu

‡jrtafoya@utexas.edu

## **Abstract**

Significant research indicates that attitude change is often a product of partisan learning (Green, Palmquist, Schickler 2004; Lenz 2011). As the party system continues to rearrange around issues of race and immigration, it may be that (on race-related issues) voters are learning more based on race/ethnicity and not on party. We evaluate the partisan learning model versus a racial-learning model with regards to public opinion on sanctuary cities among survey respondents in California and Texas – two states that have experienced extensive recent debate on the issue. After the rise of Trump and his connection with opposition to sanctuary cities, we show that partisanship is much more predictive of attitudes on sanctuary cities in 2017 versus 2015, whereas findings for racial/ethnic learning are not so forthcoming. Implications are discussed.

# Introduction

Throughout the 1990s and into the mid-2000s, the sanctuary city movement, in general, received minimal press coverage at the national level.<sup>1</sup> Sanctuary cities are municipalities that forbid local officials from inquiring into immigration status and may also ignore federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainer requests for individuals charged with non-violent offenses. For the most part, before 2015 sanctuary cities were a non-issue insofar as agenda setting and public opinion were concerned (Baumgartner and Jones, 2010). Sanctuary cities as a topic were rarely covered in the national media during this period; instead, coverage of these policies tended to be more local in nature. Before the killing of Kathryn Steinle by Juan Francisco Lopez-Sanchez, an undocumented Mexican immigrant, in the summer of 2015,<sup>2</sup> most Americans had little to shape and guide how they thought about sanctuary cities. While Republican elites appeared to uniformly oppose such cities, political rhetoric and legislation surrounding such cities was minimal indeed (see Figure 1). National Democrats, on the other hand, largely avoided the issue; moreover not all were lock-in-step supportive of sanctuary cities; indeed, as late as 2010 then-California Attorney General Jerry Brown expressed opposition to such policies.<sup>3</sup> However, following the Steinle shooting a number of Republican elites seized on this as an example of the consequences of resistance to federal immigration policy. Donald Trump in particular made this a key theme of both his candidacy and the early days of his presidency.

[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]

This article investigates how voters came to “learn” about sanctuary cities, an issue that was largely thrust into the public’s attention in the summer of 2015. Given elite cues

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<sup>1</sup>Between 1991-2004, just 4 articles a year on sanctuary cities/sanctuary movements were found in a combined corpus of newspaper articles from the New York Times, Washington Post, USA Today, and Christian Science-Monitor. From 2005-2014 the average increased to 19 articles a year. This number jumped to 255 articles a year from 2015-2017.

<sup>2</sup><http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-immigration-sanctuary-kathryn-steinle-20150723-htmlstory.html>

<sup>3</sup><http://www.mercurynews.com/2017/05/06/californias-governor-once-opposed-sanctuary-status-have-time-and-trump-changed-his-mind/>

on partisanship and race, specifically, did key voter characteristics of party identification and race/ethnicity guide how voters learned and ultimately cleaved on whether to support or oppose sanctuary cities as a matter of public policy? To untangle this, we pose two “learning” models against one another: partisan learning versus racial/ethnic learning. We find strong and consistent evidence for partisan learning, but no evidence for racial/ethnic learning.

Prior to 2015, sanctuary cities/policies received only passing attention by media outlets. However, since then sanctuary cities have been widely debated both in media and on the campaign trail, in part because Republican candidates have seen the issue as a potential wedge to their advantage (Hillygus and Shields, 2014). Following Steinle’s death, Donald Trump and other GOP candidates argued vociferously against sanctuary cities, as a way to flex their anti-immigrant credentials in appeals to GOP primary voters. During the 2016 presidential campaign, Trump routinely said he would “end” sanctuary cities once elected. In a September, 2016, stump speech in Phoenix, Trump professed that, “We will end the sanctuary cities that have resulted in so many needless deaths.”<sup>4</sup> However, a defense of sanctuary cities from Clinton and other leading Democrats during the 2016 campaign was relatively muted, as – insofar as immigration policy is concerned – Democrats focused more on comprehensive immigration reform, a pathway to citizenship for undocumented residents, and a defense of DACA (Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals).<sup>5</sup> Thus, immediately after the Steinle killing, mainstream elite communication flowed largely in a one way anti-sanctuary policy direction (Zaller, 1992a).

Shortly after his inauguration, Trump and the Attorney General, Jeff Sessions, sought to withdraw federal crime-fighting funds from sanctuary cities if these cities failed to revoke their sanctuary status. Many of these cities, such as Seattle, Chicago, New York, and Los Angeles, are Democratic strongholds with large and diverse populations. An attack on these

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<sup>4</sup><http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/01/politics/sanctuary-cities-donald-trump/index.html>

<sup>5</sup><http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2016/jul/15/compare-candidates-clinton-vs-trump-immigration/>

cities' sanctuary status is often seen as an attack on Latinos generally – a group central to Democratic prospects – and therefore a group that Democratic politicians increasingly cannot ignore. Democratic big-city mayors, and increasingly Democratic elites across the spectrum are now forced to defend their cities' sanctuary status; accordingly these mayors and other Democrats increasingly serve as elite opposition to Trump on the issue.<sup>6</sup>

In California – the nation's most populous state – Democratic governor Jerry Brown came out in strong support for sanctuary cities despite previously opposing such cities,<sup>7</sup> and leading Democrat Senate President Pro Tem Kevin de León proposed a bill to make the whole state a sanctuary for undocumented immigrants.<sup>8</sup> Senate Bill 54 (the California Values Act) would limit state and local law enforcement's ability to cooperation with federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents, amounting to a sanctuary policy for the entire state.<sup>9</sup> As of this writing, this bill has passed the legislature and awaits Governor Brown's signature, which would make California the second state, Oregon being the other, to declare itself a sanctuary for undocumented immigrants.<sup>10</sup>

In Texas – the nation's second most populous state – Republican lawmakers and the GOP governor moved in the opposite direction: attacking local jurisdictions that were considering adopting sanctuary policies, as well as Travis county (Austin), where ICE detainers were not being honored for low-level offenders. Senate Bill 4 (SB4), which ultimately became law in Texas on May 7, 2017, attaches Class A misdemeanor charges to non-compliance with federal immigration policies and ICE detainers by individuals, as well as civil financial penalties. It would also permit local law enforcement to inquire into immigration status of anyone legally

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<sup>6</sup><http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/11/14/502066703/mayor-rahm-emanuel-chicago-always-will-be-a-sanctuary-city>; <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/28/nyregion/bill-de-blasio-defends-new-york-policies-on-immigration.html?mcubz=1&r=0>

<sup>7</sup><http://www.politico.com/story/2017/08/05/california-trump-sanctuary-cities-lawsuit-jerry-brown-241358>

