

Sustained Organizational Influence: American
Legislative Exchange Council and the Diffusion of
Anti-Sanctuary Policy

LOREN COLLINGWOOD^{*1}, STEPHEN OMAR EL-KHATIB^{†2}, AND BENJAMIN
GONZALEZ O'BRIEN^{‡3}

¹*University of California, Riverside*

²*University of California, Riverside*

³*Highline College*

November 13, 2017

*loren.collingwood@ucr.edu

†stephen.elkhatib@email.ucr.edu

‡bgonzalez@highline.edu

Abstract

Building upon existing literature, we offer a particular model of network policy diffusion – which we call sustained organizational influence. Sustained organizational influence necessitates an institutional focus across a broad range of issues and across a long period of time. Sustaining organizations are well-financed, and exert their influence on legislators through benefits, shared ideological interests, and time-saving opportunities. Sustaining organizations’ centralized nature makes legislators’ jobs easier by providing legislators with ready-made model legislation. We argue that sustaining organizations uniquely contribute to policy diffusion in the U.S. states. We evaluate this model with a case study of state-level immigration sanctuary policy making and the role that the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) played in disseminating model legislation. Through quantitative text analysis and several negative binomial state-level regression models, we demonstrate that ALEC has exerted an overwhelming influence on the introduction of anti-sanctuary legislative proposals in the U.S. states over the past 7 years consistent with our particular model of network policy diffusion. Implications are discussed.

Keywords: Sanctuary Policy; Latino Politics; Policy Diffusion

Introduction

What role do interest groups play in the policy diffusion process? In recent decades, organized groups have sought to develop and promote template legislation of various types. A variety of organizations, from the National Rifle Association's (NRA) Institute for Legislative Action (ILA), to financial services groups, to anti-gay groups, develop and shop standardized bills across the states. Most prominently and controversially, the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) has served as a legislative clearinghouse since its founding in 1973. ALEC develops legislative proposals on myriad topics which it promotes directly to its legislative members. Despite the clear suggestion in journalistic accounts that ALEC has played a role in the introduction and enactment of a variety of conservative laws across the country, scholars of policy diffusion have paid no attention to the role of interest groups generally and what we call "sustained organizational influence" more specifically.

Unlike single issue organizations and advocacy coalitions, sustained organizational interests alter the costs and benefits of the legislative process in multiple ways, they: provide a forum for legislators to meet with and learn from advocates of a variety of policy causes; provide access to corporate donors; use their legal expertise to develop model legislation; and ensure discretion thus minimizing the risk that contacts between legislators and interest groups will become known by the public. This suggests that organizations such as ALEC may be especially effective in enacting legislation in state capitals; yet, little is known about their effectiveness in successfully promoting policy models they champion.

The state politics literature has focused on a variety of factors that influence the likelihood of policy diffusion, including geography (Karch 2007), ideology (Case, Rosen, and Hines 1993), partisanship, institutions (Boehmke 2005), previous successes (Volden 2006), and solving problems (Mooney and Lee 1995). However, the research on the role of interest groups in the diffusion policy has received less attention (cf., Garrett and Jansa (2015)). This is quite puzzling given evidence that a variety of policy innovations from anti-gay legislation (Haider-Markel 2001) to mothers' pensions (Skocpol et al. 1993) were promoted

by organized social interests. The literature has also shown that policy entrepreneurs play an important role in policy diffusion (Mintrom 1997).

However, most of the literature conceptualizes and empirically evaluates diffusion spatially – one state has a policy now; another state enacts a similar policy later. Increasingly, scholars are also conceptualizing and operationalizing diffusion from a network perspective by evaluating whether states adopt interest group model legislation (Balla 2001; Garrett and Jansa 2015). We adopt this network conceptualization of diffusion, and accordingly employ a textual analytic approach. We buttress this with a cross-sectional drivers’ analysis demonstrating that ALEC legislator membership drives the introduction of anti-sanctuary legislation.

We further the literature on policy diffusion and on state level immigration policy by providing a new theory of sustained organizational interests. We argue that sustained organizations – like ALEC – are unique and highly efficacious beyond standard definitions of interest groups, advocacy coalitions, or policy networks. These sustained groups brand themselves as public/private partnerships that provide legislators with access not only to representatives from a variety of interest communities but also colleagues from other states. Sustained organizations are not merely a forum for the exchange of information; rather, they provide legislators with a number of important benefits above and beyond typical interest groups, which is why such organizations are so successful. We test the implications of our theory in the domain of immigration, specifically vis-á-vis the introduction of sanctuary bills. We focus on bill introductions specifically to capture how the flow of ideas move across space and take hold in specific geographic and political contexts, and employ a methodology that lets us capture such idea movement. In recent years, states have been grappling with how to address the problem of undocumented immigration in the context of federal inaction on comprehensive immigration reform (Ramakrishnan and Gulasekaram 2012; Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan 2015; Boushey and Luedtke 2011). The literature on state-level immigration policy has focused on various drivers of policy enactment for both restrictive and inclusive im-

migration policies (Ramakrishnan and Gulasekaram 2012; Boushey and Luedtke 2006, 2011; Chavez and Provine 2009; Zingher 2014; Marquez and Schraufnagel 2013; Nicholson-Crotty and Nicholson-Crotty 2011; Ybarra, Sanchez, and Sanchez 2016; Filindra 2013; Commins and Wills 2017; Creek and Yoder 2012; Wallace 2014; Monogan 2013). Some work has also looked at the role of interest groups and policy entrepreneurs in driving the enactment of various types of immigration-related legislation (Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan 2015; Facchini, Mayda, and Mishra 2011; Butz and Kehrberg 2017). In 2010-2011, ALEC started promoting a new model legislation, known as the “No Sanctuary Cities for Illegal immigrants Act,” which prevents local governments from offering certain types of protections to undocumented immigrants. Using data from the 50 states, we show that much of the Act’s language diffused into bills throughout the U.S., and that by 2017, states with more ALEC-affiliated legislators saw more anti-sanctuary city policy proposals.

In the pages that follow, first, we outline our theoretical framework. Then, we briefly review the ALEC organizational model, relevant immigration policy-making literature, and the anti-sanctuary case. Next, we present our hypotheses, which is followed by a discussion of our data and methods, and results. Finally, we conclude with a brief discussion of the implications of our findings, and provide directions for future research.

Theory: Sustained Organizational Influence

The policy diffusion literature has paid scant attention to the role of interest groups in the process of policy diffusion, whether in a spatial or a network context. State politics scholars benefiting from Gray and Lowery’s (2000) work on the ecology of interest organizations at the state level, have sought to understand the role of interest groups and policy entrepreneurs in driving the enactment of policy solutions in a variety of domains from abortion (Cohen and Barrilleaux 1993), to immigration restrictions (Ramakrishnan and Gulasekaram 2012; Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan 2015; Facchini, Mayda, and Mishra 2011),

to higher education reform (Tandberg 2010), anti-gay laws (Haider-Markel 2001), to teacher salaries (Anzia 2011). This is further bolstered by work at the federal level that documents the crucial role of interest groups, advocacy coalitions, and policy networks in setting the agenda, framing issues, and financing political campaigns (Baumgartner and Jones 2010; Austen-Smith 1987; Denzau and Munger 1986; Baumgartner and Leech 1998, 2001; Baumgartner et al. 2009). However, the advocacy coalition/policy networks literature argues that coalitions form around single issues (policy subsystems), and may include legislators, policy entrepreneurs, journalists, interest group leaders, and national and local-level activists (Sabatier 2006; Sabatier and Weible 2014; Henry 2011; Heclo 1978; Mintrom 1997; Gray 1973; Sabatier and Weible 2014). The relative dearth of work on the role of interest groups in policy diffusion is especially puzzling given evidence from comparative politics that policy networks play an important role in policy diffusion (Weyland 2009).