<sup>8</sup><http://www.mercurynews.com/2017/05/06/californias-governor-once-opposed-sanctuary-status-have-time-and-trump-changed-his-mind/>

<sup>9</sup><https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2017/0913/California-poised-to-become-sanctuary-state.-But-do-such-policies-work>

<sup>10</sup><http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-california-sanctuary-state-bill-20170916-story.html>

detained.<sup>11</sup>

SB4, if it survives legal challenges, will be one of the toughest immigration laws in the nation and the debate over the bill recalled earlier ones on Arizona’s SB1070, which would have allowed local police to inquire into immigration status during routine traffic stops.<sup>12</sup> In the debate in the Texas House of Representatives, GOP proponents of the bill hewed to the crime narrative, arguing that the legislation only targeted dangerous criminals and was simply meant to ensure compliance and cooperation with federal laws. Democratic opponents pointed out that the bill could lead to racial profiling since it allows officers to inquire into immigration status and that it also would increase fear of police in immigrant communities, leading to decreased crime reporting, cooperation, and health care use (Pedraza et al., 2017).<sup>13</sup> Given that politics in Texas is largely aligned along racial lines – both at the mass public and institutional level – <sup>14</sup> party and race are potentially conflating how voters use these cues to “learn” position-taking. Hence, this paper seeks to clarify which variable provides the bulk of voter learning vis-à-vis sanctuary policies.

The issue of sanctuary cities – and sanctuary protection for undocumented residents in general – was thus once again dramatically thrust into the news cycle in late 2016 and into 2017 as it had been in the 1980s as a result of the church-based Sanctuary Movement (see Figure 2 below). This time though the conflict was not between the federal government and individuals affiliated with religious institutions but instead between federal and local governments over the issue of balancing enforcement of immigration policy with the need for trust between immigrant communities and the police. This very public conflict between the Trump Administration and state and local governments attracted mainstream attention once again, making the issue a highly partisan and divisive one, as is reflected in Figure 2

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<sup>11</sup><https://www.texastribune.org/2017/04/27/tensions-flaring-house-members-will-debate-anti-sanctuary-city-bill/>

<sup>12</sup><https://www.thenation.com/article/texas-sb-4-dramatic-state-crackdown-yet-sanctuary-cities/>

<sup>13</sup><https://www.texastribune.org/2017/04/27/tensions-flaring-house-members-will-debate-anti-sanctuary-city-bill/>

<sup>14</sup><https://www.texastribune.org/2017/01/09/texas-legislature-mostly-white-male-middle-aged/>,  
<http://www.cnn.com/election/results/exit-polls/texas/president>

below.

INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE

The relatively sudden rise of sanctuary cities as a salient mainstream political issue and point of controversy provokes several important questions concerning public opinion, and provides an opportunity to examine how voters arrive at the positions they have on a racially nascent issue, beyond simply transporting existing immigration attitudes onto the sanctuary domain. First, how have such political events – and the media coverage thereof – translated into public opinion? Given that most Americans had little to shape their opinion on sanctuary cities prior to 2015, many people likely exhibited non-attitudes on the topic (Converse, 2006; Zaller, 1992b), and given the growing elite political polarization on the issue, do public attitudes on sanctuary cities reflect a growing partisan cleavage? In other words, are voters learning to adopt their “correct” partisan positions (Lau and Redlawsk, 1997)?<sup>15</sup> However, since 2015, learning may well be asymmetric, as Republican voters may well have already taken their cues from Trump and other leading Republicans that sanctuary cities are something these voters should oppose.<sup>16</sup> Because Democratic elites tended to avoid the issue until 2017, Democratic voters may have initially opposed such cities given the one-way anti-sanctuary city information flow prior to 2017 (Zaller, 1992a).<sup>17</sup> As Democratic elites, and key Democratic constituency groups rallied in defense of sanctuary cities, and as Democrats moved to oppose all things Trump, we might expect to see Democratic voters moving sharply in defense of sanctuary cities over a relatively short period of time.

Recent research has shown that the party system may be further realigning around ethnicity and immigration (partly as a function of white status threat (Craig and Richeson, 2014)

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<sup>15</sup>Although see Nuño (2007) for situations where GOP candidates can effectively mobilize Latinos. The assumption of “correct” is certainly open to change over time.

<sup>16</sup>Furthermore, in California, the questions inquiring about sanctuary city policy contain the term “illegal immigrants”, which may have cued Republicans to oppose the issue initially. Although Haynes et al. (2016); Merolla et al. (2013) suggest framing around “illegal” or “undocumented” should not matter in terms of public opinion.

<sup>17</sup>Our over-time analysis of newspaper articles from New York Times, Washington Post, USA Today, and Christian Science Monitor, reveals that in 2015, 62% of sanctuary-related articles included reference to crime; 2016 the figure was 43% reference to crime; and 2017 was 45%.

and demographic growth (Ramírez, 2013)), much as it did around race post-1965 (Carmines and Stimson, 1989; Jardina, 2014; Schickler, 2016). Abrajano and Hajnal (2015) convincingly show that as the Latina/o population has grown and the Democratic Party has begun to make appeals to this group (Barreto and Nuño, 2011; Barreto et al., 2010; Collingwood et al., 2014), whites – especially blue-collar whites (Collingwood, Reny, and Valenzuela, nd)<sup>18</sup> – have begun to move into the GOP. Given that sanctuary cities are explicitly connected to immigration, and hence a racialized policy domain, it is plausible that – all else equal – whites learn to take the correct “white” position (anti-sanctuary city) and Latinos the correct “Latino” position (pro-sanctuary city). Thus, the first test in this article is to assess whether respondents’ public opinion learning on sanctuaries/sanctuary cities/sanctuary policy is a feature of partisan-learning, racial/ethnic-learning, or some combination of the two. As we show below, we find strong and consistent evidence for partisan-learning, but find little evidence of clear racial/ethnic learning. While Latina/os become more pro-sanctuary from 2015 to 2017, which might be suggestive of racial/ethnic learning, so do whites. In other words, Latinos became more pro-sanctuary in 2017 because everyone became more pro-sanctuary, not necessarily because of their ethnicity.

The rest of this article proceeds as follows: First, we outline some of the research relevant to our hypotheses on partisan learning and racial learning. Second, we set forth our formal hypotheses which we touched on above. Third, we discuss our data and methods, which include two different data sources. Fourth, we present our results. Finally, we end with a short discussion of our findings and conclusion with some thoughts for future research.

## Background and Theory

Partisan identity has long been the main driver of political attitudes and voting behavior. Angus et al. (1960); Lewis-Beck (2009) argued that party attachment was akin to religious

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<sup>18</sup><http://www.salon.com/2017/08/12/democrats-better-deal-is-a-bum-deal-for-progressives-and-wont-win-elections/>



identification, based on a value system developed during pre-adult socialization. Voters can then use this partisan identification as a valuable heuristic in candidate selection even when little is known about the candidates' policy preferences (Jacoby, 1988; Lau and Redlawsk, 1997; Schaffner and Streb, 2002). While the party system has shifted over time, invoking a massive racial (and partisan) realignment from the 1960s-1990s (Black et al., 2009; Carmines and Stimson, 1989; Schickler, 2016), parties have adopted different positions on different issues across time (Hillygus and Shields, 2014; Karol, 2009), and emerging immigrant communities seem less wedded to the party system than heretofore (Hajnal and Lee, 2011), individual-level partisan attachment nevertheless exhibits highly stable qualities (Green et al., 2004). For the most part, at least in the modern era, once voters select a party identification, they tend to stick with it.<sup>19</sup>

At the same time, extant research indicates that while many voters know relatively little about American politics and policy writ large (Carpini and Keeter, 1993, 1996; Converse, 2006), elite communications (i.e., politicians, candidates, party and media elites) strongly influence citizens' attitudes on emerging topics (Gabel and Scheve, 2007; IYENGAR and SIMON, 1993; Zaller, 1992a). Indeed Lenz (2013) demonstrates that in many cases voters actually adopt the preferred policy position of their preferred candidates/elected officials, as opposed to supporting candidates with whom they share identical policy preferences. In other words, voters are drawn to a candidate (and by extension party), then learn to adopt that candidate's/party's policy positions on a variety of issues. Taken together, the literature strongly suggests that when it comes to attitudes about sanctuary cities – a topic heretofore unconsidered by the vast majority of voters – voters will rely on partisan cues to “learn” their correct position. Thus, we might expect that party will constrain attitudes on sanctuary cities much more dramatically in 2017 than in 2015, after voters had “learned” their correct partisan position.

Beyond party identification, however, extensive research indicates the overwhelming in-

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<sup>19</sup>Although see Hajnal and Lee (2011) for some exceptions.

fluence that racial attitudes and racial group membership have on constraining opinion on policy matters explicitly or implicitly connected to race and ethnicity (McClain et al., 2009; Mendelberg, 2001; Parker and Barreto, 2014; Tajfel, 2010). Dawson (2003) developed the term, *Black Utility Heuristic* to explain why Blacks voting along racial lines so strongly for the Democratic Party was rational given the overriding influence race has on most Black Americans' lives. In addition, Sanchez and Masuoka (2010) and Sanchez (2006) show that Latina/os do exhibit variations of pan-ethnic linked-fate, although it tends to be less strong as is the case among Blacks. More recent research has begun to establish the growth of white identity in American politics and how many whites now view themselves equally if not more so discriminated against than minorities (Gest, 2016; Hutchings et al., 2011; Jardina, 2014; Major et al., 2016; Schildkraut, 2017). Moreover, research indicates that whites high in racial identity were strongly supportive of Trump (Schaffner, MacWilliams, Nteta, nd), and that Trump built his political base in areas that had recently undergone rapid Latino growth (Newman, Shah, and Collingwood, *forthcoming*). Thus, given the competing role that racial attitudes and racial group membership play in attitude development and voting, it seems entirely plausible that whites – on average – will connect sanctuary cities with something that benefits Latinos and not themselves, whereas Latinos will see sanctuary policy as something that benefits Latinos as a whole. Thus, if racial learning is true, all else equal, we should expect to see whites moving away from supporting sanctuary cities from 2015 to 2017, and Latinos moving towards greater support for such policies from 2015 to 2017.

## Hypotheses

The forgoing discussion lends itself to two hypotheses, which we evaluate below with two studies.

- **H1 Partisan Learning:** Party identification will cleave sanctuary city opinion more in 2017 compared to opinion in 2015. Specifically Democrats will become dramatically

more supportive of sanctuary cities from 2015 to 2017.

- **H2 Racial Learning:** Ascriptive racial/ethnic group identity will cleave sanctuary city opinion more in 2017 compared to opinion in 2015. Specifically, whites will become more opposed to sanctuary cities in 2017 than in 2015, and Latina/os will become more supportive in 2017 than in 2015.<sup>20</sup>

## Data, Methods, & Results

To evaluate the two hypotheses – partisan learning and racial learning – we rely on four surveys, two fielded in California (2015 and 2017, respectively) and two fielded in Texas (2015 and 2017, respectively). There are very few publicly available public opinion surveys inquiring about sanctuary cities, but we managed to acquire data for these two states. While these two states are not necessarily generalizable to the full U.S. adult population, they are the two largest states, with exceedingly diverse populations, many large cities, and are states where the debate over immigration and sanctuary policies is highly salient. In many ways, California and Texas represent the growing schism on sanctuary city and immigration politics at the state-level.

To the extent possible we conduct the same analyses in both states, to provide consistent tests of our hypotheses, and also to enhance reliability. That said, we are limited by the survey items available in both states and in both years. Furthermore, the questions asking about sanctuary cities are different in both states, and indeed, differ across years in the California surveys. To the extent possible, we control for these differences in our analytic approach, and provide several robustness checks to ensure our conclusions are sound. Besides, our analytical comparisons are within state, so while our point estimates from one state may

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<sup>20</sup>We examine these two groups because the racial learning expectations are fairly straightforward, whereas racial learning for Blacks or Asians, for instance, is not so straightforward (Kim and Lee, 2001; McClain, 1993; McClain and Karnig, 1990; Meier and Stewart Jr, 1991; Rocha, 2007; Sawyer, 2005). That said, in future research we intend to apply different learning models to other racial groups within this policy domain since this seems an area ripe for greater scrutiny.

differ from the point estimates in another state as a consequence of question wording, the differences across years within state are relative to one another so are internally valid.

## California

In August, 2015, the Institute for Governmental Studies at University of California, Berkeley, fielded a representative poll of California adults, which included several questions about sanctuary cities, along with a host of other questions and demographic items.<sup>21</sup> The survey was fielded online by Survey Sampling International (SSI), and was weighted by gender, race/ethnicity, education, and age to match adult Census proportions within the state. The total sample size is 1,098 respondents, producing a margin of error of  $\pm 3$  percentage points at the 95% confidence level. Importantly, the survey came shortly after the shooting of Kathryn Steinle.

The second California survey fielded March 13-20, 2017, and included a sample of  $n = 1000$  respondents with a margin of error of about  $\pm 3$  percentage points at the 95% confidence level. The data were collected by YouGov, an online sampling and interviewing platform, that employs propensity score sampling matching to ensure a representative sample of California voters.<sup>22</sup> The two surveys were then pooled to create an overall dataset of 2,090 respondents (2015  $n = 1098$ , 2017  $n = 992$ ).