In the immigration policy literature, the role of interest groups/policy entrepreneurs has received some attention but only to address the question of drivers of immigration policy enactment, not policy diffusion. Specifically, Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan (2015) advance an immigration federalism framework to explain the rise of anti-immigrant legislation at the state level, which implicitly rests on a policy networks/policy entrepreneurs approach (e.g., Tom Tancredo, Kris Kobach) coined “restrictionist issue entrepreneurs.” Furthermore, Facchini, Mayda, and Mishra (2011) show that interest groups (i.e., unions/business interests) influence sector immigration policy, while Butz and Kehrberg (2017) suggest that business interests may play a role in sustaining expansionary immigration policies under certain conditions, and Commins and Wills (2017) find that firms heavily dependent on immigrant labor directly influence a state’s immigration policy. However, neither the immigration scholarship nor the broader diffusion literature have examined the role of interest groups and sustained organizational influence groups in the policy diffusion process.

Furthermore, most scholars examine diffusion from a spatial/geographic perspective, where diffusion is evident when states next to one another adopt a similar policy or when

states over time adopt similar policies as other states. Recently, though, Garrett and Jansa (2015) argue that interest group policy diffusion also occurs through organized networks, and that text-based methods can show how policy ideas (e.g., model legislation) diffuse through the network. In this way, diffusion takes on a more granular quality as some parts of a model bill's ideas are passed through the network whereas others are not. We concur with this approach, particularly as we are concerned with how ALEC's ideas become part of the legislative debates in state legislatures around the country.

The limited attention to the role of interest groups in policy diffusion is even more puzzling since the emergence of what we call "sustained organizational influence." Traditionally, interest groups have had local representation with lobbyists in state capitals, working through their local offices to address local policy issues. These organizations have tended to be single issue focused, providing expert information to lawmakers about the sector's key concerns. However, in recent decades, a new type of super interest group has emerged. These sustained groups brand themselves as public/private partnerships that provide legislators with access not only to representatives from a variety of interest communities but also colleagues from other states. These umbrella organizations are not merely a forum for the exchange of information; rather, they provide legislators with a number of important benefits, which is why such organizations are so successful.

First, sustained organizations are well-financed, so they provide legislators access to powerful corporate/interest groups that can contribute to legislative campaigns (legislator perk; resources). Second, they provide policy expertise and information that legislators can use to promote ideas to their colleagues (lower information cost). Third, they focus on multiple policy issues, offering a "one-stop shop" across domains (multi-issue). Legislators who attend such meetings and conferences receive access to information about multiple policies that are of importance to their state. Fourth, they provide legal expertise in the form of model legislation (lower information cost). This is a particularly valuable service for legislators, especially those who are not members of a professional legislature. Drafting legislation

that meets constitutional and other standards is costly, especially given the electoral and legislative time constraints state legislators face. Vetted, templated legislation, developed by trusted legal experts with experience in drafting bills can greatly facilitate the likelihood of bill introductions. Furthermore, since these organizations tend to attract legislators who are ideologically compatible with the beliefs and positions of the group, the level of trust in this expertise is high (shared belief systems). Fifth, organizations that have operated for a long time tend to develop a reputation for delivering results thus creating a market among legislators (long-term) (Sabatier 1988). Finally, since these organizations are private, their membership lists are also private and their events do not include media (resources). As a result, legislators and lobbyists can discuss policy concerns as well as campaign donations without the risk of public scrutiny (resources). In Table 1, we describe the differences across various types of interest representation and organization to highlight the comprehensive nature of sustained influence groups.

[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

Sustained organizations (and ALEC) diverge from a typical advocacy coalition in that the organization is by definition well-financed (advocacy coalitions are not always well resourced), multi-issue, and produces perks for legislators. This ease of access greatly expedites the policy diffusion process. That said, the extant literature could predict the first set of empirical outcomes we examine later in this paper, if we designated ALEC as simply an advocacy coalition on steroids. However, as we point out in Table 1, advocacy coalitions may or may not be well-financed, are largely single-issue oriented, and do not necessarily provide legislators with perks. Thus, we suggest that ALEC's organizational structure is something beyond a standard advocacy coalition. Moreover, we implement a second empirical evaluation of ALEC's influence on anti-sanctuary making that demonstrates ALEC's continued influence on the anti-sanctuary legislative process.

Sustained influence organizations are also quite different conceptually from policy entrepreneurs and lobbyists. As Table 1 shows, these concepts tend to refer to single issue

groups, individuals, or small groups of experts who focus on a specific policy domain. Much like ALEC, they offer policy expertise and sometimes model legislation, but they do not offer legislators the same access to resources, and do not necessarily provide networking opportunities or assistance with campaign finances.

The sustained organizations model of policy diffusion is also influenced by the “modality framework,” expounded by Gary L Anderson and Donchik (2016, p. 325), who argue that “a modality...might be think tanks, public-private partnerships, network governance through interlocking boards, aggressive forms of philanthropy, or social entrepreneurialism,” and that the organization is focused on long term goals. However, the modality framework only implies that coalition members share ideological perspectives, and that modalities cut down on legislator information costs. Moreover, the framework says little about legislator perks. Overall though, this model seems to be quite similar to the sustained organizations model, and while the new modality framework analyzes organizations both as multi-issue and long term in orientation, Gary L Anderson and Donchik (2016) do not provide an expansive definition of what they mean by “new modality” and how that differs from existing theories of the policy-making and diffusion processes. Rather, these scholars do an excellent job describing ALEC’s network – which is reliant on trade associations, venture philanthropists, think tanks, but also state legislators. While we draw heavily on this framework, we explicitly note the perks and benefits legislators get from participating in ALEC and in its sustained organizational structure. We argue these incentives help facilitate the policy diffusion process.

The Case: ALEC’s Sustained Organizational Influence

The American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) is one of the few venues where legislators work with private entities and corporate sponsors to craft model legislation in a public-private process. Founded in 1973 around the “...principles of limited government,

free markets, and federalism,” ALEC today claims that their members represent more than 60 million Americans.¹ ALEC differs significantly from traditional lobbying since private entities are directly working with legislators to draft model bills that can then be introduced in the legislators’ respective states and chambers (Gary L. Anderson and Donchik 2016).² A recent ALEC report claimed that their membership includes 20 percent of Congress, eight governors, 25% of state legislators, as well as 200 corporate and nonprofit members (ALEC 2016). ALEC also claims that their legislation has a 20 percent average success rate, and according to their strategic plan their members surpass Democratic legislators in passing legislation by a 2:1 margin (Cooper et al. 2016; ALEC 2016).

Jackman (2013) demonstrates ALEC’s wide-ranging influence on policy-making in the states by showing that ALEC-affiliated members introduced bills on immigration, energy and environment, guns and prisons, health and pharmaceuticals, voting rights, tort reform, consumer rights, schools and higher education, and tax and budgets in the 2011-2012 legislative session. In addition, both Cooper et al. (2016) and Gary L. Anderson and Donchik (2016) show that the model legislation created by ALEC has been successful in both criminal justice and education policy. For example, New Jersey’s *School Children First Act* included all of ALEC’s recommended requirements for teacher rankings that had been included in their model legislation (Gary L. Anderson and Donchik 2016). It can be difficult to trace the linkages between this legislation and the final product at the state level since ALEC is not considered a lobbying organization, and therefore disclosure of the input they have on bills is not required (Gary L. Anderson and Donchik 2016). Furthermore, ALEC argues that it is not a lobbying group because, “laws are not passed, debated, or adopted” at their conferences, but Boldt (2012) argues that this is a spurious definition of ALEC’s activities, many of which are directly aimed at influencing legislation and should be considered lobbying. ALEC has sought to diffuse anti-immigrant and anti-sanctuary legislation throughout the states through the influence and reach they have as a public-private organization. How-

1. <https://www.alec.org/about/>

2. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2013/12/12/alec-state-legislation-who-what-where/>

ever, very little work has examined ALEC's influence in the context of state immigration policy-making.