For the most part, all question items in the two surveys are asked and coded in the same way. However there are some differences, which we note in footnotes or in the appendix. The dependent variable reads:

Under California law, local jurisdictions like cities and counties can ignore requests from federal authorities to detain illegal immigrants who have been arrested and are about to be released. Do you believe that local authorities should be able to ignore a federal request to hold an illegal immigrant who has

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<sup>21</sup>Field Dates: 8/11/2015 - 8/26/2015

<sup>22</sup>Due to potential sampling differences between vendors we control for education, income, education, and age in our analyses. In addition, partisanship affiliation is similar in both waves.

been detained? – Yes, local authorities should be able to ignore these federal requests (1); No, local authorities should not be able to ignore these federal requests (0).<sup>23</sup>

To assess our hypotheses of partisan and racial learning, we include items on partisanship, racial identification, and a dummy variable for year of survey (1=2017 respondent, 0=2015 respondent). Party identification is a standard three item question, which we scaled accordingly: Strong Democrat (1), Somewhat Democrat (2), Weak Democrat(3), Independent (4), Weak Republican (5), Somewhat Republican (6), Strong Republican. In both surveys, voters were asked to identify their race, as either: Asian/Pacific Islander, Black, Latino, Native American/Alaska Native, or White. We crafted dummy variables of these nominal categories, leaving white out of the model as the comparison group. To evaluate the two learning models, we interact party identification X year 2017, and also Latino X year 2017. Because the literature clearly suggests the potential for a white identity racial-learning framework, and a Latina/o identity racial-learning framework – when it comes to the issue of immigration – we only assess learning among whites and Latina/os. To provide support for these hypotheses we expect statistically significant interaction terms and post-estimation predicted probability simulations that show a clear divergence for party and race from T1-T2.

We include control variables available on the surveys: Gender, education, age, income, race, Catholic identification, as well as dummy variables for splits in each survey. All coding is included in the appendix.<sup>24</sup> Finally, because our dependent variable is coded as a binary, we employ logistic regression as our statistical technique.

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<sup>23</sup>Both surveys (2015 and 2017) split this question, asking slightly different items to a random subset of half the respondents. These items are included in the appendix. In 2015, the second version of the item provoked more anti-sanctuary opinion (version 1 mean = 0.271 on a 0-1 scale, version 2 mean = 0.218 on a 0-1 scale,  $t = 2.0164$ ,  $df = 1096$ ,  $p - value < 0.05$ ). In 2017, answers to the DV question wordings were not statistically significantly different across the two versions, version 1 mean = 0.495; version 2 mean = 0.535;  $t = -1.2541$ ,  $df = 988.8$ ,  $p - value = 0.2101$ . Furthermore, we subset the California data to just respondents who received the same DV in 2015 and 2017 and conducted a regression analysis. The results, presented in Table 3 in the appendix, do not substantively change our conclusions.

<sup>24</sup>The survey did not have consistent measures of nativity, so we do not include a measure for generation. Future research should investigate whether Latina/o attitudes on sanctuary cities varies as a function of generational status. However, this project is investigating main effects of partisan and racial/ethnic learning.

To begin our analysis, we present results from a baseline (non-interactive) pooled logistic regression model, which is shown in Column 1 in Table 1. The results suggest that attitudes towards sanctuary cities are guided by party identification, age, gender, and possibly by race, as Blacks report greater overall opposition to sanctuary cities than do whites.<sup>25</sup> However, in this baseline model, education does not appear to weigh on sanctuary city attitudes – at least in California. Finally, the year 2017 dummy variable reports large substantive and statistically significant effects.

To evaluate our two hypotheses, we interacted party identification and Latino (with white as the comparison), respectively, with year 2017. The results from Column 2 clearly demonstrate support for the partisan learning hypothesis as the product term is statistically significant and substantively large. We do not, however, produce any statistical evidence in support of the racial learning hypothesis (given the white–Latino dyad).

INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

To more cleanly evaluate the partisan learning hypothesis, we simulated expected probability outcomes on support for sanctuary policy as a function of changes to partisan identification. Figure 3 presents the results of this monte carlo simulation: In 2015, party identification barely constrained public opinion on the topic, as strong Democrats were marginally more positive on sanctuary policy than were strong Republicans. However, by 2017, strong Democrats now had an expected probability of supporting sanctuary policy over 0.75, whereas Republicans became slightly more opposed to sanctuary cities than they had been previously. This provides strong evidence for a partisan learning model, given how debate of the issue – and the media coverage thereof – shifted between 2015 and 2017.

INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE

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<sup>25</sup>Blacks do change opinion from 2015 to 2017, however. We do not investigate this here because theoretical expectations for this group require an independent examination due to Blacks strong alignment with the Democratic Party but also the potential for lower-income African Americans to see Latino immigrants as political and economic competition. In future research we intend to investigate this opinion shift.

While the results in Table 1 do not support a racial learning model, we nevertheless conducted a similar simulation evaluation as with the partisan learning approach. Figure 4 presents the findings from a similar analysis (because the independent variable is binary we do not simulate a range). To show effects for racial learning, we would anticipate whites to drop in support of sanctuary policy/cities from 2015 to 2017, and for Latinos to show above mean increases in support from 2015 to 2017. However, as the graph demonstrates, Latinos and whites move in support of sanctuary cities in almost uniform slopes. These results are inconsistent with a racial learning model. While Latinos “learned” to support sanctuary cities, they did not do so any more than any other group, so we cannot conclude with these data that their learning was inherently racial/ethnic. Therefore, in California we find strong support for the partisan-learning theory of public opinion on sanctuary cities. As the parties cleaved on this issue, Californians “learned” the correct position on this issue for the party they identified with and were more likely to take the “correct” position in 2017 than they were in 2015, when there were not the same stark divisions between the parties.

[INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]

## Texas

To provide greater generalizability and reliability to our California findings, we replicated our analysis with two publicly available polls in Texas fielded by the Texas Tribune/University of Texas in 2015 and 2017, respectively. The first poll was in the field between October 30 to November 8, 2015, and surveyed  $n = 1200$  adults, with a margin of error of  $+/- 2.83$  percentage points. The second survey fielded February 3-10, 2017, with an overall  $n = 1200$ .

The surveys were both online opt-in panels fielded by Yougov, a firm that uses a well-established and reliable propensity score matching algorithm, that balances the sample on age, gender, education, ideology, party identification, and race/ethnicity to create a representative sample (Vavreck and Rivers, 2008).

Between the two fielding periods, a raucous debate on sanctuary cities emerged in Texas, with the Republican governor, Gregg Abbott supporting a bill (SB4) designed to void any and all sanctuary city policies in the state, and Democrats fighting back during debates on the House floor.<sup>26</sup> Thus, it seems reasonable, that significant amounts of partisan learning occurred in Texas from Time 1 to Time 2.