The Issue Area: Immigration Policy in the U.S. States

Scholars have recently begun to unpack why states propose and/or enact immigration legislation, although this work is rarely situated within a policy diffusion framework. In general, explanations for the emergence and enactment of state-level immigration policy rest on partisan, demographic, and economic grounds. As noted, Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan (2015) advance an immigration federalism framework to explain the rise of anti-immigrant legislation at the state level, specifically arguing that policy diffusion of anti-immigration legislation is primarily a function of state-level partisanship. Other research has found support for partisanship and/or ideology as drivers of either pro or anti immigration legislation, including Chavez and Provine (2009), Boushey and Luedtke (2011), Monogan (2013), and Zingher (2014). Wallace (2014) finds that Republican-controlled states were more likely to introduce anti-immigrant copycat legislation following the passage of Arizona's highly restrictive SB-1070.

Other scholarship demonstrates the continued role of what Key (1949) and others call "racial threat", finding that either Latina/o population size and/or growth, or some other similar measure (e.g., foreign-born) influence immigration policy outcomes at the state-level (Chavez and Provine 2009; Wallace 2014; Ybarra, Sanchez, and Sanchez 2016; Marquez and Schraufnagel 2013; Nicholson-Crotty and Nicholson-Crotty 2011; Boushey and Luedtke 2011; Avery, Fine, and Marquez 2017; Filindra 2013) Studying the role of descriptive representation, Filindra and Pearson-Merkowitz (2013) show that the presence of Latino legislators is unrelated to the introduction of anti-immigration legislation in state legislatures but is negatively related to enactment of anti-immigrant laws. Other scholars have found some evidence that economic conditions may covary with state-level immigration policy-making

(Ybarra, Sanchez, and Sanchez 2016; Boushey and Luedtke 2011; Marquez and Schraufnagel 2013; Wallace 2014). While these factors are likely associated with the spatial and network diffusion of immigration policy (Soss et al. 2001), the literature does not often connect diffusion with the immigration policy-making literature. Thus, in our analysis of ALEC, we do control for state partisanship (i.e., presidential vote), “racial threat”, and economic features.

The Anti-Sanctuary Case

In the wake of Arizona’s SB-1070, other states began introducing and passing anti-immigrant legislation Ramakrishnan and Gulasekaram (2012) and Wallace (2014). These bills sought to make life extremely difficult for undocumented immigrants by, for instance, increasing local cooperation and participation in federal immigration enforcement actions, creating a new class of crime for being present in a state without proof of immigration status, and making it a crime to have an undocumented immigrant in your car. ALEC also seemed to have a hand in Arizona’s SB-1070,³ the controversial 2010 law that would have allowed local officers to request proof of citizenship during routine traffic stops and interactions. Research by National Public Radio (NPR) in 2010 found that Arizona State Senator Russell Pearce, who played a significant role in drafting SB-1070, was also a member of ALEC (Sullivan 2010). This bill, SB-1070 (“Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act”), later became the basis for ALEC’s “No Sanctuary Cities for Illegal Immigrants.” As we will show, this model piece of legislation, was, almost word for word, what would become Arizona’s SB-1070 (Sullivan 2010).

3. We do not know for sure the direction of causality, as ALEC’s model legislation was exposed in 2011 when 800 model bills were leaked to the Center for Media and Democracy (Cooper et al. 2016).

Hypotheses

With our theoretical framework specified above, we develop several hypotheses relevant to the *diffusion* of anti-sanctuary legislation in the U.S. states that we evaluate throughout the rest of the paper. It is important to note we are not fully testing our theory of policy diffusion as that would require a universe analysis at the organization-level. Rather, our goal is to empirically evaluate several diffusion implications of a particular case (ALEC and sanctuary legislation) matching our theoretical framework.

First, if diffusion within a network is occurring then we would expect ALEC model legislation to be related to some anti-sanctuary legislation following SB-1070's wake.⁴

- **Hypothesis 1:** The ALEC model legislation, “No Sanctuary Cities for Illegal Immigrants Act”, will be textually related to large elements of anti-sanctuary bills introduced throughout the country.
- **Hypothesis 2:** Relative to pro-sanctuary bills, anti-sanctuary bills will, on average, more closely resemble ALEC model legislation.

Second, if ALEC is indeed having an impact on the introduction of sanctuary legislation we might expect to see a relationship between sanctuary bill introductions in 2017 and the number of ALEC-affiliated legislators in a state.⁵

- **Hypothesis 3:** The number of ALEC-affiliated legislators within a state will positively associate with an increased count of anti-sanctuary bill introductions in year 2017.

4. Proposals, or bill introductions, are important to examine because they demonstrate the emergence of an issue that directly affects a large portion of society (Bratton and Haynie 1999; Gonzalez, Collingwood, and El-Khatib 2017; Gonzalez O'Brien 2018), tell us something about legislator signaling or position-taking (Koger 2003; Jones 2003; Grimmer 2013), and let us control for the extent that public opinion and the recent Trump-movement is driving the policy agenda in the states (True, Jones, and Baumgartner 1999; Baumgartner and Jones 2010).

5. The introduction of sanctuary city legislation jumped dramatically in 2017, essentially suggesting a very different political moment. Therefore we estimate a cross-sectional analysis as opposed to a more classic event history analysis model.

- **Hypothesis 4:** The number of ALEC-affiliated legislators within a state will be unrelated to a count of pro-sanctuary bill introductions in year 2017.

Data and Methods

We conduct two discrete analyses to assess our hypotheses. Both analyses rely to varying degrees on a corpus of $n = 235$ sanctuary-related bills introduced into state legislatures from 2005-2017. We focus specifically on sanctuary bills because of the topic’s increasing political relevancy, as well as ALEC’s specific focus on such legislation (i.e., their model bill is called “No Sanctuary Cities for Illegal Immigrants”). We gathered every introduced bill across these years that pertained specifically to sanctuary cities or sanctuary policies. This produced approximately 150 bills in 2017 and 85 bills from 2005-2016.

We gathered bills using a combination of the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) database on sanctuary legislation, the Lexis-Nexis State Net bill search database, and individual state legislative websites. On the former, NCSL recently released a database which compiled sanctuary city legislation in the states during the 2017 sessions.⁶ However, we augmented these data with a search on the term “sanctuary” in the Lexis-Nexis legislative bill database. We then applied a search algorithm to ensure some bills from our search were not really about unrelated topics.⁷ Finally, we read and coded each bill as either pro-sanctuary or anti-sanctuary. The text of the language of these bills is almost always obviously pro or anti, leading to an inter-item correlation between coders of 100%.

By gathering introduced bills across a relatively large time-span, we can examine ALEC’s influence vis-à-vis its model legislation beginning after 2010-2011. While enactments pinpoint the originator to the first enactor, that connection might miss the origins of a bill (Wilkerson, Smith, and Stramp 2015). Here, we are particularly interested in how much of ALEC’s

6. http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/immig/StateSanctuaryBills_050817.pdf

7. One or more of the following words had to be included in the bill title or text of the bill: city, cities, town, towns, central america, central american, mexican, mexico, movement, police, immigrant, immigrants, immigration, illegal, enforcement, alien, aliens, refugee, refugees, campus, campuses

ideas percolate into the legislative-making process. By focusing on introductions – and not enactments (which is more common) – we employ a plagiarism detection strategy to examine whether text from ALEC’s model bill diffuses to bills introduced around the U.S. after 2010-2011. In addition, by evaluating bills before 2010-2011, we can trace the origins of ALEC’s model piece of legislation. This approach differs significantly from standard policy diffusion papers that focus primarily on enactments, and therefore contributes to a greater understanding of the policy-making process in state legislatures.