Our analytical approach is similar to our approach in California; thus we keep the discussion about data coding to a minimum. The dependent variable, however, is asked differently: “In so-called ‘sanctuary cities,’ local law enforcement officials do not actively enforce some federal immigration laws. Do you approve (1) or disapprove (0) of city governments that choose not to enforce some immigration laws?”

Again, our main independent variables are party identification (7-point), racial identification (Latino versus white/Anglo), and survey year (2017). We include controls for gender, education, age, income, and ideology. All coding and question wording appear in the appendix. Because our dependent variable is coded as a 0-1, we estimate pooled logistic regression models.

Following a similar analytic strategy as above, Column 1 in Table 2 presents our baseline estimates: party identification, ideology, age, and race (Latino) are strongly predictive of sanctuary attitudes. Democrats and liberals report stronger support for sanctuary cities, whereas Republicans and conservatives express high levels of opposition to sanctuary cities. As with California, older voters are more anti-sanctuary than are younger voters. We do see evidence – consistent with extant research on anti-immigrant attitudes (Walker and Leitner, 2011) – that better educated Texans are more favorable on sanctuary cities than are less educated Texans all else equal. Finally, the coefficient for Year 2017 is positive and statistically significant, indicating that support for sanctuary cities in 2017 is greater than support in 2015.

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<sup>26</sup>Texas has no sanctuary cities, though there were accusations that two counties, Dallas and Travis, did not honor ICE detainers and SB4 was meant not only to prevent any sanctuary policies from being passed in more liberal locales like Austin, but also to force compliance from the sheriffs of Dallas and Travis Counties.



Column 2 in Table 2, adds product terms for Party Identification X Year 2017, and Latino (with white as comparison group) X Year 2017. If the two learning models are correct we should see a statistically significant coefficient for product terms, along with a divergence by party and race/ethnicity, respectively, between 2015 and 2017 in our post-estimation predicted probability simulation plots. As with California, the results provide support for the partisan-learning model, while the racial-learning model is not confirmed. Whereas the coefficient on Latino X Year 2017 is statistically significant, the sign is in the opposite direction. While these effects are hard to interpret, Figure 6 demonstrates why the racial-learning model is falsified. The statistically significant effect is due to whites increasing their support for sanctuary cities at a rate faster than Latinos (who began with a higher starting point in 2015).

INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

Figure 5 replicates the post-estimation monte carlo simulation plots, as we presented in the California analysis. While the trends are the same in Texas as in California (asymmetric learning for Democrats), the shift in support among Democrats is not as extreme. Still, overall, these findings, and the findings presented in Figure 6 are entirely consistent with the California findings.<sup>27</sup> Overall, then, we find strong and consistent support for a partisan-learning model but not for a racial-learning model. The next section evaluates some potential validity threats to our conclusions.

INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE

INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE

## Robustness Checks

This section provides several robustness checks to buttress our initial analysis and provide greater validity to and confidence in our findings.

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<sup>27</sup>We also assessed the possibility of racial learning occurring only among Republicans. Tables 4 and 5 in the appendix evaluate this possibility, but the results are consistent with racial learning among all whites.

First, we modeled our data with a binomial logistic regression, with 1=Support sanctuary cities/policy, 0=Oppose sanctuary cities/policy. In doing so we dropped people who declined to answer this question. However, this provides an opportunity to further test our hypotheses. If learning is going on, we might expect to see more don't know/refused to the sanctuary cities item in 2015 than in 2017. In Texas, 17.3% and 10% in 2015 and 2017, respectively, reported "don't know" to the sanctuary cities question. The difference between the two years is statistically significant ( $\chi^2 = 27.34, df = 1, p < 0.001$ ), which supports the notion that learning occurred in the population. We then modeled the don't knows (1=Don't know, 0 = answered the question). If partisan and racial learning occurred, we should expect negative and statistically significant effects with the model's product terms. Figure 6 reports the results from this analysis: there is a statistically significant effect for Democrat X Year 2017, but not for Latino X Year 2017. Democrats had less crystallized attitudes on the topic (than Republicans) in 2015, but by 2017 their attitudes became more crystallized so fewer of them responded "don't know." These findings further supports our baseline findings.<sup>28</sup>

[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]

Our main focus is on partisan learning vs. racial/ethnic learning, in general, thus, our analysis relies upon main effects for party identity and for race. While the results are very clear for party, we essentially found null effects on race/ethnic learning. However, might there be some heterogeneity with whites, i.e., perhaps some whites learned the "correct" position and moved more against sanctuary cities from T1 to T2. If any group of whites will do so it will be Republicans. Thus we subset our analysis to just white Republicans and then all other racial groups. Tables 4 and 5 present the respective California and Texas results for this analysis. In California, the interaction between Latino X Year 2017 presents null findings, indicating that Republican whites are not moving against sanctuary cities from T1 to T2, rather they are staying put if possibly inching upwards in support. In Texas,

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<sup>28</sup>Given the question wording in the California survey (i.e., no don't know option) very few responses skipped the sanctuary items in both years, so a similar analysis to that presented in Table 6 is not possible

Republican whites actually become slightly more supportive of sanctuary cities moving from a predicted probability of sanctuary support (based off the model) of .02 to .07 from 2015 to 2017.

[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]

[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]

Finally, as Kam (2005); Zaller (1992a) and others have demonstrated, people with higher levels of political sophistication tend to rely less on partisanship and more on other cues, opening the possibility that more sophisticated people may rely less on party affiliation and perhaps more on race. While both surveys do not have political knowledge measures, education is available. Tables 7 and 8 evaluate the interaction between education and year. In California – but not in Texas – better educated voters move more towards support for sanctuary policies in 2017 compared to 2015, suggesting some sort of learning process.<sup>29</sup> It’s possible that better educated Latinos and whites, respectively, “learn” their “correct” racial/ethnic position. We find no evidence for this in Texas; columns 2 (Anglos only) and 3 (Latinos only) in Table 8 show no significant relationship between education X year 2017 for the split-sample analyses. In California, we do see a statistically significant relationship between education X year 2017 and support for sanctuary cities among Latinos-only. Well-educated Latinos are better at “learning” their correct position; but we see no such relationship for whites. Overall, these robustness checks provide strong support for our initial conclusions. The main effects of no racial learning appear to exist even among highly targeted racial subgroups.

[INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE]

[INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE]

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<sup>29</sup>However, this main interaction drops out of significance once the interaction between party and year is included in the regression

## Discussion

This paper presented a fresh opportunity to examine how voters learn about new issues and what they use to guide their policy views, applied to the context of sanctuary city/movement policy. While political scientists have long known that partisan affiliation is the most powerful predictor of voting in candidate elections (Angus et al., 1960), and that party identification helps shape policy attitudes when elite partisan debates are covered in the media (Dancey and Goren, 2010), work has yet to examine whether this learning process operates vis-à-vis sanctuary cities/policies. Furthermore, given current partisan restructuring around race and ethnicity (Abrajano and Hajnal, 2015; Gest, 2016), a realistic hypothesis is that learning to take policy positions – particularly those centered around race/ethnicity – may also be partly determined by one’s race or ethnicity.