The first analysis compares all sanctuary-related bills introduced from 2005 to 2017 against ALEC’s model legislation, “No Sanctuary Cities for Illegal Immigrants Act”, which is almost identical to Arizona’s SB-1070 law (Jackman 2013).⁸ The second analysis is a cross-sectional regression analysis predicting anti (and pro) sanctuary legislation in the year 2017 where our key predictor is a count of ALEC legislator membership by state. This second analysis is more of a driver’s analysis where we assess whether ALEC – as measured by legislator membership – likely maintains legislative influence during the most dramatic increase in sanctuary bill introductions in any given year.

For the first analysis, we assess bill similarity to ALEC model legislation via plagiarism software (text reuse) which lets us generate a numeric measure of similarity/influence between the ALEC model legislation and all sanctuary-related bills from 2005-2017 (Wilkerson, Smith, and Stramp 2015; Mihalcea, Corley, Strapparava, et al. 2006; Huang 2008; Burgess et al. 2016).⁹ We use the count of overlapping words as our measure, which is basically interchangeable with the percent overlap between two documents but provides slightly more measurement granularity.¹⁰ This approach lets us test hypotheses one and two.

In the second analysis, similar to existing papers on state-level policy-making, we treat the state as the unit of analysis, then subset our corpus to bills introduced in 2017. We examine

8. https://www.alecexposed.org/wiki/No_Sanctuary_Cities_for_Illegal_Immigrants_Act_Exposed

9. We compare this against a more traditional cosine similarity measure used in quantitative text analysis and find stronger face-validity vis-à-vis the plagiarism measure.

10. In our text corpus, our count measure of plagiarism similarity correlates at $\rho = 0.99$ with our percent similarity measure.

2017 discretely from other years because 2017 saw an exponential rise in bill introductions from earlier years (see Figure 1), largely as a result of the Kathryn Steinle killing – a focusing event (Birkland 1997) – and Trump’s subsequent campaign trail assault on sanctuary policies (Gonzalez, Collingwood, and El-Khatib 2017). Then-candidate Donald Trump seized on the issue arguing that he would end sanctuary city policies, making it a key theme of both his candidacy and the early days of his presidency. This growth provides a great opportunity to examine whether ALEC legislator membership is an important predictor of sanctuary legislation in a post-election environment where Trump support by state should strongly associate with anti (pro) sanctuary bill introductions. In other words, if we find evidence above and beyond standard predictors of state-level immigration legislative policy (e.g., presidential vote/ideology, Latina/o population characteristics), then this is even stronger evidence of ALEC’s influence and theoretically supportive of policy diffusion.

[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]

As noted above, we subset our corpus to the 150 sanctuary bills introduced in 2017. Following Boushey and Luedtke (2011) and Boushey and Luedtke (2006), we separate our sanctuary legislation analysis into two types: policies designed to punish immigrants (anti-sanctuary legislation), and policies designed to integrate immigrants (pro-sanctuary legislation). As noted previously, we then read and coded each bill as either pro-sanctuary or anti-sanctuary; this variable serves as our dependent variable in our regression analyses.¹¹

In total, n=89 (59%) bills are coded as anti-sanctuary, and n=61 (41%) bills coded as pro-sanctuary. Figures 4 and 5 display the anti and pro sanctuary proposal distribution across the U.S. states. We craft two dependent variables: 1) state count of anti-sanctuary bills proposed in 2017; 2) state count of pro-sanctuary bills proposed in 2017. Because these variables are counts, we estimate two negative binomial count models to investigate determinants of proposed sanctuary legislation¹²

11. We include a few bill summary examples in the appendix.

12. We also include poisson models in Table 3 in the appendix. Our substantive findings remain unchanged.

[INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]

[INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE]

We include a host of explanatory variables to evaluate hypotheses three and four. Our key independent variable measure of ALEC influence is a count of ALEC-affiliated current legislators per state, collected in 2017 by The Center for Media and Democracy (see Figure 6). We use this measure because it allows us to further test our theory of sustained organizational influence. To provide support for our theory, we would expect to see states with more ALEC legislators co-varying with the introduction of anti-sanctuary legislation. However, if our theory is falsified, we will see no such relationship between ALEC legislator count and anti-sanctuary legislation count.

[INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE]

We also include controls for variables heretofore demonstrated or theoretically related to the introduction of immigration legislation, including: Latino population, Latino growth, anti-immigration public opinion, state competition, legislative professionalism, a measure of violent crime, economic competition, and percent Trump.¹³

We operationalize “racial threat” by including a measure for Latina/o population and Latina/o growth. For Latino population, we include measures for state percent Latino (2015 American Community Survey) and for state percent Latino growth. These data are gathered from the 2012-2015 American Community Survey (ACS) and the 2000 Census.¹⁴

To control for the possibility that the presence of sanctuary cities in the state might influence policy diffusion at the state level (Shipan and Volden 2006), we also include a

13. Given the timing of bill introductions, we prefer percent Trump to state ideology (i.e., policy liberalism). Because these two measures are highly correlated ($\rho = -.80$) we do not include both in a model due to small sample size and multi-collinearity.

14. To capture growth we craft the following percent change variable:

$$\Delta\text{Latino Population} = \frac{\text{Percent Latino 2012-2015} - \text{Percent Latino 2000}}{\text{Percent Latino 2000}} \quad (1)$$

count from Gonzalez, Collingwood, and El-Khatib (2017) of the total number of sanctuary cities (see Figure 7 below) divided by state population (2015) then logged.

[INSERT FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE]

Donald Trump vote share is an important alternative hypothesis that may well explain the introduction of sanctuary legislation. To measure Trump’s influence, we include a control for Trump percent vote-share within the state as recorded by the United State Federal Elections Committee. As a presidential candidate, and then as president, Trump and his Attorney General have railed against sanctuary cities, and used anecdotal incidents to justify crackdowns on immigrant communities (Gonzalez, Collingwood, and El-Khatib 2017). Legislators in Trump strongholds, then, might be more likely to adopt Trump’s anti-sanctuary policy positions and push legislation in their respective legislatures. It is certainly possible that states are influenced by Trump and not by ALEC lobbying; thus, our theoretical framework is greatly strengthened if we find a strong relationship between ALEC membership and the introduction of anti-sanctuary legislation, controlling for percent Trump.

We utilize NCSL documentation on state legislative seats to develop two variables: a measure of state competition (a simplified Ranney index measuring Democratic seat share in both legislative chambers) and divided party control of state government (1=yes, executive and at least one branch of the legislature are controlled by different parties, 0 = no, executive and legislature are controlled by the same party). States where at least one house of the legislature and the executive are controlled by different parties are denoted as divided. Following Bentele and O’Brien (2013), we also include a measure for institutional competition. Our simplified Ranney index was constructed based on the formula in equation 2:

$$\text{Ranney Index} = 100 - \text{abs}\left(\left(\frac{\text{Senate Dem}}{\text{Total Senate}} * 100\right) + \left(\left(\frac{\text{House Dem}}{\text{Total House}} * 100\right) - 100\right)\right) \quad (2)$$

We also include a measure for legislative professionalism King (2000). This measure in-

corporates days in session, legislator salary, and state expenditures on legislative operations and services. State legislatures similar in professionalism to the U.S. Congress – like California – will approach a score of 1; whereas states with little professionalism (e.g., Wyoming) will score closer to 0.

We include three variables to control for the possibility that crime and economic issues might drive sanctuary legislation. For crime, we include the violent crime rate from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Uniform Crime Reporting Program 2014 database, which collects and aggregates crime rates by state. For economic anxiety, we include the state’s median household income (logged), and the percentage of adults who are unemployed – both from the 2015 ACS. Finally, using the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Studies (CCES), we include a measure of anti-immigrant public opinion to rule out the possibility that legislators are simply responding to public opinion within their states as opposed to their membership in ALEC’s organization.¹⁵

Results

We present our results in two segments. The first presentation is a text-based analysis where we qualitatively and quantitatively compare all sanctuary bills against ALEC’s “No Sanctuary for Illegal Immigrants Act”. We also generate a measure of similarity based off of word count similarity. Our second set of results present two regression models of our 2017 analysis – estimating predictors of anti-sanctuary bill introductions and pro-sanctuary bill introductions, respectively.

Text Analysis

Given our data and unique set of questions, we implement a text comparison approach to assess policy diffusion in the states as opposed to the more traditional event history

15. See appendix for variable coding.

analysis approach (Boehmke et al. 2017; Berry and Berry 1990). We compare ALEC’s model legislation, “No Sanctuary Cities for Illegal Immigrants Act” (shares over 90% language with SB-1070) against all bills in our corpus. We use both a plagiarism method (Wcopyfind) as well as a cosine similarity metric (Garrett and Jansa 2015).¹⁶ While both are suggestive, we show that the former method is superior; hence we rely on this approach to draw our conclusions.

“No Sanctuary for Illegal Immigrants Act”, and SB-1070, have their origins in Russell Pearce’s (Rep, AZ) earlier legislation (Wallace 2014). Arizona’s House bill, H-2577 (2006) and H-2751 (2007) – both bills introduced by Pearce – share language with both SB-1070 and ALEC’s model anti-sanctuary legislation. Some excerpt comparisons are presented below. On the left is text from ALEC’s model legislation and on the right is AZ H-2577 (2006). These two bills share a cosine similarity of 0.68 (on a 0-1 scale), which is further evidence of their sameness. Clearly, much of the text is the same in these two bills. Pearce introduced a similar bill in 2007 with less overlap to the eventual SB-1070 and ALEC model legislation (H-2751, cosine similarity 0.43).

16. <http://plagiarism.bloomfieldmedia.com/wordpress/software/wcopyfind/>

Arizona's H-2577, 2006

(on the left "No Sanctuary for Illegal Immigrants Act", on the right Arizona's "H-2577")

Cooperation and assistance in enforcement of immigration laws; indemnification. (A) may not be prohibited or in any way be restricted from sending, receiving or maintaining information relating to the immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual or exchanging that information with any other federal, state or local governmental entity for the following official purposes: Determining eligibility for any federal, state, local or

This act shall be implemented in a manner consistent with federal laws regulating immigration, protecting the civil rights of all persons and respecting the privileges and immunities of

Cooperation and assistance in enforcement of immigration laws A. may be prohibited or in any way restricted from sending, receiving or maintaining information relating to the immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual or exchanging that information with any other federal, state or local governmental entity for the following official purposes: *determination of* eligibility for any federal, state or

this *section* shall be implemented in a manner *fully* consistent with federal *law* regulating immigration *and* protecting the civil rights of *citizens* and *aliens. e. for the purposes* of

Following the successful passage of Arizona's SB-1070 in 2010, ALEC formulated a model anti-sanctuary bill,¹⁷ that eventually found its way into other anti-sanctuary bills introduced around the country. While at this point we cannot say with certainty that ALEC was the cause of this diffusion (as opposed to policy entrepreneurs like Pearce (Mintrom 1997)), we later show that a count of ALEC-affiliated legislators in a state is a strong predictor of the introduction of anti-sanctuary legislation in 2017.

Using the plagiarism software, Wcopyfind, we can see how much text from one text

17. https://www.alecexposed.org/wiki/No_Sanctuary_Cities_for_Illegal_Immigrants_Act_Exposed

document matches another body of text from another document. We generated a similarity measure (against ALEC’s model legislation) for each bill in our corpus. The measure is simply a count of the number of overall words that match the model legislation, where the low number of matches in the search algorithm is 8 consecutive words.¹⁸ In other words, we would get a lot more overlap if we selected 2 as the minimum number of words, but significant portions of that overlap would be meaningless. We prefer this measure to a relative percentage measure because we are interested in the total amount of copied text. For instance, a bill might have 1000 overlapping words of text but could be a part of an omnibus bill, so a relative measure would show this bill has only limited connection to ALEC’s model legislation.

We validate our measure in a few ways. First, since we know that ALEC’s model legislation is similar to Arizona’s SB-1070 law (Boldt 2012), we should expect to see a very high score when we compare SB-1070 to ALEC’s model sanctuary bill. Our comparison in Wcopyfind produces a score of 5,879 – a count of the number of words that overlap between the two pieces of legislation, resulting in 95% overlap. Below we present a few snippets of this overlap.

18. See the appendix for wcopyfind settings, as results are somewhat susceptible to settings changes. We implemented Wcopyfind with a variety of settings; our analysis is based off the best output.

Arizona's SB-1070, 2010

5,879 overlapping words, 92% of this bill matches ALEC's model legislation "No Sanctuary for Illegal Immigrants Act".

<p>(A) No official or agency of this state or county, city, town, or other political subdivision of this state may adopt a policy that limits or restricts the enforcement of federal immigration laws to less than the full extent permitted by federal law. (B) For any legitimate contact made by an official or agency of this state or county, city, town or other political subdivision of this state where reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien who is unlawfully present in the United States, a reasonable attempt shall be made to determine the immigration status of the person. The person's immigration status shall be verified with the federal government pursuant to United States Code Section (c). (C) If an alien who is unlawfully present in the United States is convicted of a violation of state or local law, on discharge from imprisonment or assessment of any fine that is imposed, the alien shall be immediately transferred to the custody of the United States immigration and customs enforcement or the United States customs and border protection.</p>	<p>A. No official or agency of this state or a county, city, town or other political subdivision of this state may adopt a policy that limits or restricts the enforcement of federal immigration laws to less than the full extent permitted by federal law. B. For any legitimate contact made by an official or agency of this state or a county, city, town or other political subdivision of this state where reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien who is unlawfully present in the united states, a reasonable attempt shall be made to determine the immigration status of the person. The person's immigration status shall be verified with the federal government pursuant to United States code section 1373(c) C. If an alien who is unlawfully present in the united states is convicted of a violation of state or local law, on discharge from imprisonment or assessment of any fine that is imposed, the alien shall be transferred immediately to the custody of the united states immigration and customs enforcement or the united states customs and border protection.</p>
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Second, we assess the relationship between our Wcopyfind score and whether the bill was independently hand-coded as a “pro” or “anti” sanctuary bill. Given that ALEC’s model legislation is clearly anti-sanctuary, we should expect to see a very small plagiarism score for pro sanctuary bills and a relatively higher score for anti-sanctuary bills. A strong relationship emerges between our Wcopyfind score and whether the bill is coded as anti-sanctuary city (an independent hand-coded measure). A difference of means t-test between the anti and pro-sanctuary bills produces an average word similarity score of 65.2 for all anti-sanctuary bills, whereas pro-sanctuary bills receive a score of just 11.9 ($t = 3.4614, p\text{-value} < 0.0001$). This test shows a clear reliability of our measure.

We conducted the same test using a cosine similarity calculation between ALEC’s model legislation and all bills in our corpus – an approach employed by Garrett and Jansa (2015). To calculate this measure, we used the `quanteda` and `RTextTools` R packages to craft a document term matrix for our corpus, including ALEC’s model legislation (Benoit and Nulty 2016; Jurka et al. 2012). This process involves stemming, removing stopwords, numbers, omitting punctuation, and stripping out non-alpha characters (Grimmer and Stewart 2013). The result is a bag of words matrix where the rows are documents (bills) and the columns (features) are words found in any of the text documents. For most column and word pairings the result is a 0, but if a word shows up once in a document that column for that row will receive a 1. Thus, our corpus of bills is turned into a matrix of numbers and the cosine similarity between ALEC’s model legislation and each bill can be calculated according to the following formula:

$$\cos(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) = \frac{\mathbf{x} \cdot \mathbf{y}}{\|\mathbf{x}\| \cdot \|\mathbf{y}\|} \quad (3)$$

However, due to the nature of the language surrounding immigration-related bills, and the bag-of-words aspect to this similarity calculation (i.e., order does not matter), this measure does not separate pro-sanctuary bills from anti-sanctuary bills as well as does our plagiarism scoring technique. While we find that anti-sanctuary bills are more similar to ALEC’s model

legislation than are pro-sanctuary bills, the difference is not very large. (Anti Sanctuary Bills Cosine Similarity to ALEC model bill = 0.527, Pro Sanctuary Bills Cosine Similarity to ALEC model bill = 0.457, $t = 3.729, p < 0.0001$). Further inspection of why the pro-sanctuary bills are generating some similar cosine measures to the ALEC bill indicates that many of those bills are designed to roll-back existing anti-sanctuary bills so adopt some of the same language and size. Thus, we stick with our Wcopyfind measure for the bases of our conclusions.