To wit, we posed two “learning” hypotheses against one another to answer the question: Do voters arrive at their sanctuary policy preference based on partisan affiliation, racial/ethnic identification, or some combination of the two – all else equal? We tested this proposition in two states, California and Texas, with cross-sectional surveys in 2015 and 2017 (so four surveys in total). The argument is that attitude crystallization on the topic – at least for Democrats – was still somewhat weak at the time of fielding and that if learning took place, then we should see massive attitude swings by 2017, given the rancorous state and national debates around the topic (Dancey and Goren, 2010). In both states, regardless of question wording, we found that attitudes in 2015 were much more anti-sanctuary than in 2017. In 2015, relatively high percentages of Democrats actually opposed the idea of city sanctuary status, broadly defined. However, by 2017, in both Texas and California, Democrats moved solidly into the pro-sanctuary camp with Republicans further entrenching their anti-sanctuary viewpoints. At the same time, while we did observe that Latina/os moved in the “correct” pro-sanctuary position, their movement was not any larger than the mean movement for voters as a whole. Furthermore, in both states, whites actually moved in a pro-sanctuary direction.

Thus, we conclude that the mass public learned their views on sanctuary cities primarily through a partisan and not necessarily racial lens. Despite the seemingly racialized nature of the issue, this may come as somewhat of a surprise, until we consider that post-Obama race and party have become increasingly conflated (Tesler, 2016). Given party’s long-standing heuristic as a stand-in for voting decisions and reported policy positions, and given how the debate connected top Republicans (e.g., Trump, Abbott) with the anti-sanctuary position and top Democrats (e.g., Brown)<sup>30</sup> supporting sanctuary policies writ large, the findings are therefore not considerably surprising. Nonetheless, the importance of this issue has grown and therefore deserves considerable scholarly attention, as sanctuary cities – and the immigration issue generally – ripple through the American political system in the Trump-era.

The growth of sanctuary cities/policies as a reality, and a point of conflict in American politics provides ample space for future research. Future research should investigate the possible role that existing immigration attitudes have on mediating the relationship between party identification and support or opposition to sanctuary cities. Immigration-related questions were not consistently asked in the four survey waves we assessed, so we were unable to investigate whether stable immigration attitudes mediate partisanship’s “learning” influence on sanctuary city/policy attitudes.

Furthermore, we detected some interesting sub-group findings (i.e., highly educated Latina/os were more supportive of sanctuary city policies in 2017 relative to 2015), which suggests future research could discretely examine how Latina/os, whites, Blacks, Asian/Pacific-Islanders, and other groups learn about sanctuary cities and whether, and if so why, opinion varies between these groups.

Finally, do the findings in Texas and California generalize to the full United States adult population? While examining the “learning” findings is impossible to say given the lack of nationally representative data investigating attitudes on sanctuary cities from two cross-sectional time-periods pre/post-Trump, future research should examine how party and race

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<sup>30</sup><http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/democrats-slam-gops-sanctuary-city-plan-as-mass-deportation/article/2623530>

constrain public opinion on sanctuary cities/policies nationwide, and should investigate the attitudinal similarities between views on sanctuaries and other immigration-related topics. A naive interpretation may be that generic immigration attitudes simply map onto sanctuary city attitudes, but in one of our surveys we discovered the relationship correlated at less than 0.5. This suggests that messaging moving forward may be critical to framing the issue in a positive way for immigrant advocates. Thus, future research should experimentally examine how different sanctuary frames affect public opinion.

# Tables

Table 1: Predictors of public opinion on sanctuary cities in California, 2015-2017 Pooled Model. “Do you believe that local authorities should be able to ignore a federal request to hold an illegal immigrant who has been detained? Yes, local authorities should be able to ignore these federal requests (1). No, local authorities should not be able to ignore these federal requests (0).”

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Sanctuary Support	
	(1)	(2)
Party Identification 7-point (Dem-Rep)	-0.363*** (0.027)	-0.105*** (0.037)
Female	-0.324*** (0.106)	-0.329*** (0.109)
Education (low-high)	0.053 (0.057)	0.055 (0.059)
Age	-0.263*** (0.039)	-0.276*** (0.040)
Latino	0.185 (0.142)	0.339* (0.191)
Black	-0.465** (0.233)	-0.549** (0.249)
Asian	-0.043 (0.174)	-0.072 (0.178)
Race: Other	0.122 (0.197)	0.157 (0.201)
Catholic	-0.121 (0.127)	-0.091 (0.131)
Income: Medium	-0.062 (0.128)	-0.014 (0.132)
Income: High	-0.227 (0.158)	-0.207 (0.164)
Income: Missing	-0.219 (0.187)	-0.202 (0.194)
B Split 2015 (Steinle mention)	-0.321** (0.149)	-0.291** (0.145)
B Split 2017 (Sanctuary specified)	0.238* (0.140)	0.297* (0.152)
2017 Year Dummy	1.178*** (0.145)	2.703*** (0.231)
<b>Party ID X 2017 Dummy</b>		-0.489*** (0.055)
<b>Latino X 2017 Dummy</b>		-0.361 (0.259)
Constant	0.920*** (0.277)	0.140 (0.297)
Observations	2,090	2,090
Log Likelihood	-1,148.551	-1,106.306
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,329.102	2,248.612
Pseudo R2	0.168	0.199

Note:



Table 2: Predictors of public opinion on sanctuary cities in Texas, 2015-2017 Pooled Model. “In so-called “sanctuary cities,” local law enforcement officials do not actively enforce some federal immigration laws. Do you approve (1) or disapprove (0) of city governments that choose not to enforce some immigration laws?”

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Sanctuary Support	
	(1)	(2)
Party Identification 7-point (Dem-Rep)	-0.430*** (0.043)	-0.347*** (0.056)
Female	-0.098 (0.131)	-0.108 (0.132)
Education (low-high)	0.149** (0.070)	0.148** (0.070)
Age	-0.299*** (0.051)	-0.300*** (0.051)
Latino	0.870*** (0.150)	1.119*** (0.204)
Black	-0.250 (0.196)	-0.251 (0.199)
Asian	0.508 (0.713)	0.447 (0.716)
Ideology (lib-conserv)	-0.559*** (0.048)	-0.561*** (0.049)
Income	0.066 (0.047)	0.066 (0.047)
No Income Dummy	0.140 (0.258)	0.127 (0.259)
Year 2017	0.867*** (0.131)	1.504*** (0.265)
<b>Party Identification X Year 2017</b>		-0.150** (0.068)
<b>Latino X Year 2017</b>		-0.508* (0.283)
Constant	2.959*** (0.347)	2.649*** (0.362)
Observations	2,015	2,015
Log Likelihood	-779.188	-774.671
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,582.377	1,577.342
Pseudo R2	0.428	0.432
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

# Figures

Figure 1: Frequency of bills introduced in U.S. state legislatures related to sanctuary cities, between 2005 - 2017. Activity increased dramatically in the year 2017.