Having validated and distinguished our measure from the cosine similarity score, we present our initial analysis of bill similarity. Figure 2 reports all bills in the corpus ($n=26$) scoring over 100 overlapping words. In other words, each of these bills have segments in them directly lifted from ALEC's model legislation. Bills introduced around the same time as SB-1070 and/or bills from Arizona are obviously the most related to ALEC's model legislation; however, there are several bills even in 2017 (i.e., Maine and Mississippi) that directly lift passages from ALEC's model bill. This is certainly evidence consistent with a sustaining organizational influence policy diffusion model although we cannot be certain at this stage that ALEC membership of these legislators is the causal mechanism explaining why we see portions of introduced bills matching ALEC's model legislation.

[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]

However, while the influence of the “No Sanctuary for Illegal Immigrants Act” diminished somewhat by 2017 in terms of overlapping text, as bill language began to more directly address the issue of sanctuary cities specifically, we still see clear evidence of the lingering influence in text similarity when we compare the ALEC model legislation to all anti-sanctuary bills introduced in 2017. While over 50% of all anti-sanctuary related bills introduced in 2017 are unrelated to “No Sanctuary for Illegal Immigrants Act”, about 20% of all anti-sanctuary bills have text directly lifted from the ALEC-backed bill. Figure 3 presents an ordered dot-plot of bills with at least some matching text in year 2017.

[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]

In general, these findings support the possibility that a sustained organizational structure, like ALEC, helped facilitate the diffusion of anti-immigration – specifically anti-sanctuary legislation – around the U.S. in the post SB-1070 era. While the model bill’s influence tapers somewhat over time, we next turn to the possibility that ALEC-affiliated legislators are at least partly responsible for the introduction of anti-sanctuary city legislation in 2017 – the year that saw an exponential rise in the introduction of anti-sanctuary legislation.

Regression Analysis

We present our results in two ways, separated by predictors of anti-sanctuary legislation and predictors of pro-sanctuary legislation.¹⁹ Each analysis presents a plot of standardized simulated rope-ladder coefficients, with our regression tables in the appendix. The rope-ladder point estimates are simulated standardized coefficients so are useful in demonstrating the relative influence of one variable against another. However, given the nature of our theory, we expect ALEC to positively covary with anti-sanctuary legislation, but we also discretely conduct the same analysis on pro-sanctuary legislation as a placebo test. If our theoretical framework is correct, we should not see a positive relationship between ALEC membership and pro-sanctuary bill introductions.

We begin with an analysis of whether ALEC influences the introduction of anti-sanctuary city bills in 2017, as this assessment provides the basis for a test of hypotheses three and four. Again, to provide support for our theory of policy diffusion within the ALEC network, we should expect to see a positive relationship between our measure of ALEC influence – which is a count of ALEC legislators in the state – and the introduction of anti-sanctuary

19. We think the pro and anti sanctuary models are theoretically more sensible to a pro-anti (ratio model). In most cases, it seems that the process to introduce an anti-sanctuary bill is discrete from the introduction of a pro-sanctuary bill, given legislator motivations and district characteristics. However, we do estimate a pro-anti model, which we present in Table 4 in the appendix. Our substantive results vis-à-vis our ALEC findings remain unchanged.

legislation, controlling for model covariates.²⁰

Figure 8, reports the simulated rope-ladder coefficients for our negative binomial model estimates. The variable, “Number of ALEC legislators” is positive and statistically significant ($p < .05$), which is the outcome supportive of our theoretical framework. Along with Percent Latino 2015, Percent Trump, Legislative Professionalism, and Divided Government, Number of ALEC legislators is statistically significant and positively associated with the introduction of anti-sanctuary bills at the state level. These findings are supportive of hypothesis three, and consistent with sustained organizational influence model of policy diffusion within the organization network. Figure 9 provides a more detailed account of ALEC’s influence. The plot presents simulations of ALEC legislator count by state, holding all other covariates at their means so that we can identify the first-difference influence of this variable on the predicted count of anti-sanctuary bills in a state. As demonstrated in the graphic, moving from minimum to maximum on the range of ALEC legislator count, the number of expected anti-sanctuary bills introduced increases by over two bills.

[INSERT FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE]

[INSERT FIGURE 9 ABOUT HERE]

As a robustness check, we estimated a separate model treating the dependent variable as 1=positive sanctuary bill, 0 = not positive sanctuary bill. Our theory could be called into question if ALEC membership in a state also correlated with that state’s likelihood of introducing pro-sanctuary legislation. The coefficient for “Number of ALEC legislators” in column 2 is negative but not statistically significant. This suggests that ALEC (as measured

20. We also did a count of all anti-sanctuary bills introduced in 2017 that were from ALEC-affiliated legislators. ALEC-affiliated legislators introduced 39% of all anti-sanctuary bills in the 2017 cycle, which further demonstrates ALEC’s influence in this year, even when Trump made the issue a national one. Furthermore, using the Wordfish scaling algorithm we scaled our corpus of introduced bills, with 0 mean and unit variance (Slapin and Proksch 2008). Bills scoring negative on this measure are considered more hostile than the average bill whereas bills scoring positive are less hostile than the average bill. Among all anti-sanctuary proposed bills, ALEC-affiliated members introduced bills that were statistically significantly more hostile than did non-ALEC legislators (almost all Republican). The mean ALEC legislator-sponsored bill is -0.58, whereas the mean non-ALEC bill scores a 0.126 on sanctuary Wordfish scale, a difference that is statistically significant ($t = 3.41, p - val < 0.01$)

by the number of ALEC-affiliated state legislators by state in 2017) does not exude any impact on the introduction of pro-sanctuary legislation in the states in 2017, which is of course a finding consistent with our theoretical framework and supportive of hypothesis four.

Finally, we note that these findings are especially impressive when we consider all the covariates included in the model. In our main model (predicting anti-sanctuary legislation in 2017, Table 2, column 1), consistent with existing research on immigration policy (i.e., Ybarra, Sanchez, and Sanchez (2016), Chavez and Provine (2009)), we find effects for divided government and legislative professionalism, and percent Trump is nearing statistical significance. States that are systematically more competitive, have professional legislatures, and who backed Trump, are generally more likely to also see a greater share of anti-sanctuary bill introductions.

Furthermore, Table 5 in the appendix includes other measures of ethnic influence (percent foreign born, delta foreign-born, Percent Latino foreign-born non-citizen (the closest proxy for undocumented), and its delta) that may uniquely influence anti and pro sanctuary city bill introduction. Despite the inclusion of these variables, the substantive findings for the influence of ALEC-affiliated legislators remains unchanged.

Discussion and Limitations

This paper presented and empirically evaluated an augmented model of policy diffusion, which we coin sustained organizational influence. Under this model, a sustained organization is well financed, stable, and covers a wide domain of issue areas.

Our results indicate that ALEC is influential in the introduction of anti-sanctuary legislation over the past seven years – specifically anti-sanctuary city legislation in 2017. This should be unsurprising when we consider that Gary L Anderson and Donchik (2016) showed how successful ALEC has been in pushing for privatized education legislation in the states.