Figure 2: Sanctuary city media coverage from 2015-2017 increased in salience massively with the election of Donald Trump. Over time, Trump increasingly becomes identified with the issue.




Figure 3: California: Simulations predicting support for sanctuary cities, marginal effect of party identification in 2015 versus 2017




Figure 4: Simulations predicting support for sanctuary cities, marginal effect of white versus Latino identification in 2015 versus 2017, California. Results run counter to a racial learning model.




Figure 5: Texas: Simulations predicting support for sanctuary cities, marginal effect of party identification in 2015 versus 2017





Figure 6: Simulations predicting support for sanctuary cities, marginal effect of white versus Latino identification in 2015 versus 2017, Texas. Results run counter to a racial learning model.



## Appendix

**Newspaper article analysis:** We collected all articles from the New York Times, Washington Post, USA Today, and Christian Science-Monitor from 1980-2017 (July) related to sanctuary movements or cities, using Lexis-Nexus. If the term sanctuary or sanctuaries appeared we selected that article. However, because some articles are about sanctuary marshes, animal sanctuaries, etc., we further required the corpus to have at least one of the following terms, which produced a high likelihood the story concerns sanctuary cities/movements in some way: city, cities, town, towns, central america, central american, mexican, mexico, movement, police, immigrant, immigrants, immigration, illegal, enforcement, alien, aliens, refugee, refugees, campus, campuses.

This produced 1,252 articles. Using a dictionary-based method ([Grimmer and Stewart, 2013](#); [Krippendorff, 2004](#)), we crafted distinct themes that we theorized would vary over time. In this paper we incorporate the themes of crime and partisanship to make various points throughout the manuscript. Below are the words selected for each theme. If at least one word was detected in the text then that document receives a 1, if not, the newspaper article receives a 0, and we conclude the article is not about that theme.

- Crime: crime, crimin, murder, rape, kill, killed, gang, gangs
- Democrat: democrat, democratic, democrats
- Republican: republican, republicans
- Trump: trump



California Survey Items, 2015:

- Dependent Variable 2015: [**Split A gets this plus language in split B**] An illegal immigrant who had been deported several times was recently released from jail in San Francisco and soon after shot and killed a woman walking with her parents near the Bay.
- [**2015: Split B only gets this:**] Under California law, local jurisdictions like cities and counties can ignore requests from federal authorities to detain illegal immigrants who have been arrested and are about to be released. Do you believe that local authorities should be able to ignore a federal request to hold an illegal immigrant who has been detained? 1. Yes, local authorities should be able to ignore these federal requests. 0. No, local authorities should not be able to ignore these federal requests.
- Dependent Variable 2017: [**Split A**] Under California law, local jurisdictions like cities and counties, can ignore requests from federal authorities to detain illegal or undocumented immigrants who have been arrested and are about to be released. Do you believe that local authorities should be able to ignore a federal request to hold an illegal immigrant who has been detained? Yes, SHOULD be able to ignore a federal request to hold an illegal or undocumented immigrant who has been detained (1). No, SHOULD NOT be able to ignore a federal request to hold an illegal or undocumented immigrant who has been detained (0)
- [**2017 Split B**] Some communities in California have declared themselves “sanctuary cities” for undocumented immigrants living in the country illegally. This means that when local police or government employees learn that someone is here illegally, they do not automatically turn over that person to federal immigration enforcement officers for possible deportation to their home country. Generally speaking, do you favor or oppose communities in California declaring themselves as sanctuary cities for illegal or

undocumented immigrants? Favor strongly (1), Favor somewhat (1), Oppose somewhat (0), Oppose strongly (0).

- Party Identification (1-7, Dem - Rep): Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, an independent, or what?
- Do you consider yourself closer to the Republican Party or the Democratic Party?
- Would you call yourself a strong Democrat/Republican, or a not very strong Democrat/Republican?
- Race: White is comparison group; Asian/Pacific Islander (1=yes, 0=no); Black (1=yes, 0=no); Latino (1=yes, 0=no); Race other (1=yes, 0=no)
- 2017 respondent (1), 2015 respondent (0)
- 2015 Split B version (1), Split A (0)
- 2017 Split B version (1), Split A (0)
- Gender: female (1); male (0)
- Education: Less than HS (1); HS or equivalent (2); Some college (3); Bachelor's degree (4); Advanced degree (5)
- Age: 18-29 (1); 30-39 (2); 40-49 (3); 50-65 (4); 65+ (5)
- Catholic (1=yes, 0 =no)

## Texas Survey Items

- DV 2015: In so-called “sanctuary cities,” local law enforcement officials do not actively enforce some federal immigration laws. Do you approve (1) or disapprove (0) of city governments that choose not to enforce some immigration laws?
- Generally speaking, would you say that you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, Republican, or Independent? Uses the four PID3 follow-up questions: Strong Democrat (1); Not very strong Democrat (2); Lean Democrat (3); Independent (4); Lean Republican (5); Not very strong Republican (6); Strong Republican (7).
- On a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 is extremely liberal, 7 is extremely conservative, and 4 is exactly in the middle, where would you place yourself? Extremely liberal (1); Somewhat liberal (2); Lean liberal (3); In the middle (4); Lean conservative (5); Somewhat conservative (6); Extremely conservative (7).
- Please indicate your age group: 18-29 (1); 30-44 (2); 45-64 (3); 65+ (4).
- In which category would you place your household income last year (0-6 low to high), dummy for non income
- What is the highest level of education that you received? Less than high school (1); High school degree (2); Some college / Two-year college degree (3); Four-year college degree (4); Post-graduate degree (5)
- What race do you consider yourself to be? Nominal with White as comparison category (0); Black (1=yes, 0=no); Hispanic/Latino (1=yes, 0=no); Asian/Pacific Islander (1=yes, 0=no)

Table 3: Predictors of public opinion on sanctuary cities in California, 2015-2017 Pooled Model (Identical DV): 'Do you believe that local authorities should be able to ignore a federal request to hold an illegal immigrant who has been detained? Yes, local authorities should be able to ignore these federal requests (1). No, local authorities should not be able to ignore these federal requests (0).'

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Sanctuary Support	
	(1)	(2)
Party Identification 7-point (Dem-Rep)	-0.364*** (0.038)	-0.126** (0.050)
Female	-0.383*** (0.148)	-0.400*** (0.152)
Education (low-high)	0.088 (0.081)	0.089 (0.084)
Age	-0.250*** (0.054)	-0.255*** (0.055)
Latino	0.535*** (0.196)	0.795*** (0.252)
Black	-0.833** (0.344)	-0.984*** (0.366)
Asian	-0.147 (0.245)	-0.132 (0.251)
Race: Other	0.142 (0.274)	0.150 (0.280)
Catholic	-0.285 (0.178)	-0.256 (0.184)
Income: Medium	-0.251 (0.180)	-0.223 (0.186)
Income: High	-0.147 (0.217)	-0.162 (0.224)
Income: Missing	-0.327 (0.260)	-0.313 (0.268)
2017 Dummy	1.191*** (0.149)	2.776*** (0.290)
Party ID X 2017 Dummy		-0.489*** (0.077)
Latino X 2017 Dummy		-0.623* (0.360)
Constant	0.844** (0.369)	0.099 (0.396)
Observations	1,056	1,056
Log Likelihood	-586.164	-563.034
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,200.329	1,158.068
Pseudo R2	0.161	0.194

Note:

Table 4: Predictors of public opinion on sanctuary cities in California, 2015-2017 Pooled Model (Sample: White Republicans, Minority Voters)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Sanctuary Support
Party Identification 7-point (Dem-Rep)	-0.268*** (0.039)
Female	-0.181 (0.137)
Education (low-high)	0.110 (0.074)
Age	-0.234*** (0.051)
Latino	0.435 (0.276)
Black	0.070 (0.298)
Asian	0.289 (0.247)
Race: Other	0.351 (0.259)
Catholic	-0.092 (0.155)
Income: Medium	-0.254 (0.164)
Income: High	-0.317 (0.209)
Income: Missing	-0.236 (0.230)
B Version 2015	-0.427** (0.186)
B Version 2017	0.333* (0.182)
Year 2017	0.481** (0.212)
Latino X Year 2017	0.317 (0.278)
Constant	0.339 (0.445)
Observations	1,325
Log Likelihood	-717.404
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,468.807
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 5: Predictors of public opinion on sanctuary cities in Texas, 2015-2017 Pooled Model  
(Sample: White Republicans, Minority Voters)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Sanctuary Support
Party Identification 7-point (Dem-Rep)	-0.312*** (0.055)
Female	-0.005 (0.165)
Education (low-high)	0.121 (0.088)
Age	-0.339*** (0.063)
Latino	2.370*** (0.331)
Black	1.123*** (0.320)
Asian	1.462** (0.698)
Ideology (lib-conserv)	-0.376*** (0.059)
Income	-0.003 (0.060)
No Income Dummy	-0.185 (0.322)
Year 2017	1.306*** (0.251)
Latino X Year 2017	-0.904*** (0.329)
Constant	0.865 (0.551)
Observations	1,466
Log Likelihood	-505.665
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,037.330
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 6: Predictors of ‘Dont Know’ on sanctuary cities in Texas, 2015-2017 Pooled Model

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Sanctuary Support
Democrat	0.872*** (0.237)
Independent	1.147*** (0.204)
Female	0.780*** (0.140)
Education (low-high)	-0.144** (0.071)
Age	-0.133*** (0.049)
Latino	-0.160 (0.199)
Black	0.827*** (0.178)
Asian	1.329*** (0.501)
Ideology (lib-conserv)	-0.065 (0.047)
Income	-0.177*** (0.051)
No Income Dummy	-0.068 (0.223)
Year 2017	-0.358* (0.200)
Democrat X Year 2017	-0.595** (0.262)
Latino X Year 2017	0.141 (0.302)
Constant	-1.287*** (0.430)
Observations	2,338
Log Likelihood	-823.836
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,677.671
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 7: Predictors of sanctuary city support in California, 2015-2017 Pooled Model (Education analysis)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Sanctuary Support		
	Full Sample	Anglos	Latinos
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Party Identification 7-point (Dem-Rep)	-0.366*** (0.027)	-0.425*** (0.037)	-0.306*** (0.060)
Female	-0.320*** (0.106)	-0.412*** (0.145)	-0.409* (0.232)
Education (low-high)	-0.147* (0.084)	-0.099 (0.122)	-0.175 (0.202)
Age	-0.252*** (0.039)	-0.331*** (0.052)	0.001 (0.090)
Latino	0.194 (0.142)		
Black	-0.015 (0.175)		
Asian	-0.465** (0.232)		
Race: Other	0.123 (0.197)		
Catholic	-0.120 (0.127)	0.097 (0.186)	-0.249 (0.229)
Income: Medium	-0.047 (0.128)	0.116 (0.182)	-0.298 (0.258)
Income: High	-0.230 (0.159)	-0.170 (0.217)	-0.580 (0.371)
Income: Missing	-0.217 (0.187)	-0.087 (0.266)	-0.712* (0.422)
B Version 2015	-0.314** (0.150)	-0.049 (0.218)	-1.093*** (0.335)
B Version 2017	0.237* (0.140)	0.165 (0.189)	0.147 (0.301)
Year 2017	0.012 (0.389)	0.735 (0.569)	-1.061 (0.856)
Education X Year 2017	0.340*** (0.106)	0.238 (0.148)	0.498* (0.260)
Constant	1.585*** (0.344)	1.535*** (0.491)	1.887** (0.738)
Observations	2,090	1,180	399
Log Likelihood	-1,143.374	-595.750	-241.061
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,320.747	1,217.501	508.122

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01



Table 8: Predictors of sanctuary city support in Texas, 2015-2017 Pooled Model (Education analysis)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Sanctuary Support		
	Full Sample	Anglos	Latinos
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Party Identification	-0.430*** (0.043)	-0.455*** (0.068)	-0.353*** (0.066)
Female	-0.097 (0.131)	-0.238 (0.197)	-0.131 (0.231)
Education (low-high)	0.108 (0.098)	0.229 (0.156)	-0.124 (0.158)
Age	-0.298*** (0.051)	-0.313*** (0.077)	-0.231*** (0.083)
Latino	0.869*** (0.150)		
Black	-0.251 (0.196)		
Asian	0.506 (0.714)		
Ideology (lib-conserv)	-0.560*** (0.048)	-0.792*** (0.081)	-0.423*** (0.081)
Income	0.065 (0.047)	0.191*** (0.070)	-0.067 (0.084)
No Income Dummy	0.142 (0.258)	0.454 (0.394)	-0.226 (0.484)
Year 2017	0.621 (0.430)	1.132* (0.664)	-0.134 (0.727)
Education X Year 2017	0.077 (0.129)	-0.050 (0.197)	0.189 (0.225)
Constant	3.087*** (0.407)	3.342*** (0.627)	4.218*** (0.655)
Observations	2,015	1,298	491
Log Likelihood	-779.008	-357.379	-250.794
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,584.017	734.759	521.589

*Note:* \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

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