First, through quantitative text analysis, we demonstrated that ALEC's model legislation often served as the basis for anti-sanctuary legislation in the U.S. states over the past several years. This is fitting with a policy diffusion model of sustained organizational influence where an super interest-group like ALEC formulates legislation which then diffuses around the states.

Second, we demonstrated that, controlling for a host of influential model covariates, a count of ALEC-affiliated legislators by state is predictive of anti-sanctuary legislation in 2017, but not of pro-sanctuary legislation in the same year. Again, this is supportive of a sustained organizational model of policy diffusion because ALEC as an organization is well financed, been around a long time, and focuses on a panoply of issues. However, 2017 was such a banner year for such anti-sanctuary city legislation, states may increasingly take up the issue. Assuming this is the case, future research should therefore employ a more traditional event history policy diffusion analysis, where the dependent variable is the enactment of similar sanctuary legislation, with key geographic indicators included.

While we noted this in our theory and hypotheses sections, given data limitations, future research should expand our analysis beyond ALEC to include other interest groups/advocacy coalitions/policy entrepreneurs (e.g., Common Cause, NRA) in a manner similar to Phinney (2016). However, to employ our methods, these other organizations should also produce model legislation. This should assess whether ALEC's influence is indeed significantly different from that of other interest groups in terms of ALEC's effectiveness and ability to generate policy diffusion. Rather, this paper served as an initial test-case of our theoretical framework.

In addition, future research should investigate the whether this sustained organizational model applies to other issues that ALEC focuses on. If ALEC is successful at influencing bill introductions on immigration-related issues, but not in other issues, our theory of sustained organizational influence might be falsified. However, if scholars repeat these findings with voter id laws, hold your ground laws, and other areas of interest to ALEC, then we may

discover further support for a broader model of policy diffusion.

Finally, research should consider tracking these dynamics into the future – especially in light of continued racial and ethnic diversification. Will more sanctuary bills be introduced, and laws passed, in 2018 and throughout Trump’s presidency, or was the suite of 2017 introductions a flash-point of legislative activity? While we cannot say for sure, increasingly, legislatures will diversify, and so it seems that how states’ white populations respond to demographic change will determine both sanctuary policy proposals and immigration policies more generally. It remains an open question how the political dynamics of this emerging issue – which cuts across local, state, and federal jurisdictions – will play out.

Conclusion

In conclusion, while interest groups have long influenced public policy, and indeed serve as the basis for one of the main theories of democratic representation, relatively little work has examined how interest groups influence policy diffusion in the U.S. states. While interest groups may theoretically promote better government by ensuring various factions in society are represented, democracy is undoubtedly damaged when such lobbying and influence pedal in secrecy.

A growing body of evidence documents how a relatively secret interest group such as ALEC is playing an out-sized role in the production of public policy around the United States, often to the advantage of private interest organizations and to the detriment of specific racial/ethnic groups (e.g., anti-sanctuary city legislation). ALEC is so effective precisely because of its organizational structure, that, in part, lets legislators and corporate interests cooperate while avoiding claims of collusion. The relationship is mutually beneficial which further strengthens ALEC’s influence. However, after the ALEC-exposed dump, and subsequent analyses of its bills and apparent influence, scholars are beginning to reassess the role that private interest groups play in the development and diffusion of public policy. We

hope other scholars will advance our work on sustained organizational influence.

Tables

Table 1: Characteristics and outcomes of competing models/theories of state policy diffusion

Component Characteristics (example -- >)	Description	Policy Diffusion Models			
		Policy Entrepreneurs (Kris Kobach)	Interest Groups/Lobbyists (K-Street)	Advocacy Coalition ²¹ (Labor movement)	Sustaining Organizations ²² (ALEC)
Resources	Money, expertise, number of supporters, think tank nature	Sometimes	Sometimes	Sometimes	x
Members hold shared belief systems	Organization supports policies on right or left, respectively	-	-	x	x
Low legislator information costs	Centralized, known by legislators, creates model legislation	-	x	x	x
Long-term	Organization existed for 10 years or more ²³	Sometimes	Sometimes	x	x
Multi-Issue	E.G.: health care, immigration, prisons, taxes	Sometimes	-	-	x
Legislator Perks	Campaign donations, lavish conferences, easy membership, financial benefit from law change, etc.	-	x	-	x
Outcomes					
Issue Amount	Diffusion Lots of bills introduced/passed in state legislatures fitting goals of organization	Varies	Varies	Large	Large
Diffusion Scope	Effects exist across the full policy spectrum	Varies	Varies	Small	Broad

21. Here we interchange advocacy coalition with policy networks framework

22. We do not include modality framework in this table given its relative lack of theoretical and empirical testing.

23. This number is admittedly somewhat arbitrary, but is the standard employed by Sabatier and his collaborators. We expand in the text on this point further.

Figures

Figure 1: Frequency of bill introductions related to sanctuary cities/movements over time




Figure 2: Bills most related to ALEC-sponsored model legislation “No Sanctuary of Illegal Immigrants Act”




Figure 3: Bills most related to ALEC-sponsored model legislation “No Sanctuary of Illegal Immigrants Act”, introduced in 2017.




Figure 4: Distribution of anti-sanctuary legislation across the U.S. states, 2017

Anti-Sanctuary City Bill Introduction 2017




Figure 5: **Distribution of pro-sanctuary legislation across the U.S. states, 2017**

Pro-Sanctuary City Bill Introduction 2017




Figure 6: Distribution of ALEC membership across the U.S. states, 2017




Figure 7: Sanctuary city locations through 2014, Source: NILC




Figure 8: Standardized predictors of anti-sanctuary city bill introductions within U.S. state legislatures, 2017




Figure 9: Simulated predicted probability impact of the count of ALEC-affiliated legislators per state and the likelihood of anti-sanctuary bill introductions in that state, 2017. Simulation controls for divided government, state competition, legislative professionalism, percent Trump, percent Latino, percent Latino growth, sanctuary city count, violent crime rate, household income, unemployment rate, and public opinion immigration.





Figure 10: Standardized predictors of pro-sanctuary city bill introductions within U.S. state legislatures, 2017



Appendix

Below we list the title and some excerpts of a few anti and pro bills from 2017.

Anti-Sanctuary

California SJR 4

“Harboring violent criminals protected by the line 29 policies of sanctuary cities has contributed to the problem of many line 30 citizens of the United States suffering great bodily harm, including line 31 death.”

Rhode Island H 5394

“This act would require the division of sheriffs to verify the immigration status of each incarcerated person presented to the court for any hearing, to notify ICE as to any such person lacking legal immigration status, and to cooperate with ICE relative to any deportation proceedings regarding any such individual.”

Pro-Sanctuary

Vermont HJR 2

“Joint resolution commending Vermont municipalities that have adopted or are considering adopting sanctuary status.”

California SR 22

“The Trump administration has justified its vast expansion of those targeted for deportation by falsely portraying the United States as a country under siege by a flood of undocumented immigrants who threaten public safety, giving rise to anti-immigrant fervor and a nativist desire to preserve our nation’s historically dominant Euro-Christian culture.”

WCopyFind settings:

- Shortest Phrase to Match: 8
- Fewest Matches to Report: 0
- Ignore Punctuation: Yes
- Ignore Outer Punctuation: Yes
- Ignore Numbers: Yes
- Ignore Letter Case: Yes
- Skip Non-Words: Yes
- Skip Words Longer Than 20 Characters: Yes
- Most Imperfections to Allow: 9
- Minimum % of Matching Words: 75

Public Opinion Anti-immigrant Sentiment. 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Studies (CCES)

We summed up yes/no responses to four items inquiring about immigration policy. The base question asks: “What do you think the U.S. government should do about immigration?” Each item is dummied yes (1=anti-immigrant position) or no (0 = pro-immigration position), aggregated, then divided by 4, for a scale ranging from 0-1 (pro-immigrant to anti-immigrant). We then take the mean score for each state as our measure of anti-immigrant sentiment. The items are below:

- Grant legal status to all illegal immigrants who have held jobs and paid taxes for at least 3 years, and not been convicted of any felony crimes (1=no, 0=yes)
- Increase the number of border patrols on the U.S.-Mexican border (0=no, 1=yes)
- Grant legal status to people who were brought to the US illegally as children, but who have graduated from a U.S. high school (1=no, 0=yes)
- Identify and deport illegal immigrants (0=no, 1=yes)

Table 2: Predictors of Count of sanctuary city bill introduction in state legislatures, 2017

	Sanctuary Bill Count	
	Anti (1)	Pro (2)
ALEC Legislator Count	0.030** (0.013)	-0.016 (0.027)
Percent Trump 2016	0.044 (0.033)	-0.110** (0.055)
Public Opinion: Anti-Immigration Attitudes	-0.637 (8.014)	13.993 (11.558)
Percent Latino 2015	0.034 (0.022)	0.005 (0.025)
Delta Percent Latino	0.004 (0.007)	-0.019* (0.010)
Sanctuary Cities/Population (logged)	0.014 (0.105)	-0.063 (0.167)
Log HH Median Income 2015	0.233 (1.376)	1.996 (1.375)
Pct. Adult Unemployment Rate 2015	0.067 (0.200)	0.269 (0.260)
Violent Crime Rate 2014	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.002)
Divided State Gov't	0.719* (0.376)	0.885** (0.445)
State Competition: Modified Ranney Index	0.010 (0.009)	0.002 (0.013)
Legislative Professionalism	2.013* (1.204)	0.033 (1.176)
Constant	-6.276 (16.988)	-24.081 (15.860)
Observations	50	50
Log Likelihood	-82.759	-49.058
θ	3.894 (2.596)	28.407 (96.294)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	191.517	124.116
Pseudo R2	0.095	0.314
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table 3: Predictors of Count of sanctuary city bill introduction in state legislatures, 2017 (Poisson Model)

	Sanctuary Bill Count	
	Anti (1)	Pro (2)
ALEC Legislator Count	0.028*** (0.010)	-0.016 (0.026)
Percent Trump 2016	0.060** (0.028)	-0.111** (0.055)
Public Opinion: Anti-Immigration Attitudes	-3.916 (6.714)	14.913 (11.355)
Percent Latino 2015	0.043** (0.018)	0.004 (0.024)
Delta Percent Latino	0.005 (0.006)	-0.019** (0.009)
Sanctuary Cities/Population (logged)	0.016 (0.082)	-0.069 (0.165)
Log HH Median Income 2015	0.458 (1.123)	2.019 (1.319)
Pct. Adult Unemployment Rate 2015	0.039 (0.162)	0.293 (0.250)
Violent Crime Rate 2014	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.002)
Divided State Gov't	0.649** (0.306)	0.876** (0.432)
State Competition: Modified Ranney Index	0.013 (0.008)	0.003 (0.013)
Legislative Professionalism	1.878* (0.990)	-0.030 (1.140)
Constant	-8.088 (13.904)	-24.779 (15.104)
Observations	50	50
Log Likelihood	-83.820	-48.088
Akaike Inf. Crit.	193.641	122.176
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table 4: Predictors of pro minus anti sanctuary city bill introductions in state legislatures, 2017 (“Ratio” Model, OLS)

	Sanctuary Bill Count
	Pro - Anti
ALEC Legislator Count	-0.103** (0.044)
Percent Trump 2016	-0.095 (0.083)
Public Opinion: Anti-Immigration Attitudes	14.777 (22.351)
Percent Latino 2015	0.010 (0.070)
Delta Percent Latino	-0.004 (0.020)
Sanctuary Cities/Population (logged)	-0.032 (0.341)
Log HH Median Income 2015	2.522 (4.188)
Pct. Adult Unemployment Rate 2015	0.431 (0.605)
Violent Crime Rate 2014	0.001 (0.004)
Divided State Gov't	-0.068 (1.107)
State Competition: Modified Ranney Index	-0.029 (0.024)
Legislative Professionalism	0.082 (3.759)
Constant	-28.946 (51.638)
Observations	50
R ²	0.356
Adjusted R ²	0.147
Residual Std. Error	2.873 (df = 37)
F Statistic	1.704 (df = 12; 37)
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 5: Predictors of Count of sanctuary city bill introduction in state legislatures, 2017 (Augmented Ethnicity Model)

	Sanctuary Bill Count	
	Anti	pro_count_17 Pro
	(1)	(2)
ALEC Legislator Count	0.024** (0.012)	0.003 (0.030)
Percent Trump 2016	0.015 (0.044)	-0.215* (0.127)
Public Opinion: Anti-Immigration Attitudes	3.344 (9.056)	11.107 (19.027)
Percent Latino 2015	-0.040 (0.043)	-0.126 (0.077)
Delta Percent Latino	-0.014 (0.012)	-0.066* (0.037)
Percent Foreign-Born 2015	0.057 (0.074)	0.239** (0.097)
Delta Foreign-Born	0.032* (0.019)	0.070 (0.043)
Percent Latino Foreign-Born Non-Citizen 2015	0.261 (0.237)	0.527 (0.398)
Delta Latino Foreign-Born Non-Citizen	-0.001 (0.004)	0.013 (0.013)
Sanctuary Cities/Population (logged)	0.019 (0.095)	0.068 (0.163)
Log HH Median Income 2015	-1.794 (1.901)	-7.310** (3.662)
Pct. Adult Unemployment Rate 2015	-0.161 (0.203)	-0.298 (0.315)
Violent Crime Rate 2014	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.005* (0.003)
Divided State Gov't	0.824** (0.378)	1.765*** (0.586)
State Competition: Modified Ranney Index	0.014 (0.009)	0.001 (0.014)
Legislative Professionalism	1.405 (1.327)	-3.231* (1.867)
Constant	16.157 (22.417)	85.333** (41.574)
Observations	50	50
Log Likelihood	-78.872	-41.039
θ	8.470 (8.942)	4,620.347 (38,131.590)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	191.745	116.078

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

	Min	Max	Median	Mean	S.D.
Anti-Sanctuary Count	0.00	12.00	2.00	1.78	2.12
Pro Sanctuary Count	0.00	11.00	0.00	1.20	2.25
Divided State Gov't	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.34	0.48
State Competition: Modified Ranney Index	3.00	98.24	71.91	64.78	22.88
Legislative Professionalism	0.06	0.90	0.24	0.26	0.15
Percent Trump 2016	30.00	68.60	48.85	49.31	10.22
Number of ALEC Legislators	1.00	42.00	14.00	15.72	10.59
Percent Latino 2015	1.40	47.40	8.75	11.22	10.16
Delta Percent Latino	12.62	146.09	75.18	75.14	36.41
Sanctuary Cities/Population (logged)	-4.89	0.00	0.00	-1.48	1.77
Violent Crime Rate 2014	99.27	635.78	325.11	346.81	128.82
Log HH Median Income 2015	36851.00	68854.00	48332.50	49755.06	8060.36
Pct. Adult Unemployment Rate 2015	2.00	6.70	5.00	4.80	0.97
Public Opinion: Anti-Immigration Attitudes	0.41	0.58	0.47	0.48	0.04
Percent Foreign-Born 2015	1.53	27.04	6.76	8.96	6.09
Delta Foreign-Born	1.21	75.39	34.78	36.58	20.95
Percent Latino Foreign-Born Non-Citizen 2015	0.10	9.20	2.00	2.51	2.13
Delta Latino Foreign-Born Non-Citizen	-16.90	200.00	47.22	57.05	50.16

Table 6: Summary Statistics

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